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ABSTRACT 
This anthropological study of two Kyrgyz communities in Afghanistan's Parnir 
Mountains examines the changing nature of political leadership in Afghan Kyrgyz 
society over the past forty years. The research was conducted during nineteen months 
spent in Afghanistan, between 2006 and 2010, including twelve months of ethnographic 
fieldwork and participant observation among the Kyrgyz in both the Great and Little 
Pamirs. Data were collected on Kyrgyz history, demography, pastoral production 
strategies and market access-as well as, most importantly, the political strategies of 
various Kyrgyz leaders. 
Given the predominately rural nature of Afghanistan and the limited reach and 
influence of formal government structures, informal leadership constitutes the primary 
form of governance experienced by most Afghans. Far from being a timeless or static 
process, access to positions to leadership has been and remains opportunistic and 
dynamic, demonstrating considerable adaptability to changing social, economic, and 
political conditions. This study considers informal leadership in Afghan Kyrgyz society 
over four periods: pre-April 1978; the Saur Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan war (1978-
1989); the mujahideen conquest, the civil war, and the war against the Taliban (1989-
2001); and the post-Talibanperiod (2001-2012). 
Kyrgyz population transfers, the Soviet occupation of the Pamirs, mujahideen 
rule, and post-Tali ban state-building efforts in Afghanistan have had far-reaching effects 
upon Kyrgyz politics, primarily by reconstituting access to political capital. In contrast to 
the pre-1978 period, when it was derived mostly from pastoral wealth, political capital 
has been increasingly accumulated through the process of extracting and redistributing 
exogenous resources, via patron-client networks, by Kyrgyz leaders seeking to establish, 
maintain, legitimize or contest political authority. Situating both the Great and Little 
Pamir, as well as the Afghan state, in recent historical context, this dissertation explains 
the various social and economic factors that account for the development of three 
different types of political leadership-the khan, the wakil, and the CDCs-all of which, 
though, retain the same goal: extracting patronage to accumulate political capital and 
legitimacy. It concludes by noting recent significant events which have occurred in both 
Pamirs, changes which are illustrative of Kyrgyz politics and which will greatly affect the 
future ofthis community. 
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"Descending from the hidden 'Roof of the World', its waters tell of 
forgotten peoples, and whisper secrets of unknown lands." 
George N. Curzon, The Pamirs and the Source of the Oxus (1896) 
"To try conclusions with the winter snows on 'the Roof of the World' was 
just what tempted me." 
Sven Hedin, My Life as an Explorer (1925) 
"You cannot stay on the summit forever, you have to go down again- so 
why bother in the first place? Just this: What is above knows what is 
below but what is below does not know what is above. One climbs, one 
sees. One descends, one sees no longer, but one has seen. There is an art 
of conducting oneself in the lower regions by the memory of what one saw 
higher up. When one can no longer see, one can at least know." 
Rene Daumal, Mount Analogue (1968) 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
Because the regiOn with which this dissertation is concerned spans several 
countries, each with its own language, script, and, in some cases, calendar, the coherent 
rendering of dates, place-names, and the transliteration of non-English words presents a 
significant difficulty. In an effort to maintain consistency and for the benefit of non-
specialists, I employ the following standardizations: 
All dates are according to the Gregorian calendar, either BCE (Before the 
Common Era) or CE (Common Era). I have generally tried to avoid alternate calendrical 
reckonings (e.g., Anno Hijra, AH, or AP-Anno Per sica-referring to the Persian Solar 
Hejri calendar) or double dating. In those instances when I quote a source that uses an 
alternate reckoning, I have provided the common-era equivalent in parentheses. 
When multiple names exist for a place (e.g., Transoxiana, Mawarannahr) or a 
people (e.g., Jungars, Oirats, Kalmyks), I have selected the more common and 
recognizable rendering and used it consistently except where a source being quoted has 
used a different form. In such cases, I have included the "standardized" term in brackets 
at the first appearance of the "alternate" term. 
I have not transliterated foreign words that have a commonly recognized English 
rendering (e.g., Joseph Stalin, Badakhshan). For other foreign words, I use the following 
systems: 
Russian: Library of Congress system (without diacriticals) 
Chinese: Hanyu Pinyin 
xvm 
Arabic and Persian: All Arabic and Persian words found in an unabridged 
dictionary (ulema, Sunni, madrasa) have been treated as English words, that is, without 
italics or diacriticals, unless the word occurs in a quotation, in which case the author's 
rendering has been left intact, including diacriticals, and italicized. All other Arabic and 
Persian words have been transliterated without diacriticals but italicized. 
Kyrgyz: Kyrgyz, as written in the Kyrgyz Republic, has an alphabet of 34 letters 
(and two characters, band h, indicating hard and soft sounds, respectively), based on the 
Russian Cyrillic alphabet. There are three letters specific to Kyrgyz not found in Russian: 
H; (ng), e (o), y (ti). Additionally, certain Cyrillic letters are only found in Russian loan-
words, which are rarely, if ever, used by the Afghan Kyrgyz: <l>, u;, III:, b, h, 10 (though 
these sounds occur in loan-words from Dari and Wakhi). 
As there is not one commonly accepted system of transliterating Kyrgyz to 
English, I have opted to use a modified form of the American Library Association-
Library of Congress (ALA-LC) system, which is similar to the romanization system used 
by the Kyrgyz Republic. 
The transliteration system I employ for Kyrgyz is not perfect, since it fails to 
discriminate between potential sound combinations involving the letters a (transliterated 
as ya) and hi+ a (also transliterated as ya), as well as e (transliterated as yo) and hi+ o 
(also transliterated as yo). For example, the word for "foot" or "leg," ayak, could have, 
based on the above system used in this work, two possible Kyrgyz written forms, aJIK 
(correct) or abiaK (incorrect). Similarly, the word for "rabbit," koyon, could be written as 
KoeH (correct) or KOhiOH (incorrect). 
XIX 
Kyrgyz English Kyrgyz English 
A, a A, a IT, II P,p 
:0,6 B, b/W, w P, p R,r 
B,B V,v C, c S,s 
r, r G,g T,T T, t 
,[(, ,[( D,d Y,y U,u 
E,e E,e Y,y D,u 
e yo <P, <l> F,f 
)1(, )!( J,j X, x Kh,kh 
3, 3 Z,z u:, I( Ts, ts 
H,H I, i l.J, 'I Ch,ch 
H, if I,r Ill, ill Sh, sh 
K,K K, k m, m Shch, shch 
n, n L, 1 1> " 
M,M M,m bl, bl Y, y 
H,H N,n b ' 
H;, H; Ng,ng 3,3 E,e 
O,o O,o IO, 10 Yu,yu 
e,e 0,6 5[, H Ya,ya 
Additionally, several Kyrgyz letters represent multiple sounds and/or change 
sound depending on where they occur in a word, or in relation to adjacent letters: 
li: Can represent the sounds "b" or "w." E also is pronounced as "v" when is 
occurs after JI or p, or when it occurs before back vowels (a, I>I, o, y), but its written form 
does not change. 
r: Pronounced as a hard "g" unless it is followed by a back vowel (a, I>I, o, y), in 
which case it is pronounced as "gh." The written form does not change. 
XX 
K: The Afghan Kyrgyz often pronounce K (in standard Kyrgyz, a hard "k," and 
found in a dictionary as such) as "kh," which phonetically would be written as x. To 
maintain consistency in transliteration, I have used the dictionary form of the word, even 
though it might not approximate the sound. Hence, KOPYK ("reserve, preserve") is 
pronounced by the Afghan Kyrgyz as xopJK but will be transliterated as KOpJK, since 
xopJK will not be found in any Kyrgyz-language dictionary. Similarly, Kapbi ("old"), 
though pronounced as xapbi, will nonetheless be written as Kapbi. Also, under certain 
conditions, the letter K is pronounced as "g," though still written as K (which is followed 
here). However, when followed by a possessive suffix beginning with a vowel, K changes 
to r in both writing and pronunciation. 
IT: Shifts to 6 in writing and "v" in pronunciation when followed by a suffix 
beginning with a vowel. For example, )1(0011 ("answer") becomes )I(006)'M ("my 
answer"). Though it is pronounced asjoovum, for consistency (and following the 
grammatical rule), I transliterate it asjoobum. 
I employ this transliteration system both forwards (romanizing Kyrgyz) and 
backwards (transliterating from English to Kyrgyz). Hence, rather than rendering it as 
Qirghiz (from the Persian..)C .)) or the French Orientalist Kirghiz, I have opted for the 
"official" romanization-Kyrgyz-based the written form KI.Iprnl3. 
One problem (for the researcher) with the Kyrgyz language having assimilated 
Persian (and Arabic) words is that, just like Russian loan-words, they often violate the 
Kyrgyz grammatical principle of vowel harmony. Kyrgyz has eight vowels, divided into 
XXI 
front (or soft) vowels (pronounced in the front of the mouth) and back (or hard) vowels 
(pronounced in the back of the mouth). 
Back Vowels Front Vowels 




Vowel harmony simply means that all the vowels in a given word should be of the 
same type-back vowels with back vowels and front vowels with fi.·ont vowels. If a word 
violates this rule, then it is likely to be a loan-word. For example, the words for 
vegetable, sabzi ( ca63H) and fruit, mewa (Me6a), violate vowel harmony, as both are 
derived from Persian. 
For plurals, there are 12 variants (lar, ler, lor, lOr; dar, der, dor, dor; tar, ter, tor, 
tor) in Kyrgyz, depending on the final letter of the word (non-pluralized, singular form) 
as well as according to the rules of vowel harmony. Unless I am quoting a source in 
which the plural form occurs, I simply add "s" to the singular form. For example, I would 
refer to valleys (singular:jy/ga) as ''jylgas" rather than ''jylgalar". 
Finally, the dialect of Kyrgyz spoken in the Afghan Pamir I will refer to as the 
"Pamir" dialect, as it is essentially the same as that spoken across the border in the Tajik 
Pamir. The Pamir dialect is similar to southern Kyrgyz in pronounciation (in contrast to 
northern Kyrgyz, spoken in Bishkek and around Y ssyk Kol) but the major difference 
between the Tajik and Afghan variants concerns the influence of loan-words: Russian in 
the case of the fmmer, Persian (Dari) in the latter. 
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INTRODUCTION: VOLTAIRE'S CHALLENGE 
If you have nothing to tell us, but that on the banks of the Oxus and the 
J axartes, one barbarian has been succeeded by another barbarian, in what 
respect do you benefit the public? 
Voltaire, A Philosophical Dictionary (1824) 
This is the story of how one Kyrgyz "barbarian" succeeded another Kyrgyz 
"barbarian" along the headwaters of the Oxus. However, while highlighting individuals, 
it is really the story of how the arena in which those "barbarians" competed for political 
authority changed and how, in response to a different playing field, those who aspired to 
lead modified their approaches to establishing, consolidating, legitimizing, and 
maintaining their authority. In telling their story, this work seeks to answer a seemingly 
simple question: what is the source, or sources, of political authority and legitimacy in 
Afghan Kyrgyz society? 
Voltaire's quote seems to capture the trajectory of twentieth century 
anthropology, as interest shifted away from whatever might be happening along the 
"banks of the Oxus and Jaxartes" toward much broader topics, such as the role of the 
state. Many contemporary perspectives on "local" politics have emphasized the 
hegemony of the state, whether in terms of language, symbolism, or power, to enumerate 
just a few of the more common anthropological approaches toward understanding the 
relationship between the "formal" state and the "informal" politics of its citizens. From 
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such a lofty v1ew, the actors on the receiVmg end of the state appear fated to be 
encapsulated or co-opted by it, though they may deploy a number of "weapons of the 
weak" along the way in the "prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and 
those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them" (Scott, 
1987: 29). 
In contrast, this study takes individual and collective agency as prima facie. In 
part, this is simply a function of political geography: many states, including the modem 
Afghan one, are unwilling or incapable of projecting power into their most remote, 
unpopulated, marginal, and barely remembered-much less governed-areas, such as the 
Afghan Pamirs. The state' s inability or unwillingness to directly administer these 
interstitial places permits a degree of political autonomy, leaving many aspects of 
governance-leadership, succession, dispute resolution, resource allocation, etc.-to be 
determined by the local community. Typically considered "local" or "informal" politics, 
this type of governance is sometimes contrasted with the "formal" politics of the 
bureaucratic state as an atavistic form of political organization (Wong, 201 0). But rather 
than some zero-sum competition between tradition and modernity, the relationship 
between formal-informal (or state and non-state) politics reflects a complex interaction of 
internal and external factors. 
In the broadest outline, the argument that I make here is theoretically informed by 
previous studies of Central Asian pastoral nomadic political organization, which 
recognized that "hierarchical political institutions are generated only by external relations 
with state societies and never develop purely as a result of internal dynamics of such 
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societies" (Irons, 1979: 362). Thomas Barfield's seminal1 work, "The Perilous Frontier: 
Nomadic Empires and China, 221 B.C. to AD 1757" (1992), provides a model for 
studying the relationship between states and non-state, mobile pastoralist societies, based 
on the idea that "The creation of a tribal confederacy was a means by which tribes 
confronted the threats posed by sedentary states. In general, the degree of centralization 
of tribal confederations was correlated with the power of the states they faced" (Barfield, 
2002: 66). The raison d'etre of Central Asian nomadic confederations was to exploit the 
Chinese state, harnessing their military potential in the steppe equivalent of Ben 
Franklin's aphorism that "We must, indeed, all hang together, or most assuredly we shall 
all hang separately." Largesse extracted from the Chinese state in the face of this unity 
allowed the nomadic chieftain to maintain his confederation, by rewarding supporters 
who, for their part, understood such patronage to be the fruit of collective, not individual, 
action. As Barfield notes, "If egalitarian tribal groups were bound together by 'asabiya 
[group feeling], hierarchical Turko-Mongolian polities were bound together by their 
ability to distribute benefits" (20 10: 87). 
While the Afghan Kyrgyz certainly pose no martial threat to any aspect of the 
Afghan state, their political organization is guided by the same rent-seeking behavior and 
held together by the same centripetal logic of patronage. Kyrgyz extraction from the state 
is also backed by implicit threats, most notably that of emigrating from Afghanistan, 
which would pose a number of problems for the Afghan government. And, despite 
1 I call it "seminal" because Barfield's was one of the first, and most successful, attempts to apply a 
sociological lens to Inner Asian history rather than viewing it through the hitherto traditional lenses. The 
first of these, following Arnold Toynbee, can be considered the "one damned thing after another" approach. 
The second, and the focus of Barfield's critique, was an over-emphasis on internal socio-political processes 
among Central Asian nomads. 
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numerous differences, the Kyrgyz, like their nomadic forebears described by Barfield, 
have a political system in excess of that required to maintain internal order and deal with 
the exigencies of animal husbandry. 
While Barfield's model provides the scaffolding, the contentions I make here are 
all ethnographically informed by my own fieldwork (2006-08, 2010) in addition to 
drawing from earlier ethnographies based on field research conducted among the Afghan 
Kyrgyz during the 1970s.2 As a work of political anthropology, the events and processes 
described herein provide not just the continuation of earlier ethnographic research but 
also serve to juxtapose the bucolic image of a timeless, unchanging way of life-nomadic 
pastoralism-with the reality of a dynamic and opportunistic system of politics. 
Accordingly, I privilege neither endogenous nor exogenous factors but attempt to give 
equal weight to both in an effort to highlight how one affects the other and vice versa. 
My argument, then, is this: Political capital in Kyrgyz society no longer derives 
from pastoral capital but instead accrues from political patronage. As the avenues to 
political leadership have changed over the past 40 years, in response to both internal and 
external events and processes, both established leaders and those who aspire to 
leadership-the former to maintain their position of authority and the latter to wrest it, or 
a portion of it, from the other-have had to modify their tactics and strategies 
accordingly. While a ,number of qualities and prerequisites remain de rigueur for any 
leader-wisdom, generosity, piety, cunning-the basic political capitat3 of Kyrgyz 
society has changed. Previously there were internal structural constraints, owing to an 
2 Dor (1975, 1980), Dor and Naumann (1978), and Shahrani (1977, 2002). 
3 In Pierre Bourdieu's sense of"political capital" as " interconvertible" with other forms of capital, such as 
economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital (cf. Casey, 2008). 
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extreme degree of economic stratification, which militated in favor of political authority 
being vested among a small, wealthy elite. The majority of the Kyrgyz's pastoral capital 
was controlled by this elite, and in particular by one family, that of the khan, Hajji 
Rahman Kul. Largely through the pervasiveness of patron-client relations based on a 
livestock loaning system called amanat, Rahman Kul was able to convert his pastoral 
capital into political capital. Today Kyrgyz society is much more economically 
egalitarian and this is reflected in a more open, competitive political system, 
characterized by opportunistic, transactional behavior rather than structural factors like 
amanat-based clientelism. But how, in this new system, are positions of political 
leadership achieved, not to mention legitimized, maintained, and contested? 
The simple answer is that patronage still determines political authority, though 
now at one remove from the leader and his supporters, and is no longer based on amanat. 
The outside resour~es that a leader (or aspirant) can mobilize are more important in the 
context of political authority than whatever domestic (mostly livestock) resources he 
already possesses. Of course, these two processes are linked: without any domestic 
support, a leader is unlikely to find any external resources to mobilize in the frrst place. 
And, without a doubt, a certain measure of wealth is still a prerequisite, if only to meet 
the hospitality obligations incumbent on any leader. There is as yet no Kyrgyz equivalent 
of Dennis Kucinich. 4 
The Kyrgyz have a two-track political system, one focused on maintaining 
internal order and the other existing to deal with external affairs. Of course, there is as 
4 Kuchinich, the perennial long-shot presidential candidate, has one of the lowest net worths of any member 
of Congress. In the 2008 presidential campaign, the wealthiest candidate, Mitt Romney, had 944 times the 
worth of Kuchinch. 
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much complementarity as contrast between these two tracks, not least smce both 
responsibilities have traditionally been vested (at the higher political levels) in the same 
person-the khan. But while every Kyrgyz "politician" had some part to play in domestic 
affairs, not everyone was as involved, or involved at all, in managing external affairs. 
Since 2001, the opposite has become increasingly true: with the re-establishment of the 
Afghan state, the khan's importance in domestic affairs has diminished, as the 
administrative rudiments of state control have taken root in the Pamir. At the same time, 
his external representation of the Kyrgyz community, especially in Kabul, has become 
more important. So, heuristically as well as practically, it makes sense to treat the two 
political tracks separately. 
The Kyrgyz khan represents the community to the outside world and is assumed 
by outsiders to enjoy a measure of popular backing, as well as influence (if not authority 
or outright power) over his constituency. For example, the current Kyrgyz khan's 
letterhead and seal states that he is the "Chief of the Tribes, Department of the Afghan 
Pamirs." It is this community support-implied or, here in the case of the letterhead, 
explicit-which comprises the leader's legitimacy, but in order to maintain it, his 
followers must realize some benefit as the price of their support. This is the cyclical 
process in which the modem Kyrgyz leader fmds himself enmeshed: he operates in a neo-
patrimonial state structure, where patronage is "the lubricant that makes the political 
system work" (Lewis, 2010: 47) and he therefore has to balance two sets of expectations, 
those of his patrons-usually the Mghan state and its officials, but also non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)-and those of his supporters. Failure to deliver on 
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either set of expectations constitutes a sharp, and possibly mortal, blow to his legitimacy, 
and thus his ability to lead. 
Combined with other factors, this is an inherently unstable system, predicated as it 
is on a constant inflow of exogenous resources to maintain its primary legitimacy. The 
Kyrgyz leader does not collect tax revenue or control productive capital but, like his 
nomadic predecessors, is instead engaged in a "seemingly endless pursuit of wealth [or 
other resources] to redistribute as political capital" (Barfield, 2010: 87). It is certainly less 
stable than the previous system under Hajji Rahman Kul, in which the Kyrgyz leader 
already possessed most of the resources (again, mostly livestock) he needed to ensure the 
support of his followers. Today, nearly all of the resources utilized by the khan to 
maximize his political capital, and thus his leadership and legitimacy, exist outside of his 
environment and are completely beyond his control. As a result, the entire patronage 
structure suffers from the possibility of sudden collapse. 
The Kyrgyz khanship, as an institution, falls firmly within the realm of informal 
politics. It is not bound by a formal set of rules delineating rights and responsibilities but 
rather derives its legitimacy from what the sociologist Max Weber called traditional 
authority or "the authority of the 'eternal yesterday'" (Weber, 1948: 78). As such, the 
khanship is more of a status than an office. While historically there have been a number 
of other informal leadership statuses in Kyrgyz society-manap, biz, akym, and others-
today there is just the khan and then, beneath him, a number of respected elders, called 
aksakals (literally, "white beards"). 
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While the khan (and, to a lesser degree, the aksakals) is invested with traditional 
authority, there are two other forms of formal leadership found in modern-day Afghan 
Kyrgyz society. One is an office possessed with what Weber termed "legal-rational 
authority." It is the position of wakil, or parliamentarian, and the holder of it, Hajji Turdi 
Akhun, is an appointee to the Meshrano Jirga or upper house of Parliament (also known 
as the Afghan Senate). This is a novel office only in the sense that no Kyrgyz has ever 
held a formal position in Afghanistan. 5 However, the functions of the Kyrgyz wakil are 
strikingly similar to that of the khan. In both cases, the leader is seen as .primus inter 
pares in the realm of domestic affairs, possessing greater authority than the aksakals but 
still unable to compel or otherwise exercise actual power. And, in both cases, the leader is 
conceived first and foremost as representing Kyrgyz interests beyond the Pamirs, 
primarily by extracting resources from external actors. While the vehicle (khan versus 
wakil) differs, the goal (patronage) is fundamentally the same. 
The other formal office, an elected position on one of the National Solidarity 
Program's (NSP) Community Development Councils (CDCs), does not fit neatly into any 
of Weber' s categories. In part, this is because it is a new program in the Pamir (elections 
were only held in 2008) and the Kyrgyz remain uncertain as to exactly how it should 
function, whether the CDCs should exist alongside existing political structures or serve as 
a replacement for them. Contributing to the ambiguity, the NSP is not designed, at least 
explicitly, to bestow political authority upon elected members of the CDCs. Initially, 
beginning in 2003, it was conceived of as a way to deliver development assistance to 
5 Hajji Rahman Kul Khan had been declared pasbaan-e Pamir ("protector of the Pamir") by the Afghan 
King, Zahir Shah, but this was not a formal position equivalent to parliamentary office. 
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remote areas and, not incidentally, more firmly tie them to the government, through 
which the international funding for the NSP would flow. It has since assumed a number 
of other functions, some overtly political in nature, such as "the strengthening of 
community level govemance"6 and dispute resolution. Regardless of the original intent 
behind the NSP, it was always destined to be political, especially among the Kyrgyz, 
since it involved the allocation and distribution of resources. 
While the Kyrgyz comprise a small community ofless than 1,200 people living in 
one of the remotest parts of Afghanistan-and in many respects they are not at all 
representative of the rest of Afghanistan-political leadership and its transformations in 
Kyrgyz society closely mirror processes occurring throughout other Afghan communities. 
So, while the Kyrgyz are in no sense "Afghanistan writ small," their experience does 
illustrate at least three general political trends common throughout Afghanistan. 
First, the Kyrgyz are adapting to the neo-patrimonial orientation of local politics 
in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Unlike a patronage system, in which followers are rewarded 
materially for their support, or a patrimonial system, in which both power and resources 
emanate from the leader, neo-patrimonialism combines Weber's concepts of leader-
centric patrimonialism with legal-rational bureaucracy: 
Neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven, 
types of domination: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic 
domination. Under patrirnonialism, all power relations between ruler and 
ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; 
there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm. 
However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and 
the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference 
can be made to this distinction. Neopatrimonial rule takes place within the 
6 NSP website: http://www.nspafghanistan.org/ 
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framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or 
'modem' stateness. (Erdmann and Engel, 2007:105). 
Whereas previously local leaders like khans were responsible for keeping the 
government out of community affairs, today they are expected to attract the attention of 
the nee-patrimonial Mghan government (or other actors, including NGOs), in the hope 
that resources will follow.7 This reorientation does not imply that suddenly local leaders 
now desire to cede their authority to the state, only that today minimizing the 
government's presence often involves a cost whereas previously there were mostly 
benefits. The net result is that the calculation between the desire to maximize benefits 
from the government while, at the same time, minimizing government control, has shifted 
in favor of the former. 8 The reason underpinning the change is that in the past, the 
Afghan state was primarily extractive, collecting taxes and conscripting soldiers 
(although, as I discuss in Chapter Six, the Kyrgyz were exempted from both). In 
response, many rural communities retreated behind "the mud curtain": "The village 
builds a 'mud curtain' around itself for protection against the outside world, which has 
often come to the village in the past. Sustained relations with the outside world have 
seldom been pleasant, for outsiders usually come to extract from, not bring anything into, 
the village." (Dupree, 1980: 249). 
7 One exception is when an increased government presence, whether physical or in terms of resources, 
increases the threat of insurgent violence (Barnett Rubin, 2008, personal communication). 
8 James C. Scott refers to this calculation as one aspect of what he calls "state evasion" but notes that "it is 
crucial to understand that what is being evaded is not a relationship per se with the state but an evasion of 
subject status. What hill peoples on the periphery of states have been evading is the hard power of the fiscal 
state, its capacity to extract direct taxes and labor from a subject population. They have, however, actually 
sought, sometimes quite eagerly, relationships with the valley states that are compatible with a large degree 
ofpolitical autonomy" (2009: 330). 
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Now that the Afghan state neither collects taxes from rural communities nor 
conscripts soldiers, it is less threatening overall, especially because the government-at 
least temporarily-has significantly greater resources at its disposal than it did 
previously. However, most of these resources, financial and otherwise, are provided by 
external actors (foreign countries, NGOs, international financial institutions, the United 
Nations, etc.) and not all of them are channeled through the state, nor are they permanent. 
Because the state no longer holds a monopoly on the redistribution of patrimonial 
resources, groups such as the Kyrgyz now have alternative sources from which they can 
seek patronage. 
Second, there is intense competition throughout Afghanistan for formal political 
office, whether through elections or appointments. The key electoral offices are mainly in 
the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of Parliament) and the Provincial Councils (some members 
of which also hold seats in the Meshrano Jirga). The number of candidates who have run 
for office in every election, the extent of the fraud many of them have perpetrated, and 
the contention which followed elections in 2009 and 2010 all suggest that something 
important and valuable is at stake. While a desire to fulfill one's civic duty and serve the 
nation should not be discounted entirely, many candidates for elected office are more 
likely motivated by other concerns, such as immunity from prosecution and the numerous 
opportunities to profit from their position. 
Third, the National Solidarity Program presently operates in 361 districts (out of 
398)9 in all 34 provinces. While the effectiveness of the NSP as a vehicle for 
9 This is the fi gure provided on the NSP website http: //www.nspafghanistan.org/defau1t.aspx?Se1=26#QIO). 
However, various Afghan ministiies disagree over the number of official districts: the Ministry of Interior 
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development has received a great deal of attention, its social and political side-effects 
remain largely unstudied. One of the more trenchant criticisms of the NSP concluded that 
as a "non-customary" form of governance, the CDCs are unaccountable to both the 
community and the state; they tend to concentrate rather than distribute power; they 
create a "rentier effect"; and they tend to destabilize communities by increasing the 
probability of disputes (Brick, 2008: 36). The net result is that the NSP "has no effect on 
'state building' or building links between individuals and local government" and, more 
problematic in the context of the Kyrgyz, in the long term fails to provide an effective, 
viable alternative to "customary organizations" of governance (ibid). 
Kyrgyz political organization, in its three variants-traditional (the khanship ), 
legal-rational (the wakil, holding parliamentary office), and hybrid (the NSP CDCs)-
fundamentally serves to extract resources from the Mghan state and other actors. Each 
variant acts as a patronage network, mobilizing and redistributing resources, but because 
each one also provides politically ambitious Kyrgyz with an avenue for domestic 
leadership, within their community, they are more than mere coping strategies; they are 
the political system, in the sense that leaders holding these positions (whether a status or 
an office) are invested with a certain amount of prestige and influence, though falling 
well short of the ability to compel: "the title [of khan] merely implies a claim to authority 
over others; it is a statement of a person's willingness to lead" (Barth, 1965: 74). But 
"willingness to lead" alone is insufficient, as "a claim to authority" is largely meaningless 
without the acceptance of such by the governed. As Charles Lindholm notes, 
Affairs claims 401 while the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development lists 402 (Brown, 2012: 
17). 
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"Competitive egalitarian individualism has an inherent dilemma - that is, how to 
conceptualize the actual relations of hierarchy and command which must exist in any 
complex social formation" (2002: 262). In proposing a solution, he cites Barth's 
observation that in Swat Pakhtun society, "It is the fact of effective control and 
ascendancy - not its formal confirmation or justification - that is consistently pursued" 
(1985: 175). 
Measured relative to their numbers, their marginal location, and their overall 
importance as an Mghan polity, the various Kyrgyz patronage systems has performed 
exceptionally well. Kyrgyz leaders have a direct line to the Afghan president, Hamid 
Karzai, as well as the two vice presidents, various ministers, influential members of 
parliament, and officials at the provincial and district level. A Kyrgyz holds one of the 34 
appointments to the Meshrano Jirga, out of a total of only 102 seats. The Kyrgyz receive 
nearly half a year's worth of food-free, without any reciprocal obligations-every year; 
have two healthcare workers as well as eleven teachers working in the Pamir, all 
provided by the state; and receive considerable attention (and some resources) from at 
least four NGOs active in Wakhan district. Though many of the Kyrgyz's needs are 
genuine and much of the assistance they receive is warranted (and too often insufficient), 
the degree to which they have marshaled support, while giving almost nothing back in 
return, is astounding, considering that they are one of the numerically smallest, most far-
flung, and politically marginal ethnic groups in the entire country. 
In the chapters which follow, I describe the changing nature of political leadership 
in Afghan Kyrgyz society over the past 40 years and how political capital came to be 
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derived from patronage rather than pastoral wealth. I situate both the Great and Little 
Pamir, as well as the Afghan state, in recent historical context and explain the various 
social and economic factors which account for the development of three different types of 
political leadership-the khan, the wakil, and the CDCs-all of which, though, retain the 
same goal: extracting patronage. I conclude by noting recent significant events which 
have occuned in both Pamirs, changes which are illustrative of Kyrgyz politics and 
which will greatly affect the future of this community. 
In Chapter One, I provide a general overview of Afghan Kyrgyz society today, 
with an emphasis on those changes that have occuned in the 3 0 years since the last 
ethnographies about the Kyrgyz were published. Specifically, I describe how recent 
historical events created new avenues to political leadership, in the context of four 
periods: the Kyrgyz exodus (1978) and return (1978-1979), the Soviet occupation (1979-
1989), the mujahideen era and the civil war (1989-2001), and the post-Taliban period 
(2001 to present). 
In Chapter Two, I look at the Afghan Kyrgyz through the lens of physical and 
political geography. In the Afghan Pamirs, political rather than physical geography is 
destiny and accordingly I employ Shahrani's concept of "closed frontiers nomadism" not 
only to explain the genesis and persistence of certain forms and practices but also to 
illustrate how many recent socio-political changes are explicable in terms of more 
permeable international borders. 
In Chapter Three, I address Kyrgyz demography. Exaggerated population size, a 
skewed sex ratio, and extremely high levels of mortality all underpin Kyrgyz requests to 
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the Mghan government and NGOs for aid. Using demographic data I collected, I 
critically evaluate these claims. I show that while in aggregate the Kyrgyz experience 
considerable hardship, especially given high mortality levels, much of the Kyrgyz' s 
narrative of suffering is exaggerated in an attempt to win attention and sympathy. I also 
describe those significant changes that have occurred in the Kyrgyz genealogical 
structure. 
In Chapter Four, I consider the two pillars of the Kyrgyz economy, livestock and 
trade, with an emphasis on production (both subsistence and market) and access to 
markets. This framing situates the Kyrgyz in broader regional context, primarily in terms 
of how decision-making is influenced by exogenous economic trends. I also discuss 
numerous Kyrgyz economic adaptations, most centered upon the crucial questions of 
producing a surplus, maintaining access to existing markets, and exploiting new market 
opportunities. 
In Chapter Five, I illustrate how the post-1978 leveling effects of land and 
livestock redistribution fundamentally altered the amanat system, transforming it from 
the basis of clientelism and the primary source of political capital into an investment 
strategy, especially for outsiders seeking to enter the Kyrgyz' s pastoral economy. I show 
how this process affected economic inequality and the transformation from a highly 
stratified economic system to one characterized by self-sufficient smallholders. 
In Chapter Six, I discuss Kyrgyz politics prior to the overthrow of the Tali ban in 
2001 , with an emphasis on the informal system of traditional leadership--the Kyrgyz 
khanship. I outline the role of the Kyrgyz khans, both generally in terms of the Central 
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Asian tradition of nomadic political organization and historically in the context of 
Afghanistan. Focusing on the two most recent khans, the late Hajji Rahman Kul Khan 
and the present khan, Abdul Rashid, I discuss how both depended on clientelism to 
buttress their authority but differed in their sources of patronage. Rahman Kul, thanks to 
the distribution of his vast herds as amanat, was able to convert his pastoral wealth into 
political capital through direct patronage relations with his Kyrgyz clients. Abdul Rashid, 
with all of 250 head of sheep-1160111 Rahman Kul's holdings-instead relies upon state 
and NGO patronage as the main source of his political capital and legitimacy. 
In Chapter Seven, I discuss Kyrgyz politics in the context of the post-Tali ban 
Afghan state. After a brief overview of the formal political system in Afghanistan, I 
consider how the neo-patrimonial Afghan state has introduced patronage politics at all 
levels of Afghan society. I describe three different leadership positions, one informal and 
traditional (the khanship) and the other two formal (the wakil and the CDCs). I contrast 
the legal-rational authority of the wakil with the hybrid NSP, especially how the latter has 
affected Kyrgyz communities in both the Great and Little Pamir, as it was received very 
differently in each place. Finally, I consider how the various systems co-exist and the 
degree to which new forms of leadership such as the CDCs threaten to displace, or even 
replace, the khanship. 
In the Epilogue, I describe recent changes which have occurred in the Afghan 
Pamirs, most notably the death of the Abdul Rashid Khan in 2009 and the ensuing 
succession struggles, as well as Hajji Turdi Akhun's loss of his seat in the Meshrano Jirga 
in 2011. Does the passing of Hajji Abdul Rashid really mark, as some Kyrgyz claim, the 
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end of the time of khans? In conclusion, I discuss what these changes portend for Kyrgyz 
political leadership, their ability to extract patronage, and their future prospects for 
remaining atop the "roof of the world." 
CHAPTER 1 -HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
OF THE AFGHAN KYRGYZ 
The Kyrgyz of the Afghan Pamirs are a classic example of a "postcard" ethnic 
group, punching well above their weight in terms of attention-scholarly and popular-
relative to their numbers. During the latter half of the twentieth century, they were the 
subject of numerous magazine articles, films, and ethnographic research. 10 Even when a 
majority of the population fled the Pamir for Pakistan, eventually being resettled m 
Turkey, their ethnographic celebrity, as refugees, only increased. 
While the fate of the Kyrgyz who went to Turkey has been well documented, 11 
those few Kyrgyz who remained behind in Afghanistan, or who returned there from 
Pakistan, were, by contrast, forgotten. In part, this was a matter of access. The decade-
long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan precluded scholarly research and as the Soviet 
withdrawal segued into another decade of conflict, this time civil war, Afghanistan 
remained little more hospitable to academic inquiry. But because the ethnographic 
obituary of the Afghan Kyrgyz had been written by various academic authorities, as 
previous research was recast as salvage ethnography (Shahrani, 2002: 235), it was 
10 The most notable works on the Afghan Kyrgyz from the pre-1978 period were those of the Shors (1950, 
1955), the Michauds (1972, 1977), the film The Kirghiz of Afghanistan (1975), Dor (1975, 1976, 1980, 
1982b), Shahrani (1976b, 1976c, 1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1986, 2002), Petocz (1978a, 1978b), Dor and 
Naumann (1978), de Graney and Kostka (1978), and Breitenback (1979). The above list does not include 
the vast literature produced by nineteenth and early twentieth century European explorers and 
ethnographers of Central Asia, in which the Pamir Kyrgyz frequently appear. 
11 Shahrani (1980, 1981a, 198lb, 1984, 1987, 1988, 2002) and Dor (1979, 1981 , 1982a, 1985, 1987, 2003) 
have been the main chroniclers of the Kyrgyz's post-1978 experiences in Pakistan and Turkey. Additional 
information has been provided by Denker (1983), Paksoy (1985a, 1985b), Somerville-Large (1991), 
Karasar and Wynn (2005), in the film 37 Uses for a Dead Sheep (2006), and Kay1pov (2010). 
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assumed that whatever remained of the Kyrgyz in the Afghan Pamirs was unlikely to 
endure (Denker, 1983). 
Yet, in spite ofthese pessimistic prognostications, the remaining Kyrgyz managed 
to weather the subsequent two decades-ones characterized by population transfers, 
military occupation, warlordism, economic collapse, drought, and rampant opium 
addiction-in surprisingly good stead. The little information available about the Afghan 
Kyrgyz during the most difficult period in their recent history, the Afghan civil war 
(1992-2001), was largely due to the efforts of a sole German geographer, Hermann 
Kreutzmann (2000a, 2000b, 2001). Even in the years following the overthrow of the 
Taliban in the fall of 2001, when the Mghan Pamirs were more accessible to foreigners 
than they had ever been, the Kyrgyz continued to receive relatively little academic 
attention; mostly, they were the subject of impressionistic and often inaccurate popular 
accounts, such as Greg Mortenson's Three Cups of Tea (2006) and Stones into Schools 
(2009), and various media reports (Coughlan, 2005; Jenkins, 2005; Wong, 2010). 
Superficially, very little has changed in the nearly 40 years since the first formal 
ethnographic studies of the Mghan Kyrgyz were conducted (separately) by linguist Remy 
Dor and anthropologist Nazif Shahrani. The Kyrgyz still practice an intensive form of 
semi-nomadism, moving two to five times a year according to the dictates of their herds. 
Kyrgyz material culture today is almost the indistinguishable from the 1970s, the biggest 
difference today being the influx of cheap Chinese-made goods and the arrival of satellite 
dishes and televisions. Even the dismal lack of development in the Pamirs remains 
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unchanged: literacy is virtually nil, women still routinely die in childbirth, and opium 
addiction threatens to impoverish a large segment of the population. 
While there are any number of minor changes that could be cataloged, the really 
significant differences between today and 40 years ago have occurred in the political and 
economic spheres. Many of these . changes have been the result of geopolitical 
developments far beyond the control of the Kyrgyz, yet their impact has had very real 
consequences for the Kyrgyz. As Kreutzmann notes, "The lesson to be learnt from 
geopolitical interventions in peripheral mountain areas could be that decisions made in 
the core of empires always affect the livelihoods of people who have not been involved in 
the decision-making process" (2005: 23). 
Thus, in order to comprehend the present situation of the Kyrgyz, in both relative 
and absolute terms, it is necessary to situate them within a broader regional context 
involving history, political geography, and economic trends, especially concerning trade. 
While isolation might be the most defining characteristic of life on the bam-e dunya, the 
"roof of the world," in no way does it mean that the Afghan Kyrgyz are either autarkic or 
unaffected by the outside world, so removed from the surrounding milieu that external 
events have little reverberation (Callahan, 2012). At the same time, while indisputably 
affected by economic and political events, often far beyond their control, the Kyrgyz 
have demonstrated agency in their conscious decision to maintain a pastoral lifestyle and 
remain in Mghanistan, despite having been offered numerous opportunities to settle 
(Shahrani 2002: 230) or emigrate (Callahan, 2007: 45). Such choices are as much 
political and social as economic and are not merely guided by subsistence concerns alone 
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(e.g., fmding adequate pasture). In their decision making, the Kyrgyz greatly benefit from 
having a subsistence economy and a semi-autonomous system of political authority. 
While these factors do not make them autarkic, they do insulate the Kyrgyz somewhat 
from events and dynamics that would have a much more immediate impact upon 
communities entirely dependent on markets and under more direct government rule. 
The Settlement of the Afghan Pamir 
Anyone looking at a map of Afghanistan is struck by the incongruous, slender 
panhandle jutting out from its northeastern comer. In keeping with Afghanistan's raison 
d'etre as a buffer state between British India and Tsarist Russia, the appendix of land 
known as the W akhan Corridor was demarcated during the Parnir Boundary Conference 
in 1895 so that these two powers would not have a common border at any point; the 
better, it was thought, to prevent any potential flashpoints (Lattimore, 1950: 260). As 
with the demarcation of much of Afghanistan's borders, the British foisted this decision 
upon the Afghan ruler, Abdur Rahman, the "Iron Amir," who "objected to the gift, 
exclaiming he had enough problems with his own people and did not wish to be held 
responsible for the Kirghiz bandits in the Wakhan and Pamir" (Dupree, 1980: 424). 
Abdur Rahman was only mollified after he was promised an additional annual subsidy of 
50,000 rupees (Adamec, 2003:386). 
It is unknown what, if anything, the Kyrgyz thought about this change in their 
political fortunes. It is quite likely that it had minimal impact upon them initially, as they 
were rather used to crossing international boundaries (Dor, 1975: 74-75), and throughout 
their recent history had been claimed as the subjects of the Kokand Khanate, Qing China, 
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and the mirs of Badakhshan and Wakhan, among others. The uncertain but seemingly 
elastic nature of the Pamir Kyrgyz' s political allegiances is attested to by a number of 
authorities. M.l. Veniukov, a Russian ethnographer of the mid-nineteenth century, 
observed that, 
The political condition of the ... Kirghizes is at once varied, uncertain, and 
ill-defined. Some of them .. . profess to be subject to Russia, although 
internally they are not governed by that country . .. Other tribes ... owe 
allegiance to Kokan [Kokand], and pay tribute to that Khanat. A third 
portion ... pay the Chinese a land-tax, although they govern 
themselves .. . Lastly, the tribes of the extreme south, occupying the Bolor 
mountains, Karatigen, and Badakshan, are, partly independent, and partly 
subject to Bokhara, Kunduz, or Kokan, with which States they are, 
nevertheless, often at enmity (in Valikhanof, 1865: 277-278). 
Around the same time, the American traveler Eugene Schuyler noted that 
At the end of the last century [late 1700s] these Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] 
were subject to the Chinese . .. Subsequently they came under the dominion 
of Khokand, but later those inhabiting the Issyk Kul region asked one after 
another to be take under Russian protection. A few of them, however, owe 
allegiance to the ruler of Kashgar. Those living in the Alai and the Pamir 
in part recognize a nominal allegiance to the Khan of Khokand (1966: 
260). 
Compared to the other ethnic groups present in northern Afghanistan (Afghan 
Turkestan), those Kyrgyz nomadizing in the Pamirs enjoyed a greater degree of 
autonomy, afforded by their mobility and their only pruiial reliance upon grazing lands 
located within Afghanistan, which had traditionally been utilized solely as summer 
pastures or, on occasion, as a place of refuge. Open borders allowed the Kyrgyz to avoid 
having to permanently dwell in the Afghan Pamirs, which were distant from markets; 
comparatively and unif01mly high in elevation; extremely windy, owing the channeling 
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effects of the mountainous topography; and predominately north-facing, all of which 
made them a poor choice for year-round habitation, especially in winter. 
The first group of Kyrgyz to nomadize in the Afghan Pamirs were members of the 
Teiit clan, who in the eighteenth century steadily expanded southwards from their 
customary pastures in the Alai Mountains, roughly along the modem-day border between 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Dor, 1975: 74). The Teiit pioneers were accompanied by 
some members of the Kypchak clan, who worked as servants and herders for the 
wealthier Teiit (Dor and Naumann, 1978: 45-46). Muhammad Arif Kutlu, a son of Hajji 
Rahman Kul, confirmed to me that his Teiit ancestors migrated to the Afghan Pamir from 
the Chong Alai region of southern Kyrgyzstan. Members ofthe Naiman clan living in the 
Afghan Pamir also claim to have originally come from the Alai region. 
In the nineteenth century, increasing numbers of Kyrgyz from a different clan, the 
Kesek, also began to aiTive in the southern Pamirs from their traditional pasturelands in 
the Karategin valley in today's Tajikistan (Dor and Naumann, 1978: 46). Except in rare 
cases, the southern Pamirs were mainly used as summer pastures and the Kyrgyz would 
over-winter further to the north, in the lower-lying valleys of the Alai (and possibly 
Karategin), which in any case offered better winter pasturage. A Russian census, 
conducted in 1896, found 2,221 Kyrgyz living in the Eastern Pamir (Middleton, 2005: 
18). Another estimate, made by the British explorer Ney Elias a year earlier, claimed 
5,000 Kyrgyz (Middleton, 2005: 21). 12 
12 It is unclear what the Russians and Ney Elias used as their standard for habitation and thus whether these 
Kyrgyz were seasonal (summer) or permanent residents of the Tajik Pamirs. 
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It is uncertain why the Kyrgyz ventured out of their more productive pasture land 
in the Alai and Karategin. Dor hypothesized that the Kesek left Karategin due to the 
aggression of Muhammad Ali, khan of Kokand, who conquered Karate gin region in 1834 
(1975: 74). Another author suggested population pressure (Bliss, 2006: 194-195) though 
it is likely that the increasing Russian presence was also partially responsible for some of 
the later Kyrgyz migrations to the Pamirs, especially following General Skobelev's 
punitive expedition to the Alai in 1876. Exactly how the various Kyrgyz groups reached 
the Afghan Pamirs13 is unknown, as is the consistency with which they returned to their 
original pasturelands in the north each winter. It was only beginning with the Russian 
exploration of the Eastern Pamirs in the 1870-1880s, culminating in the 1892 
establishment of the "Pamirsky Post," a military outpost in what is today Murghab, that 
the history of the Pamir Kyrgyz become systematic and well-documented. 14 
Even before the 1895 Anglo-Russian demarcation of the Mghan Pamirs, 
momentous geopolitical events were already occurring in Central Asia which would 
greatly impact the Kyrgyz. In February 1876, the Russians annexed the Kokand Khanate 
13 Dor and Naumann's (1978: 46) claim that the Teiit simply followed the major valley systems, orientated 
along a north-south axis, from the Alai south to the Little Pamir, is logical. However, as Frank Bliss (2006: 
184) points out, it is unlikely that the Kesek reached the Great Pamir from the Karategin-as postulated by 
Dor and Naumann-by transiting Darwaz and Shugnan, since the terrain is extremely difficult and often 
only passable by means of owringi, described as "a path laid down by the population allowing travel along 
a river that stretches to the cliffs on both sides." Additionally, various nineteenth century travelogues 
document the enmity between the Karategin Kyrgyz and the Pamiri inhabitants of (especially) Shughnan, 
further undermining the idea that they would have passed along this route to reach the Great Pamir (cf. 
Bliss, 2006: 194-195). 
14 Numerous British expeditions preceded the Russians but, as Robert Middleton notes, "It is striking that 
while contemporary British explorers of the Pamirs in most cases travelled alone and frequently reveled in 
highly personal accounts of their exploits, almost all Russian expeditions were accompanied by a broad 
range of expetts: cartographers and geodesists, of course, but also zoologists, botanists, entomologists, 
anthropologists and others. The result was not only a major improvement in Russian maps and in 
assessments of geological resomces, but also a surge of Russian official and academic interest in Central 
Asia" (2005: 10). 
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and in 1893 the Eastern Pamir was officially incorporated into the Tsarist empire. One 
basis of Russia's claim to the Pamirs was that these territories had previously belonged to 
Kokand, yet "the khanate's mountainous periphery fringing the Fergana valley to the east 
and south" (Soucek, 2000: 192; cf. Dor, 1975: 75-76) had always been indistinct. 
Vambery, disputing "Russia's claims of ownership of the Pamir by pretending that this 
high tableland belongs to her by right of direct inheritance from the late Khanate of 
Khokand," wrote: 
I was travelling with Khokandians for months. I never heard the name of 
Pamir, and when speaking of south of their country they always used the 
vague expression Alai-taglari (the Alai Mountains). It is under this name 
that Madali [Muhammad Ali, khan of Kokand, r. 1822-42]. .. may have 
laid claim occasionally to certain portions of that high tableland 
[Pamir]. .. As with every nomadic people, so also with the Kara-Kirghiz 
[Kyrgyz], it is extremely difficult to fix a strict delimitation to the sphere 
of their wanderings, and, consequently, to the character of their 
allegiance ... There is no doubt that certain portions of the Pamirs are 
frequented by Kirghiz coming from the Alai- i.e., Russian subjects; but, 
on the other hand, it is patent that some of the Kirghiz subject to China 
likewise resort to the said high tableland ... (1892). 
The Russians considered the Kyrgyz, like other Central Asian indigenes, 
inorodtsy (non-Slav natives, or "alien-born") and so exempted them from compulsory 
military service. However, in 1916, facing a difficult situation on the Eastern Front in the 
First World War, the Russians changed the previous policy and subsequently large 
numbers of Central Asians were drafted for labor behind the front lines (Soucek, 2000: 
209). This decision triggered a number of uprisings against both the Tsarist government 
and the Russian settlers, which were often brutally put down, forcing large numbers of 
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Kyrgyz to flee to China, 15 where in 1877 Qing forces had defeated the Kashgarian 
upstart, Yakub Beg, and regained control of Xinjiang (also known as Chinese or East 
Turkestan). 
After the 1917 Russian Revolution, a number of Kyrgyz returned from China to 
their former lands, including those in the southern Pamirs. As before, the international 
borders were mostly notional and those Kyrgyz utilizing the Afghan Pamirs freely 
crossed into Soviet and Chinese territory, though in the former they were required to pay 
a 10% tax on their livestock (Dor and Naumann, 1978: 47; Bliss, 2006: 195). In the late 
1930s, however, as collectivization was more rigorously implemented in the Soviet 
Union, the seasonal presence of free-range, non-collectivized nomads in Tajikistan 
became an issue and the Tajik-Afghan border was "hermetically sealed" (Bliss, 2006: 
195; cf. Kreutzmann, 2002: 37). This promoted a series oflow-intensity tit-for-tat cross-
border raids and reprisals between the Afghan Kyrgyz and the Soviet forces. The 
proximity ofthe Soviets and the Kyrgyz's vulnerability to their raids prompted a number 
of Kyrgyz, including Hajji Rahman Kul, to flee to the Taghdunbash Pamir in China in 
1947. 
This exodus was observed by the British explorer, Bill Tilman, who in the same 
year was traveling over the Wakhjir pass from China into Afghanistan: 
[The Afghan Kyrgyz] had arrived there [the Chinese side ofthe Wakhjir] 
two days before from the direction of Bozai Gumbaz and the Chakmaktin 
Lake, a region they were now quitting in fear of raiders from the Russian 
side . .. Emigrants would be a better description of them, for they intended 
leaving Wakhan for good and settling in Chinese territory ... Thirty 
15 These uprisings, and the exodus (iirkiin) which followed, are still cmmnemorated annually in Kyrgyzstan 
on 27 July. 
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families were said to be moving out of the enclave east of the Chakmaktin 
Lake with the intention of settling in Chinese territory (1949: 624). 
These Kyrgyz remained in the Taghdunbash Pamir until the Chinese communist forces, 
led by Mao Zedong, prevailed in 1949. Most accounts, including those offered by the 
Kyrgyz themselves, state they had to fight their way back into Afghanistan, skirmishing 
with (and/or slaughtering) Chinese troops stationed near the foot of the Wakhjir pass, on 
the Chinese side (cf. Shor, 1950: 706). 
Even after they returned from China, there were a number of serious incidents, 
some instigated by Kyrgyz raids into Tajikistan, which prompted the Soviets to launch a 
series of punitive expeditions. In 1953, one Soviet incursion killed 41 Kyrgyz in the 
Great Pamir, including one prominent leader, a certain JanbaL 16 Another raid that same 
year into the Little Pamir targeted the khan, Hajji Rahman Kul, who barely managed to 
escape (Dor and Naumann, 1978: 48). A number of yurts and other property were 
destroyed by the departing Soviet forces (ibid). 
By the mid-point of the twentieth century, the Wakhan-Pamir area was more cu1-
de-sac than corridor, surrounded as it was by highly sensitive and very sealed 
international borders: to the north, the Soviet Union (the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, 
or SSR); to the east, the People's Republic of China; and to the south; the newly 
independent Dominion of Pakistan (which became the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 
1956). Fenced in by these international borders, the Kyrgyz responded to the challenges 
of "closed frontiers" (Shahrani, 2002: 170)-losing access to their winter pastures and cut 
off from their traditional markets in Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan-through 
16 Some smrrces refer to Janbai as a khan. Cf. Dor and Naumann, 1978: 48. 
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a number of adaptations. Shahrani termed these new conditions and the collective Kyrgyz 
response to them "closed frontiers nomadism" which, among other things, involved a 
reorientation of Kyrgyz political and economic strategies westwards, towards the rest of 
Afghanistan. Besides their effect on pastoral production, some of the economic 
adaptations that closed frontiers necessitated would also eventually produce significant 
political and social change among the Kyrgyz. 
Because livestock are the basis both for subsistence and trade, adapting pastoral 
production to the exigencies of closed frontiers was a vital task, one the Kyrgyz 
accomplished through what Shahrani (2002: 173) identified as four main innovations: 
private or corporate ownership of pastures and camps; capital improvement of privately-
owned areas, especially irrigation of fodder producing pastures; intensive rather than 
extensive seasonal pasture use; and a short, well-defmed seasonal migration utilizing the 
same pastures and camps on a recurring basis. A fifth major innovation was the dispersal 
of livestock through a loaning system called amanat. 
Closed frontiers nomadism also necessitated political accommodation with the 
Afghan state. Rahman Kul, after a fortuitous encounter with the Afghan king, 
Mohammed Zahir Shah (r. 1933-73) during a hunting trip to the Pamir by the latter in the 
1950s, traveled to Kabul en route to Mecca and "was received by the Afghan monarch 
and he [Kul] and his companions were extended official hospitality" (Shahrani, 1986: 
267). Thereafter, Kul enjoyed an amicable relationship with the Afghan government, 
which had already exempted the Kyrgyz from conscription17 (and, after 1966, taxes, 
17 In 1921, General Mohammad Nadir Khan, the future king of Afghanistan, was Minister of War under 
King Amanullah. Amanullah sent him to survey the regions of Qataghan and Badakhshan, which today 
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when the Afghan parliament abolished livestock taxes nationwide), and named Rahman 
Kul pasbaan-e Pamir-"protector of the Pamir" (Shahrani 2002: 209)-which mostly 
involved monitoring this sensitive border region. 
Urkun: The Kyrgyz Exodus 
As noted earlier, the post-1949 history of the Mghan Kyrgyz was well-
documented in several magazine and journal articles, a film, and a number of 
ethnographies. It was a time of unprecedented prosperity among the Kyrgyz, who were 
renowned throughout northern Afghanistan for their pastoral wealth, despite it being 
concentrated among a small elite. Though tensions and mutual suspicion remained 
between the Kyrgyz and the Soviet authorities across the border in the Tajik SSR, the 
Kyrgyz- as subjects and, after the promulgation of the 1964 constitution, citizens-
enjoyed the protection of the Afghan government and so they went unmolested by the 
Soviets. However, just as the political geography of the Wakhan-Pamir region was born 
out of the imperial rivalry between the British and the Russians during the "Great 
Game,"18 even the physical remoteness of the Afghan Pamirs proved insufficient to 
insulate the Kyrgyz from the effects of greater geopolitical forces, as external "socio-
political interference led to the creation of an arena of confrontation in the Pamirs, 
consist of the northeastern provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan. Mohammad Nadir's 
report was collected and published by Mawlawi Burhan al-Din Kushkaki, one of Amanullah's historians. 
During Mohammad Nadir's visit to the Pamirs, he noted the many passes leading to Russian territory and 
Rahman Kul's father "was unofficially entrusted with the duties of frontier commissioner" (Shahrani, 2002: 
40). He also exempted the Kyrgyz from conscription, having been told that "In summer and autumn, they 
never go to Wakhan, lshkashim or Zebak, because there they'd die ofthe beat . .. When the [Amanullah] 
administration demanded that certain ones come to Khanabad [in Kunduz] in summer, they died of the 
heat" (Reut, 1979: 172). 
18 The coining of the term "Great Game" is usually credited to Lieutenant Arthur Conoliy, a British 
intelligence officer (Hopkirk, 1994: 123). The Russians called it Turniry Teney, the "Tournament of 
Shadows." 
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Hindukush and Himalaya during the Cold War which was one of the least permeable 
frontier regions in the world" (Kreutzmann, 2005: 23). 
On April 27, 1978, a Marxist coup in Kabul toppled the republican government of 
Mohammed Daoud Khan, the president of Afghanistan. The Saur Revolution, led by the 
communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), sent tremors up into the 
faraway Pamirs and threatened to upset the modus vivendi which had prevailed between 
the Kyrgyz and the Soviet forces across the border. As described by Shahrani, the Kyrgyz 
khan, Hajji Rahman Kul, concerned about what a communist regime in Kabul augured 
for his future, dispatched his eldest son, Abdul Wakil, to assess the situation in the 
provincial capital, Faizabad. Abdul Wakil "~etumed convinced, based on what he had 
seen and heard in the city, that the new regime in Kabul was indeed Communist and 
supported by the Soviet Union" (Shahrani, 2002: 231 ). A few Kyrgyz elders I 
interviewed claimed that during the summer of 1978, they also witnessed increased 
military activity along the Tajik border and began to fear a Soviet invasion. 
Accordingly, preparations were begun in July to cross covertly into Pakistan. 
Because of the distance separating the Little from the Great Pamir, it was not feasible to 
involve the Great Pamir Kyrgyz without tipping off the Soviets and the Afghan 
authorities. In any event, the Kyrgyz of the Great Pamir, though nominally ruled by 
Rahman Kul, did not suffer the same degree of animus from the Soviets and so were less 
fearful of retribution following any invasion. In late July 1978, only three months after 
the Saur Revolution, having left their yurts set up as decoys, 1,300 Kyrgyz from the Little 
Pamir, together with most of their livestock, began riding south, towards the Pakistani 
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border. Today, this emigration and the months and years which followed are still referred 
to as the urkun, or exodus. 
Few of the livestock that were taken to Pakistan ever returned. The exodus 
occurred in July, when the rivers were running high as a result of snowmelt, and many 
sheep and goats are said to have drowned while crossing the W akhan and Bar Kara rivers 
en route to the passes leading to Pakistan. 19 Although the Kyrgyz were able to cross the 
border without incident, they quickly discovered they would have to split up in order to 
find sufficient pasture for their livestock. Even then they were unable to graze such a 
large number of animals and had to sell off a considerable portion of their herds, often at 
fire sale prices. 
Nor was the only shock econom1c. The climate of Pakistan was considerably 
warmer and more humid than the Pamir, which caused many Kyrgyz to fall ill and that 
first summer alone over 100 people died (Shahrani, 2002: 232). In addition, 1978 was the 
year that the Pakistani president General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq launched his 
Islamization program and the Kyrgyz were forced to endure a number of unfamiliar, 
conservative strictures, such as the veiling and seclusion of their women (purdah). They 
were also viewed with considerable suspicion by the Pakistanis and were not made to feel 
welcome by their reluctant hosts. 
These dire straits, combined with a suspicion that Hajji Rahman Kul had 
exaggerated the Soviet threat, prompted seven families (about forty individuals) to return 
19 The Kyrgyz crossed into Pakistan via a number of different routes. Most went up the Bai Kara valley and 
over the Khora Burt pass into the Karambar and Ishkoman Valleys of Pakistan. A few Kyrgyz took the 
Irshad Uween pass into the Chapursan Valley, while others transited the Wakhjir Valley and crossed into 
Pakistan via the Dilisang pass. Regardless of the route taken, they all would have faced at least one difficult 
river crossing in Afghanistan, at close to peak seasonal flow. 
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to the Little Pamir in October-November 1978, just prior to the onset of winter and the 
closure of the passes. This group, led by Hajji Osman and Mullah Hajji Muhammad 
Kasim, did not consult with Rahman Kul about this decision and in fact described it to 
me as "escaping" (kachyr ketuu) from him, without his knowledge. Just three months 
after fleeing to Pakistan, they returned and were welcomed back by the Afghan 
government and claim to have been given an award in recognition of their patriotism, as 
well as various forms of assistance (food, medicine, and livestock). 
An almost comically overwrought article appeared on September 15, 1978, in 
Izvestia, the daily newspaper and mouthpiece of the Soviet govemment,20 entitled "The 
Bloody Paths of the Independent Khan" (Akhmedzyanov, 1978). It described how Hajji 
Rahman Kul, a "double-dyed adventurer" and "self-styled khan," fearful of the 
"progressive forces" which had come to power in Afghanistan as a result of the 1978 
Saur Revolution, had tried unsuccessfully to have the Little Pamir secede from 
Afghanistan under Chinese auspices (ibid). When this scheme failed, and facing the "the 
pressure of the revolutionary wave" in Afghanistan, Rahman Kul had no recourse but to 
flee to Pakistan (ibid). He attempted to force all the other Kyrgyz to join him in exile and 
those who refused were "tortured" and left to starve after Rahman Kul "took away all 
their livestock and deprived them of food supplies" (ibid). 
The Izvestia article named a few of the Kyrgyz thus abused by Rahman Kul, who 
nonetheless still refused to go with him to Pakistan, and valorized their obstinacy. Of the 
original 246 households in the Little Pamir, all but nine or ten (between 40 to 50 
20 The full name of this publication was Izvestiya Sovetov Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR, the "Notifications of 
the Soviet Peoples ' Deputies of the USSR." 
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individuals) fled to Pakistan. Those who stayed behind were described by Shahrani as 
"very poor and disgruntled" (2002: 231 ). A few of these families fled the Little Pamir to 
Wakhan, lower Badakhshan, or the Great Pamir, but the majority remained in situ. When 
40 Kyrgyz returned a month after the article was published, it offered an obvious 
propaganda coup, and the Kyrgyz were only too happy to receive rewards and material 
compensation for their supposed rejection of "the feudal lord and landowner" Hajji 
Rahman Kul (Akhmedzyanov, 1978). It wouldn't be the last time that they were trotted 
out by a cynical government intent on scoring some political points. 
Roughly a year later, around October 1979, a few representatives from the seven 
families which had returned to Afghanistan went back across into Pakistan (supposedly at 
the urging of the Afghan government) and informed their kinsmen that the situation in 
Afghanistan was fine. They had received assurances from Afghan officials guaranteeing 
them that they (and any other Kyrgyz who returned, with the exception of Rahman Kul 
and his family) would have nothing to worry about from either the Afghan or the Soviet 
government. This news, as well as the seemingly dismal prospects they faced in Pakistan, 
convinced another 50 to 54 families, or between 250-270 individuals, to return to the 
Little Pamir. They were led this time by Abdul Rashid Khan, an ambitious and respected 
junior leader who had clashed with Hajji Rahman Kul several times in Pakistan and who 
had come to represent the Kyrgyz faction opposed to Kul's idea of remaining in Pakistan 
until they could find a new home, whether in Alaska,21 Turkey (which had previously 
21 The notion of emigrating to Alaska began with an American wildlife biologist, Ronald Petrocz, who had 
studied wild sheep in Alaska prior to living among the Kyrgyz while researching Marco Polo sheep in the 
Pamirs. Petrocz, in conversations with the Kyrgyz, had often mused about the similarities between the 
Pamirs and the Alaskan interior, as well as some of the cultural similarities between the Kyrgyz and some 
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accepted many Central Asian Turkic refugees), or somewhere else. Although 
dissatisfaction with Rahman Kul's authoritarian style of leadership was one reason cited 
for their return, mostly they decided to come back to the Little Pamir because of their 
untenable situation in Pakistan and because the threat of a Soviet invasion appeared to 
have been overwrought. 
A couple months later, the Soviets did invade Afghanistan and in May 1980 they 
established a garrison in the Little Pamir (Arnstultz, 1986: 294). According to Kyrgyz 
informants, more Kyrgyz families had been planning to return from Pakistan but once the 
Soviets invaded, they closed the border and no one was allowed to come or go. The 
difficult times faced by the roughly 1,000 Kyrgyz who remained in Pakistan have been 
described elsewhere (Shahrani, 1984; Shahrani, 2002; Denker, 1983; Somerville-Large, 
1991). Eventually, with the cooperation of the Turkish government, the remaining 1,129 
Kyrgyz refugees in Pakistan were granted asylum and allowed to resettle in eastern 
Turkey, near Lake Van where, in 2010, they numbered about 3,000 individuals (Kay1pov, 
2010: 195). 
At this point, an obvious question concerns why nearly all of the Kyrgyz in the 
Little Pamir decided to flee to Pakistan in the fust place. Shahrani, who interviewed the 
Kyrgyz in Pakistan in 1980, was surprised to hear them admit that "they had not faced an 
imminent threat to their safety from the central government in Kabul" (2002: 237), 
leading him to conclude that "the Kirghiz decision to leave was, therefore, based entirely 
indigenous peoples of Alaska. The Kyrgyz had hoped to settle in Alaska and resume their pastoral nomadic 
lifestyle until they learned that US immigration laws required that cases be adjudicated on an individual or 
family basis and thus there was no guarantee that all the Kyrgyz refugees would be resettled together. Cf. 
Stockbower (1981) and Mortiz (1982). 
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on their anticipation of future threats" (ibid). Shahrani also notes that any retribution from 
the Soviets was likely to be limited to Hajji Rahman Kul: "because of his past opposition 
to Communism, the Russians regarded him as their personal enemy and would not leave 
him in peace" (2002: 231). 
Islam: 
The answer Shahrani offers to explain the mass Kyrgyz exodus gives primacy to 
... they simply sought to safeguard the future integrity of their community 
as Muslims by taking refuge in the neighboring Muslim state of Pakistan. 
In essence, the single most dominant motivating force for the Kirghiz 
exodus was said to be Islam, that is, their desire to preserve the future 
continuity of their identity both as Muslims and Kirghiz. The centrality of 
Islam as the primary motivating force was consistent with their previous 
flights to Muslim Mghanistan in search of security from Soviet and 
Chinese Communist revolutions (2002: 237-238). 
Shahrani adduces Hajji Rahman Kul's exhortation of the Kyrgyz to remain behind in 
Afghanistan, as they themselves were not in danger, and their refusal to do so, as 
evidence that this decision was a collective one. 
A somewhat different version is offered by those Kyrgyz who left Pakistan and 
returned to Mghanistan. As they remember it, following the Saur Revolution, Hajji 
Rahman Kul began to speak forcefully and often about the dangers posed by the 
Russians, saying that "The Afghan state has been conquered by the Soviets and they will 
come to Pamir." Not only would the Kyrgyz lose their property and their freedom but the 
Communists would take their women as well as their religion. Additionally, the Kyrgyz I 
interviewed claimed that Rahman Kul assured them prior to their departure that the 
Pakistani government had been contacted and arrangements had already been made for 
their arrival, which was obviously not the case. 
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When asked why they believed Rahman Kul, my Kyrgyz informants replied that 
the people lacked any knowledge of politics outside of the Pamir, as few had radios or 
other sources of infmmation besides hearsay, and they trusted the khan, especially since 
they heard nothing to contradict him. In their version, Hajji Rahman Kul not only 
exaggerated but invented the apocalyptic scenario he presented to them, which they 
described as a lie (kalp) . No one, though, could explain how Hajji Rahman Kul, whether 
by mistakenly hyping the threat or deliberately lying, as they suggested, stood to benefit 
from everyone leaving the Pamir. Arguably, he would have been no worse off had the 
rest of the Kyrgyz followed his suggestion, as related by Shahrani, to remain in the Pamir 
and tend his livestock and just let him and his family flee to Pakistan (2002: 231 ). But all 
the Kyrgyz I interviewed agreed that he was pressing the entire community to decamp 
with him, whether for their own sake as a community of Muslims or for less altruistic 
reasons. 
"We conquered you, Pamir": The Soviet Occupation 
As no road existed (and still does not) from the Little Pamir to Sarhad-e Broghil, 
where the Soviets had placed another small firebase, they established and supplied the 
Little Pamir garrison using a dirt track that followed the northern bank of the Aksuu 
River southwest from Kyzyl Rabat, a small town close to the Tajik-Afghan border (a 
secondary road connects Kyzyl Rabat to Murghab, a large town along the paved, all-
weather Pamir Highway). The main impetus for establishing this base was to interdict the 
flow of weapons that were reaching the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgents (mujahideen) from 
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Figure 1. Graffiti left by Soviet troops from January 27, 1980: 
"We conquered you, Pamir!" 
China (Amstutz, 1986: 295; Mitrokhin, 2002: 117), which was one of the first nations to 
provide materiel to insurgent forces: "During the initial stage of the armed struggle 
against the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan, China provided antigovernment 
guerrillas with Soviet-made light weapons, such as rifles, light machine guns, and mines" 
(Emadi, 1993: 114; c.f. Garver, 1981:118 and Segal, 1981, passim). Prior to the Soviet 
occupation of the Little Pamir, China had "provided a sizeable number of Soviet-
designed arms to the Afghan mujahideen groups to contain Soviet expansionism. They 
used the Wakhan corridor (Chitral) route and the bulk of them [the arms provided by 
China] were routed through Peshawar. Soviet-style light weapons and stores came to the 
insurgents in the northeast from China, despite severe logistical problems" (Hilali, 
2001:339) 
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Secondarily, the Bozoi base also served a blocking function, to prevent the 
infiltration of any insurgents into Afghanistan by way of the passes (the Irshad Uween, 
Khora Burt, and Dilisang) connecting the Little Parnir to Pakistan22 or over the Wakhjir, 
the main pass connecting China and Afghanistan. The Chinese had mobilized troops 
along the Chinese-Afghan border in response to the Soviet invasion (Emadi, 1993: 113-
115) and "set up training camps in the Xinjiang province for ... the mujahideen" (Hilali, 
2001 :339).23 
It is uncertain how many troops were stationed in the Little Pamir-the barbed 
wire perimeter of the Bozo I Gtimboz base still exists and structural remnants suggest that 
there were never more than a few hundred soldiers at most, though some Kyrgyz claim 
that there were more than 1,000 Soviet troops. A company-sized element of 100 troops 
would have been sufficient to secure the area, especially since force protection concerns 
would have been minimal given that there was no insurgency in the Pamir. However, 
photos from the time of the Soviet occupation show armor and artillery at the Bozo I base, 
indicating that the Soviets were intent upon maintaining a tripwire defense against 
Chinese military action. It was rumored that tactical nuclear weapons were moved into 
the Little Parnir, close to the Chinese-Afghan border, as an additional deterrent: "there 
were unconfirmed reports that the Soviets had established two military camps, one 
signals intelligence site and an undetermined number of missile sites" (Hilali, 2001: 330; 
c.f. Amstutz, 1986: 295). The Soviets did construct a road along the Wakhjir Valley 
22 The base at Sarhad served a similar function in regard to the Broghil Pass. 
23 Chinese instructors were also present inside Pakistan, training Afghan insurgents. C.f. Hilali, 2001:350. 
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leading to the Wakhjir pass, though it appears only to have been for supplying a smaller 
outpost they had established in the upper part of the valley. 
Regardless of their actual number, the Soviet presence in the Pamir, far from the 
dire predictions of Hajji Rahman Kul, is remembered today as a golden era. The Soviets 
deployed a number of Central Asian troops to the Pamir, which was one of the few areas 
in Afghanistan where they could reasonably hope to win the "hearts and minds" of the 
population. One of the first things they did in this regard was to help the Kyrgyz rebuild 
their herds, bringing in livestock from Tajikistan, as most of the Kyrgyz's animals taken 
to Pakistan hed either died or been sold there. The Soviets also provided basic medical 
care for the Kyrgyz (in several instances, more complicated cases were evacuated from 
the Pamir for definitive treatment in the hospital in Khorog, Tajikistan), distributed food, 
bartered staple goods for Kyrgyz livestock, and even provided entertainment in the form 
of weekly movies during the summer, shown on a large outdoor screen. While few 
Kyrgyz evince fondness for the Soviets themselves, they wistfully recall the Soviet 
occupation as a time of peace, security, and relative prosperity, allowing most households 
to concentrate on rebuilding their herds and re-establishing themselves in the Little 
Pamir. 
Initially, however, believing that more Kyrgyz would soon be returning, those 
who came back from Pakistan simply returned to their previous settlements, although 
they freely utilized the vacant rangelands to pasture the few animals they had. One 
exception was Abdul Rashid, who moved into Hajji Rahman Kul's winter camp, Mulk 
Ali, ostensibly to be closer to the small Afghan garrison at Bozoi Gfunboz (and, later, the 
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Soviet forces stationed there) but perhaps also to don symbolically the mantle of khan. 
After the Soviet occupation of the Little Pamir 1980 and the closure of the Pakistani 
border which followed, the Kyrgyz realized that the others would not be coming back 
from Pakistan any time soon and felt free to occupy the empty camps. Many of those 
families who had remained behind in the Little Pamir and never left for Pakistan had 
occupied the best camps and pastures between 1978 and 1979 but, as the lands were 
redistributed, they were forced off by some of the more influential and aggressive 
returnees. Nonetheless, in most cases they, like virtually everyone else, were still able to 
obtain better lands than they had had access to previously. 
The Mujahideen Period and Civil War 
If, for most Kyrgyz, the Soviet occupation was the best time in living memory, 
then the period which followed the Soviet withdrawal was the worst. The mujahideen 
took all of Badakhshan in 1992 and a bloody period of reprisals commenced. Although a 
robust anti-Soviet insurgency had been waged throughout much ofBadakhshan, many of 
the border regions such as W akhan and the Pan:'lirs had embraced both the Soviet 
occupation and the communist Afghan government. The Ismaili Pamiris were especially 
sympathetic to leftist ideologies, as 
Decades of political repression and economic exploitation caused Isma'ili 
intellectuals to espouse radical ideologies for transformation of the status 
quo. They saw Isma'ilis in Khorog, Tajikistan and those in Sinkiang, 
China to have achieved a comparatively better quality of life under Soviet 
and Chinese socialism. They began to idealize socialism as the only road 
to the emancipation and economic prosperity of their communities 
(Emadi, 2005: 181). 
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In the eyes of the Sunni mujahideen, though, the inhabitants of such areas were at best 
seen as weak for not having resisted and at worst as collaborators with the communists. 
Various low- and mid-level commanders (qomandan) became the de facto 
government and they would requisition livestock, crops and other property at whim. (The 
Wakhi claim that they would also take attractive women). There was no law and no 
redress for any abuses: 
Most warlords rose through the ranks of the mujahideens [sic], often 
eliminating local rivals in the process, to assert their authority over 
substantial parts of northern Afghanistan. This was achieved through the 
creation of pyramidal networks of local sub-commanders who replaced the 
state after it collapsed. These local warlords dispensed justice, maintained 
the law and order, and crucially fought the communists and Taliban 
regime. It is the latter function that allowed them to maintain their 
legitimacy. The role of the warlords, however, did not extend only to 
security matters. Through their control of territory they became involved 
in the economy, controlling trading routes, levying taxes and benefitting 
from illegal activities, such as the opium trade. They also confiscated 
governmental land which they distributed to their clients and subordinates. 
In the absence of the state, and under the guise of the Jihad against the 
communists and the Taliban, many warlords gradually extended their 
control over all spheres of public life (Orsini, 2007: 46). 
Making matters worse was the economic collapse that followed the mujahideen 
takeover. As civil war engulfed Afghanistan, the price of those few goods available 
skyrocketed in Wakhan. Tajikistan, an important source of imports during the Soviet 
occupation, was embroiled in its own civil war, which would last five years, from 1992-
1997. During this time "there was a famine in the [Tajik] Pamirs as food imp011s ceased 
and private subsistence farming had not yet begun" (Robinson, 2005: 200), leaving 
Tajikistan in no position to export anything. Compounding these economic woes was an 
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epic drought that descended upon northern Afghanistan in 1998 and which persisted until 
2003. 
After the Taliban took Kabul in 1996 and began to push north over the Hindu 
Kush, the "Northern Alliance" (officially called the Jabha-ye Muttahid-e Islami-ye Milli-
ye bara-ye Nijat-e Afghanistan or the National United Islamic Front for the Salvation of 
Afghanistan), an anti-Taliban umbrella group comprised of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and 
a Pashtun faction (Ittehad-e Is/ami, lead by Ustad Abdul Rasul Sayyaf), found themselves 
increasingly embattled. The main Tajik faction, Jamiat-e Is/ami, was forced to fall back 
into their few remaining strongholds: the Panjsher valley, parts of Takhar province, and 
Badakhshan. Badakhshan's long border with Tajikistan made it a crucial rear base for the 
Northern Alliance, across which they could import materiel and export drugs and 
gemstones. Badakhshan was the only province that did not fall to the Taliban,24 though it 
was effectively blockaded from the rest of Afghanistan between 1999 and 2001. The 
Northern Alliance Tajiks increasingly came to depend upon precious gems and narcotics 
to maintain a revenue stream. According to Schetter (2002: 124): 
The main revenue of Massoud ... derived from the exploitation of emerald 
and lapis-lazuli mines in Badakhshan. Massoud started this business in the 
1980s. When his party, the Jam'iyat-i Islarni, came to power in 1992, he 
made sure that the mines were nationalized and came under his control. .. It 
is estimate [sic] Massoud collected up to US$200 million per year from 
the trade in gemstones. 
Prior to the mujahideen takeover, significant quantities of opium were already 
being grown in Badakhshan, with an estimated 183 metric tons of opium resin produced 
in 1989 (Brailsford, 1989: 3). However, as Goodhand (2000: 271) notes, "The end of the 
24 The Panjsher was also never occupied by the Taliban; however, at the time, it was a district in Parwan 
province. It only gained provincial status in 2004. 
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Cold War and the final collapse of the communist government in Kabul marked an 
important shift in the Afghan conflict. Declining levels of external patronage (in 
comparison to the mid-1980s) forced the warring parties increasingly to develop their 
own means of economic sustainability." Opium poppy was an obvious source of revenue 
in a system in which "spheres of influence are franchised out to local level commanders 
who are responsible for generating much of their own income locally" (Goodhand, 2000: 
272). But it was only following the Taliban's 2001 ban on opium cultivation that drug 
production boomed in Badakhshan, as its "share [of total opium production in 
Afghanistan] soared to 83 percent of a substantially lower total amount ... the cultivation 
area was expanded from 2,684 ha in 1999 to 8,250 ha in 2002. The trend continued, and 
by 2004, Badakhshan's poppy cultivation area had reached 15,607 ha" (Kreutzmann, 
2007: 610-613). 
Most of the opmm was slated for the more lucrative international market, 
exported via Tajikistan: "The increased porosity of the border with Central Asia and the 
growth of mafia networks have created the space and linkages necessary for the trade to 
flourish" (Goodhand, 2000: 271). However, a smaller amount was sold domestically by 
lower level commanders, part of a regional network "engaged in the purchases of raw 
opium, processing, transport, levying toll-taxes, and trafficking, but at the same time it 
supplies quantities of opium to the local people along the smuggling routes" 
(Kreutzmann, 2007: 617). The greater availability of opium, combined with coercive 
practices involved in "pushing" it onto the population, led to spiking levels of use and 
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addition, especially in poor, marginal areas such as Wakhan and the Pamirs, which were 
more susceptible to the pressure tactics of the dealers (Pain, 2004: 35). 
Together with all the other challenges they were facing, and with no end in sight, 
the Kyrgyz began to consider yet another exodus from Afghanistan. In 1991, the Central 
Asian states had become independent following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the titular nationality felt threatened by large numbers of 
other ethnic groups (primarily Russians, but ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan had also raised 
fears about the sizeable Uzbek minority in the south) and embarked on a program of 
repatriating their co-ethnics from abroad (IRIN, 2001). In Kyrgyzstan, the motivation 
behind this initiative was unabashedly political, designed as it was to "help to soothe 
nationalists and promote the government policy of instilling a national identity" (ibid). 
The Kyrgyz government reached out to the Kyrgyz "diaspora" in China, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey and offered them inducements to repatriate to 
Kyrgyzstan. While tilting the demographic in favor of the titular nationality was the 
primary goal, it was also hoped that these immigrants could be settled in depopulated 
areas, including the southwest (Schuler, 2007: 79-80). 
A vestige of the Soviet demarcation of Central Asia, this part of Kyrgyzstan, 
along the southern edge of the Ferghana Valley, has large numbers of Uzbeks and a 
recent history of ethnic discord between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. In addition, there are six 
enclaves in the Kyrgyzstani part of the Ferghana Valley-four belonging to Uzbekistan 
and two belonging to Tajikistan. Further south, along the border with Tajikistan, is the 
Chong Alai valley. Sparsely populated and with a predominantly pastoral economy, the 
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Chong Alai had originally been part of Tajikistan after independence in 1991 but in 2004 
it was transferred to Kyrgyzstan. However, Tajikistan still leased about 34,000 hectares 
of arable land in southern Kyrgyzstan, including entire villages in the Chong Alai valley, 
which fanned fears of Tajikistani encroachment.Z5 In part because "more than 90 percent 
of the area's population is qualified as poor, earning an average of USD 17 per month" 
(Undeland, 2008: 7), many residents of the Chong Alai had migrated to other parts of 
Kyrgyzstan or gone abroad looking for work and few Kyrgyzstanis wanted to take their 
place. Relocating ethnic Kyrgyz from other countries to such regions presumably seemed 
like a good way to lessen the likelihood that Kyrgyzstan's neighbors would press 
irredentist claims or annex these areas altogether. 
The Kyrgyzstani government made contact with the Afghan Kyrgyz in 1996 and 
discussions proceeded about having them relocate to Kyrgyzstan. The difficult and 
oppressive situation in Afghanistan convinced a number of Kyrgyz to formally request 
repatriation, which Abdul Rashid did in 1999 (Kreutzmann, 2000b ). However, a number 
of issues hindered progress. First, both parties were expecting the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to cover the costs and provide the logistics 
involved in any such move. UNHCR, for its part, pointed out that what was being 
planned was less a question of refugees than a voluntary migration and as such did not 
fall under its remit. The Afghan Kyrgyz also had limited enthusiasm for being resettled in 
the Chong Alai valley, where they were being offered land. They felt that if they were 
going to leave the Afghan Pamir, they might as well abandon pastoralism entirely and 
25 Bakyt Beshimov, former Kyrgyzstani Ambassador to India and former Vice President of the American 
University of Central Asia, personal communication, 2006. 
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sedentarize in a city such as Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan's capital. Of additional concern to 
many Mghan Kyrgyz was the limited availability and high cost of opium in Kyrgyzstan. 
Eventually, the collective resolve of the Kyrgyz to emigrate foundered on the questions 
of who would pay for the repatriation, where the Afghan Kyrgyz would be resettled 
within Kyrgyzstan, and divisions among themselves over the wisdom of leaving the 
Pamirs for an uncertain future in Kyrgyzstan, itself struggling economically. After a few 
influential families balked, isolating the khan, who was leading the talks and who 
supported the move, the idea was scrapped during the summer of 2001.26 
In retrospect, their decision to remain in Afghanistan was probably a wise one. 
The post-1991 repatriation efforts were much less successful than anticipated: despite 
attracting 23,000 ethnic Kyrgyz between 1991 and 2005 (mostly from Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan), only 9% obtained citizenship and the "vast majority have no legal status 
whatsoever" (RFE/RL, 2006), making them ineligible to work or to receive benefits from 
the state. In addition, many of the returnees reported "having problems integrating into 
Kyrgyz society" (ibid). In 2006, the Kyrgyz government set up the Kafrylman (returnee) 
program, designed to grant returnees temporary legal status "that would allow them to 
work and have access to education and medical care, pending Kyrgyz citizenship" (ibid). 
Five years later, in 2011, legislation for the Kafrylman program was still pending. 
Additionally, in 1999, about 100 guerillas from the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) infiltrated the Chong Alai from Tajikistan and displaced the residents 
26 My informants (and the few published references to this event) were uncertain ofthe exact time when 
this occurred, whether it was 2000 or 2001. 
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of a number of Kyrgyz villages, which were subsequently bombed by Uzbek aircraft.27 
While the Afghan Kyrgyz never mentioned the poor security situation in the Chong Alai 
as influencing their decision not to relocate there, it is likely that they were at least aware 
of the conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan and this might have added to their apprehension. 
When queried why they dropped their support for relocating to Kyrgyzstan, Hajji 
Osman, an influential elder and a rival of Abdul Rashid Khan, who led the faction 
opposed to emigrating, stated that, "We went to Tajikistan, and we came back. We went 
to China, and we came back. We went to Pakistan, and we came back. Why would we 
leave for anywhere else? This is our watan [homeland]." Better the devil you know. 
The Post-Tali ban Period 
After the 9/11 attacks, various media outlets, citing a preposterous article that 
appeared in The News International, a Pakistani English language newspaper, reported 
that Osama bin Laden was hiding in the Afghan Pamirs, where "he and 1,000 followers 
had dug into a former Soviet base in the Wakhan Corridor."28 The News article claimed 
that US Special Operations Forces had arrived in southern Tajikistan and were preparing 
to attack the al Qaeda base.Z9 Although the December 2001 overthrow of the Taliban by 
US forces proved nothing so dramatic in the Pamirs, it did inaugurate a new era of hope 
for most Mghans, including the Kyrgyz. 
Salvation was slow in coming, though: the drought, now in its third year, showed 
no sign of relenting and the Afghan economy was a wreck. Plus, the Kyrgyz were far 
from Kabul and the international assistance programs based there. They were not 
27 http://www .rferl.org/contentJarticle/1343642.html 
28 http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/200 l/october/oct2n200 l.html 
29 http: //archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/200 Ill 0/2/8543l .shtml 
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represented in the any of the major events leading to the formation of the transitional 
Afghan government such as the 2001 Bonn Conference, the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, 
or the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003. Their mention in Chapter One, Article Three of 
the current (2004) Afghan constitution as one of fourteen named ethnic groups 
comprising "the nation of Afghanistan" seems to have occurred without any effort on 
their part; perhaps another example of their celebrity as a "postcard" ethnic group, since 
more populous but less familiar groups such as the W ak:hi were not mentioned (despite 
having sent a representative to the Emergency Loya Jirga). 
The Kyrgyz, like many other ethnic and tribal groups, sent unofficial, ad hoc 
delegations to Kabul in the hope of establishing a relationship with the new government 
and gaining access to government or NGO resources. The first mission to Kabul, led by 
Abdul Rashid, occurred in 2003 but proved fruitless. Another attempt was made in the 
fall of 2004 and, as discussed in Chapter Seven, thanks to the intercession of various 
influential political figures on behalf of the Kyrgyz, they received an audience with 
Karzai in early 2005, after waiting a few months.30 Abdul Rashid met with Karzai again 
in 2006, 2007, and 2009, in addition to having a number of phone conversations with the 
Afghan president and his staff. 
A number ofNGOs31 remained active in Badakhshan during the Afghan civil war, 
as much of the province was sufficiently secure for development activities to occur. The 
far eastern reaches of Badakhshan had been spared the conflict, whether between the 
Soviets and the mujahideen or, later, between various Afghan factions, that had destroyed 
much of the country. However, it was still remote, rural, and underdeveloped and 
30 Establishing chronologies is always problematic with the Kyrgyz and various informants, including 
Abdul Rashid, often are inconsistent with the dates for various events, including when they first met 
Karzai. The journalist Jon Lee Anderson, writing in the New Yorker, describes the first meeting as having 
occurred in 2005 (Anderson, 2005: 66). 
31 Here, "NGO" refers to both international NGOs, such as the Aga Khan Foundation, and Afghan aid 
agencies. None oflatter (to the best of my knowledge) operate in Wakhan or the Pamirs. 
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accordingly much NGO activity in Wakhan district was focused on building basic 
infrastructure: roads, bridges, irrigation canals, and the like. Humanitarian aid, in the 
form of food and medicine, was also a key sector. The main NGOs active during this 
period were the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC); Orphans, Refugees and Aid 
(ORA); various affiliates of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), including 
Focus Humanitarian Assistance (FOCUS); Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), and various 
UN agencies (WHO, UNICEF, WFP, etc.). 
After the Taliban were overthrown, a number of other NGOs arrived in Wakhan, 
including the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), the Central Asia Institute (CAl), and 
Mission East. AKDN, which had considerable experience across the border with Ismaili 
populations in the Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan as well as in northern 
Pakistan, significantly expanded its operations among Afghan Ismailis after 2001 and is 
by far the biggest NGO operating in Badakhshan. All of the NGOs operating in Wakhan 
district concentrate their activities among the W akhi, as the community is much easier to 
access by virtue of geography and temperament than the Kyrgyz, though occasional (and 
often token) efforts are made to provide some measure of development assistance to the 
Pamirs. A few NGOs have been put off by what is seen as Kyrgyz intractability. For 
example, a British doctor, Alex Duncan, described his experience among the Kyrgyz 
thus: 
During the survey process, it was clear that there is very little sense of 
community or desire to help one another in this group. This formed a 
marked contrast to the Wakhi among whom the ORA [Orphans, Refugees 
and Aid International, a German NGO] team has had prolonged 
experience of health and development work. We had continual arguments 
about the amount we should pay for hiring animals for transport, and when 
we suggested that the owners should consider that we had come to help 
the community, and that we had seen sick people and distributed free 
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medicines for them, they responded that "well, everyone should pay for 
their own medicines". Two of the men we trained asked how much we 
were going to pay them for helping the community in this very small way 
(Duncan, 2006: 10) 
Another visitor, also working for an NGO, opined, "With the Little Pamir lacking 
a leader of vision and political adroitness, there is no community or administrative base 
from which the scattered households can be effectively coordinated. There is no focal 
point to which outside organizations can offer assistance and be assured that a task will 
be well done ... My impression is that of a poor community in decline" (Schaller, 2004: 
16). Duncan similarly concluded that "there is very little sense or desire to help one 
another ... It was hard to see in the community much willingness to initiate or embrace 
change, despite the many hardships they endure. There seemed to be a general fatalistic 
sense ofhelplessness and lack of hope" (Duncan, 2006). 
Despite growing insecurity in many parts of Badakhshan, Wakhan district 
remains one of the safest and most stable parts of Afghanistan. While there have been a 
number of security incidents along the main road between Faizabad, the provincial 
capital, and Ishakshim, a district capital, regional entrepot, and the gateway to the Pamirs, 
W akhan itself has not experienced any significant security incidents. 32 The remoteness of 
the area, its lack of tactical or strategic value for insurgents, the presence of a relatively 
large Afghan Border Police (ABP) contingent based in Ishkashim, and the predominately 
Ismaili Shiite population are all factors that have contributed to stability. 
32 In 2006, a Russian trekker, traveling alone, disappeared in the Wakhan. Most locals believe he was the 
victim of robbery rather than anything having to do with the insurgency. 
CHAPTER 2- PHYSICAL, POLITICAL, AND 
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY OF THE PAMIRS 
Kyrgyz social and political organization need to be understood in the context of 
the unique geography of the Pamirs. By "unique" I mean not just the tectonic chaos of the 
Pamir Knot, where several of Asia's great mountain ranges intersect, but also the political 
geography of the Wakhan-Pamir region. Although extremely isolated from the rest of 
Afghanistan, and linked to Pakistan and China solely by means of high and difficult 
mountain passes, the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan is demarcated only by 
the Amu Darya (Oxus) river and, further upstream, by the Panj and Pamir Rivers, lake 
Zor Kol, a series of fairly low mountain saddles and, finally, at the far northeastern end of 
the Little Pamir, by nothing more than an arbitrary international border dividing a large 
expanse of pasture, half of which lies in Afghanistan and the other half in Tajikistan. 
While they recognize the border with Tajikistan, the Afghan Kyrgyz are 
nonetheless greatly frustrated by the physical openness of it, in both the Great Parnir 
(where the Pamir River is only 20 feet across in places and relatively shallow, not to 
mention frozen in winter) and the Little Parnir (where only the omnipresent Tajikistani 
border guards keep the Afghan Kyrgyz out). The border creates an artificial isolation, 
especially since there is a road directly across the border in Tajikistan, part of the Soviet-
era road network linking the various parts of Central Asia. This artificial isolation 
magnifies the overall remoteness of the Kyrgyz, since the absence of any legal crossing 
points into Tajikistan from the Pamirs means that to reach the nearest stores, hospitals, or 
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government offices, they must leave the Pamirs and transit half the length of the W akhan 
Corridor-a journey of 120 km, on foot or on horseback. 
Physical Geography 
A "pamir" is simply a high-altitude u-shaped valley, flanked by mountains and 
formed as the result of glacial activity rather than riverine erosion. Its etymology is 
uncertain but the word is generally believed to have first appeared in the writings of the 
seventh century BCE Chinese traveler, Xuanzang, who referred to the "valley of Po-mi-
lo" (Beal, 1906: 297), mostly likely a phonetic transcription of a local term, though its 
exact etymological origins are unknown (Curzon, 1896: 14-16). Marco Polo related it as 
"Pamier," the name of a "plain clothed with the finest pasture in the world" (Polo, 1929: 
171). A nineteenth century English explorer described a pamir as "a mountain valley of 
glacial formation, differing from ordinary mountain valleys only by reason of its superior 
altitude and the degree to which it has been filled up with alluvium, until it has obtained 
almost the appearance of a plain. The leading features of the Pamirs are the scarcity of 
trees, the abundance of pasturage and the severity of the climate" (Cobbold, 1900: 32). 
Here, the important features of a pamir are its altitude; low biological productivity, 
characterized by a lack of woody vegetation and generally above the limits of agriculture; 
and having a breadth such that there are clearly defined aspects (north- and south-facing). 
During the nineteenth century heyday of Central Asian exploration, one task of 
great geographical interest involved trying to determine how many pamirs were extant. 
Commonly, seven or eight were cited (Figure 2), of which four lie entirely within 
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PAMIRS 
Figure 2. The Central Asian Pamir valleys 
Tajikistan (Khargushi, Rang Kol,33 Sarez, and Alichur Pamirs), one straddles the Tajik-
Afghan border (Chong Parnir), one is wholly in Afghanistan (Kichik Pamir),34 and at 
least one lies in China (Taghdunbash, "the head of the mountain," often mistakenly 
referred to as "Taghdumbash").35 While these primarily appear to be etic distinctions, 
Dor and Naumann report that the Afghan Kyrgyz make a distinction between the first six, 
classifying them as the "Inner Pamir," versus those in China which, being part of a 
33 The Rang Kol Pamir is believed to have been included in the 1,122 km ofland ceded by Tajikistan to 
China in 2011 in order to settle a longstanding territorial dispute, although the exact location of the ceded 
lands remains unclear (Sodiqov, 2011). 
34 If the eighth Pamir identified by Curzon is included, that of the "Pamir-i-Wakhan" or the Wakhjir valley, 
then two pamirs lie completely within Afghanistan. Cf. Curzon, 1896: 19-20. 
35 Middleton and Thomas (2008: 521) mention that two other regions in China might qualify as distinct 
pamirs: Sarikol and Tagharma. However, the distinction between the two is very slight and it is more useful 
to distinguish between the Sarikol Range (mountains) and the Taghdunbash Pamir (valley). 
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separate hydrographic system, are considered the "Outer Pamir" (1978: 25). Today, the 
various pamirs are usually distinguished by nationality, giving us the Tajik, Afghan, and 
Chinese Pamirs. Within Tajikistan, the most common division is between the Western 
and Eastern Pamir, the salient distinction being that the Western Pamir is predominately 
inhabited by Indo-European Pamiri peoples and the Eastern Pamir by the Uralic-Altaic 
Kyrgyz. It is the Eastern Pamir of Tajikistan which abuts both of the Mghan Pamirs. 
On the Afghan side, the two pamirs-the Chong (or Zor) Pamir (in Dari, Pamir-e 
Kalan) and the Kichik (or Aksuu) Pamir (in Dari, Pamir-e Khurd)-are, in English, called 
the Great and the Little Pamir, respectively. The name of the former is somewhat 
misleading, as it is actually smaller in area than the Little Pamir; the appellation derives 
from its greater altitude relative to the Little Pamir. The 5,500 km2 Great Pamir runs east-
west for nearly 60 km and is bounded by the Alichur and Wakhan36 massifs of the Pamir 
Mountains on the north and south, respectively. Only half of the Great Pamir lies in 
Afghanistan; the other half, bisected by the Pamir River, which serves as the international 
border between Tajikistan and Mghanistan, lies in Tajikistan. The Little Pamir runs 
southwest-northeast for 100 km. It is separated from the Great Pamir, lying to the north-
northwest, by the W akhan massif and is bordered on the south by the Hindu Kush and 
Karakoram ranges, which form the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Within Afghanistan, there is a single route connecting these two areas and it is 
generally only passable in summer and early fall, which affects trading patterns as well as 
communications and serves to divide the two Kyrgyz populations geographically as well 
as socially, economically, and politically. The two pamirs are separated by a minimum of 
36 Also called the Nicholas or Nicholas II massif. 
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three days' travel, which involves crossing four mountain passes37 ranging in elevation 
from 4,595 to 4,902 m, two of which have permanent snow and glaciers. The surrounding 
mountains of the Wakhan Range average 5,450 min height and the highest point is Koh-
e Pamir, at 6,320 m. Crossing though Tajikistan, it would be possible to get from one to 
the other pamir in a day but, at present, such a trip is impossible due to the closed 
border38-another example of the Kyrgyz's artificial isolation. 
82.9% of the Wakhan-Pamir area in Afghanistan is above 3,000 m and during the 
nearly six-month winter (early November to late April) temperatures can plummet to -
50°C. The mean annual temperature is -l6°C and the number of days >0°C are fewer than 
60 per annum (Haritashya, et al., 2009: 7-8). The precipitation and wind patterns of the 
Pamir valleys are dictated by the mountainous topography of the region. Average 
precipitation is between 200-500 mm, mostly in the form of snow occurring in the spring 
and early summer. The snow line varies between 4,800 and 5,300 m. The Afghan Pamirs 
lie in the rain shadow of the Hindu Kush, which effectively blocks the summer monsoon 
precipitation, contributing to the low annual mean precipitation. The prevailing wind 
direction is from the northwest, which has the effect of scouring the windward and 
northern ends of the valleys: "the winter pastures are thus left clear of snow, but the 
continuous wind adds to the extreme harshness of the winter" (Shahrani 2002: 13). 
37 The Kyrgyz employ two different words to indicate the relative severity of a pass: art refers to a mild 
pass and bel (or dawan) denotes a more difficult one. Three of the four passes between the two Pamirs are 
considered bel. 
38 On the eastern side of lake Zor KtH, close to the Tajik border, is a small area where no natural boundary 
exists, but the Afghan Border Police have forbidden the Kyrgyz from grazing in or transiting through it. 
Nonetheless, the area, called chek (frontier) by the Kyrgyz, is occasionally used as a shortcut to the Little 
Pamir, as it involves crossing only one pass, the Andamin, versus four going by the legal route. It is also 
where the road that the Kyrgyz and a few of their allies in the Afghan government have proposed building 
in the Great Pamir would need to transit Tajikistan in order to connect to the Little Pamir. 
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Generically, the word "pamir" refers to the type of valley described above but as a 
proper noun it is also the name of a mountain chain, the Pamir Mountains. The apellation 
of this chain comes from the pamirs these mountains flank but in popular ( etic) usage it 
more commonly refers to the peaks rather than the valleys. This can lead to confusion, as 
seen in the distinction between the Sarikol Pamir mountains and the Taghdunbash Pamir 
valley mentioned earlier. While usually considered to be part of the Pamir Mountains, the 
southeastern part of the Afghan Pamir is better described as the "Pamir Knot," a loose 
geographical reference to the intersection of four (sometimes identified as five) of Asia's 
great mountain ranges: the Himalaya, the Karakoram, the Hindu Kush, the Tian Shan, 
and the Kunlun Mountains?9 At a minimum, the Afghan portion of the Pamir Knot can 
be considered to include the Pamir, the Hindu Kush, and the Karakoram. The Kyrgyz 
refer to the Pamir uplands using the Persian term Bam-e Dunya or "Roof of the World." 
All of the pamirs in Afghanistan and Tajikistan drain into the 534,739 km2 Amu 
Darya basin; the pamirs in China are part of the Tarim River basin. The Afghan-Chinese 
border follows the watershed between these two drainages. Chakmaktyn KOl, the "lake of 
flint" in the Little Pamir, so-named because of the abundance of flint stones (chakmak) 
occurring on its shores, drains in two directions: to the northeast into the Aksuu River and 
to the southeast into the Wakhan River. The Aksuu flows north into Tajikistan, where it 
becomes the Murghab and then the Bartang River, crossing southern Tajikistan's Gorno-
Badakhshan province before it joins the Amu Darya. The Wakhan River is joined by a 
39 The western extent of the Kunlun radiating from the Tibetan Plateau is ill-defined but on some maps 
includes Muztagh Ata (7,546 m) and Kongur Tagh (7,649 m) in Xinjiang, China, which would make the 
Kunlun part of the Pamir Knot. 
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number of tributaries, including the Wakhjir and the Bai Kara Rivers and then flows west 
into the upper Wakhan valley. 
Zor Kol,40 the lake at the eastern end of the Great Pamir, drains westward into the 
Pamir River,41 along which the Afghan-Tajik border continues southwest to the 
confluence of the Pamir and Wakhan Rivers, forming the Panj River (Figure 3). Near this 
confluence is Qala-ye Panja, a sprawling village that demarcates lower from upper 
Wakhan, and Gaz Khan, another Wakhi village on the right bank of the Wakhan River, 
where the main route to the Great Pamir begins. Geographically, the main distinction is 
that lower Wakhan, from Qala-ye Panja west to Ishkashim, abuts the southern bank of the 
Panj River, whereas upper Wakhan, from Qala-ye Panja east to Sarhad, straddles the 
Wakhan River (which lies entirely within Afghanistan). The Panj becomes the Amu 
Darya downstream of the confluence with the Vakhsh River, flowing southwest from 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Amu Darya, also called the Oxus by the Greeks and the 
Jayhun by the Arabs, forms the border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan 
before it jogs north, eventually flowing into the Aral Sea after its 2,540 km journey from 
the Pamir.42 
40 Zor Kol is also known as Lake Victoria, the name it was given by Lieutenant John Wood, who was the 
first modem European to set eyes upon it, in 1838. It is sometimes also identified (in writing) as Sirikol, 
Sarikol, or Sarykol, though this is not a name used or recognized by the present Kyrgyz inhabitants. 
41 Locally called the "Darya-ye Shuravi" or "Soviet River." 
42 The Amu Darya flows 1,415 km from the confluence of the Panj and Vakhsh Rivers but its total length is 
usually estimated from the head of the Wakhjir valley. 
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TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AFGHAN PAMIRS 
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Figure 3. The topography of the Wakhan-Pamir region 
Discovering the source of the Amu Darya was a task of keen interest in the 
nineteenth century, especially after 1873, when according to the Granville-Gortchakov 
Agreement between Britain and Russia, the river would serve as the southern border of 
the Tsarist empire. While its main course was clear enough, which of the various 
upstream affluents comprised the "true Upper Oxus" remained uncertain: "To the British 
the matter was vital because they were determined there should be a piece of 'no-man's 
land', a 'cordon-sanitaire'- (in fact client Afghan territory)- between Russia and British 
India" (Leach, 1986: 265). The original claim, offered by John Wood in 1838, was that 
Zor Kol comprised the source of the Oxus and that the Pamir River was the Oxus proper. 
In 1893, Russia used lingering uncertainty over the upper course of the Amu Darya to 
threaten Britain with the transfer of the border south, from the Pamir River to the W akhan 
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River (Becker, 1968: 156-157). Although Britain acquiesced to Russia's demands and the 
Pamir River remained as the border, the episode did add impetus to determining which 
affluent of the Amu Darya-the Pamir or the Wakhan-was in fact the true source of the 
Oxus. Various theories and candidate sources were suggested and debated until 1894, 
when George Nathaniel Curzon (later Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India) declared that an 
ice cave at the head of the Wakhjir valley comprised the proper geographical source of 
Oxus, based on water volume and elevation (Curzon, 1896). Perhaps surprisingly, the 
debate over "the source of the Oxus" continues in some quarters and in 2007 a new 
candidate was announced: a small, seasonal stream flowing out of the Chalap Valley in 
the Little Pamir (Colegrave, 201 0; cf. also Leach, 1986). 
Political Geography 
Afghanistan has a total of six different international borders of which Badakhshan 
province (including the Pamirs) abuts three:43 Pakistan to the south, China to the east, and 
Tajikistan to the north. The riparian Afghan-Tajik border in the Great Pamir has no 
significant mountain passes but there are a number of important ones crossing the 
mountainous international borders ofthe Little Pamir: the Andamin (or Bendersky; 4,563 
m), Jamanshor (4,427 m), and Ortobel (4,320 m) to Tajikistan; the Tegirmensuu (4,827 
m) and Wakhjir (4,927 m) to China; and the Dilisang (5,290 m), Irshad Uween (4,979 m), 
and Khora Burt (4,661 m) to Pakistan. 
43 The total length of Afghanistan's land boundaries is 5,529 km (China 76 km, Tajikistan 1,206 km, 
Uzbekistan 137 km, Turkmenistan 744 km, Iran 936 km, Pakistan 2,430 km). 
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Pakistan 
Wakhan district borders two different administrative units in Pakistan: Gilgit-
Baltistan, an autonomous political territory formerly known as the Northern Areas, and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province. Within 
Gilgit-Baltistan, two different districts are co-terminous with the Little Parnir, Gilgit to 
the east and Ghizar to the west. From Afghanistan, the Khora Burt pass connects to 
Ishk:oman tehsil (sub-district) and the Karambar valley of Ghizar, whereas the Irshad 
Uween and Dilisang passes both connect with Gojal tehsil and the Chapursan valley of 
Upper Hunza. 
The rest of Wakhan district is bordered by Chitral district, formerly a princely 
state dating back to the British Raj and one of five Provincially Administered Frontier 
Areas (PATA) in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The border between Afghan Wakhan and Chitral 
follows the crest of the Hindu Kush, including the highest peak in Afghanistan, Koh-e 
Noshaq (7,492m). The two main passes breaching the Hindu Kush along the border are 
the Dorah ( 4,511m), which was a key infiltration and supply route from Chitral into 
Badakhshan for the anti-Soviet mujahideen, and the much more gentle Broghil (3,882 m), 
which connects to a number of strategic valleys, including the Y asin and Y arkhun, as 
well as Gilgit (via the Darkot pass in Chitral) (Adamec, 1972). 
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Cit ina 
China's short but strategic border with Mghanistan44 occurs along the eastern 
Amu Darya watershed. The main pass is the Wakhjir, which was crossed in 747 CE by a 
portion of the Chinese army led by the Tang general Gao Xianzhi that routed Tibetan 
forces close to Sarhad-e Broghil (Stein, 1922: 118). The Kara Chukur valley, on the 
Chinese side, reportedly hosts a military base and as such is a restricted zone. The area 
bordering Afghanistan is part of the Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County, part of 
Kashgar (Kashi) prefecture, but remains "the only Kirghiz-dominated pasture region" in 
the county (Kreutzmann, 2003: 226). Most of China's 150,000 Kyrgyz live further north, 
in the neighboring Kyzylsuu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture. 
Tajikistan 
The administrative area in Tajikistan bordering Afghan Wakhan is the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (in Russian, Gorno-Badakhshanskaya avtonomnaya 
oblast ' and in Tajiki, Viloyati Mukhtori Kuhistoni-Badakhshon or more commonly just 
Kuhistoni-Badakhshon). Of the seven districts (nohiya) comprising Gorno-Badakhshan, 
two border Afghan Wakhan: Ishkoshim and Murghab. Murghab is part of the Eastern 
Pamir and is home to most of Tajikistan's 11,000 Kyrgyz (Herbers, 2001: 368). 
From Tajikistan, the Mghan Great Pamir can easily be accessed across the narrow 
Pamir river, although the only bridge is further downstream at Langar. The one motorable 
crossing point into the Little Pamir follows the road (on the Tajik side) from Murghab 
south past Toktamysh and Shaimak to Kyzyl Rabat, the last (Kyrgyz) settlement in the 
44 An interesting fact is that the Afghan-Chinese border has the greatest change in time zones of any 
international border in the world: three-and-a-half hours. This is because all of China follows a single time 
zone, based on Beijing time (UTC+8:00). Afghanistan is UTC+4:30. 
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Tajik Pamirs. From Kyzyl Rabat, the terrain is mostly dasht, a flat, open area, and the old 
Soviet road to Bozoi Gfunboz, on the drier and less riverine northern side of Chakmaktin 
KOl, is still passble. Perhaps as a legacy from the time when it was "the most hermetically 
controlled boundary at the interface between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan" 
(Kreutzmann, 2009: 112), the entire Tajik-Afghan border along both the Little and Great 
Pamir has remained closed since Tajikistan's independence and the nearest official 
crossing point is further west, in Ishkashim. 
Afghan Badakhshan and Wakhan 
Encompassing both the crest of the Hindu Kush mountains and the jagged Pamir 
Knot, almost 90% of Badakhshan province is classified as mountainous or semi-
mountainous (Figure 4). It is 44,059 km2 in area and has a population of approximately 
900,000, mostly Tajiks but with a significant minority of Uzbeks and Pamiris (Shughni, 
Zebaki, Ishkashimi, Wakhi). The provincial capital is Faizabad, a city of more than 
50,000 people, straddling the Kokcha River.45 Badakhshan is one of the poorest of 
Afghanistan's 34 provinces, with a 61% poverty rate and a per capita monthly total 
consumption (of food and non-food items) of 1,069 AFN ($22), compared to a 
nationwide average of 1,672 ($35) (The World Bank, 2011). Given its mountainous, high 
altitude terrain, predominately rural population, and poor transportation infrastructure 
(besides the recently completed highway connecting Faizabad to points west, there are no 
45 The Old City (shahr-e khuna) is on the right (north) bank of the Kokcba but since 2001 Faizabad has 
been rapidly expanding along the opposite side of the river in what is called the New City (shahr-e nau). 
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Figure 4. Badakhshan province, Afghanistan 
paved roads), Afghan Badakhshan has historically been a food deficient region and even 
today it suffers from poor food security (ibid). Subsistence agriculture is the main 
economic activity, although mining of gemstones (mostly lapis lazuli, plus small amounts 
of rubies and emeralds) and gold46 comprises another important sector. 
Badakhshan is divided into 28 districts (wuluswali) and the largest (by area) is 
Wakhan (Figure 5). Wakhan district consists of four geographical regions: the upper and 
lower Wakhan valley, which is the alluvial plain on both sides of the Wakhan River and 
46 In December, 2011 , the Afghan Ministry ofMines issued its first mineral tender for four 250 km2 
exploration plots of gold-bearing quartz-vein systems in Badakhshan. 
http://www.afgbanmineraltenders.com/current-tenders/badakhshan-gold/ 
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Figure 5. Wakhan district, Badakhshan 
along the southern bank of the Panj River, respectively; and the Great and Little Pamir 
(Figure 6). Although the term "Wakhan Corridor" is commonly used to refer to all four 
regions, properly it denotes only the upper and lower Wakhan valley, which runs east-
west, approximately from Ishkashim in the east to Sm·had-e Broghil in the west, for 
approximately 220 km. It is uniformly narrow, ranging from 16 to 64 km in width. A 
rough dirt road runs the length of the Wakhan, ending at Sm·had, and is usually passable 
year-round. Since 2006, a series of bridges over the major river crossings (tributaries of 
the Wakhan and Panj Rivers) have been constructed, significantly shortening the driving 
time from Ishkashim to Sarhad to less than a day. Most of the vehicle traffic consists of 
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Figure 6. The Wakhan-Pamir region 
government and NGO 4WDs, 12-seater taxi vans, and multi-ton Kamaz trucks. Khandud 
(also written as Khandut), the district center, is the only place in Wakhan with any 
appreciable population of non-Wakhi; the merchants as well as the district government 
and security officials are mostly Tajik. Ishkashim,47 though not in Wakhan district, is the 
commercial center of the Wakhan-Pamir area, owing to the border crossing with 
Tajikistan. It also hosts a large Afghan Border Police garrison, commanded by the 
region's main power broker, Mir Abdul Wahid Khan. 
47 Also known as Sultan Ishkashim, to differentiate it from the Tajikistani town oflshkashim, directly 
across the Panj River. 
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The population ofWakhan district is estimated to be about 13,700 (Duncan, 2009: 
252), most of whom are Wakhi (12,500), living in 39 villages located between Ishkashim 
and Sarhad in the upper and lower Wakhan valley. The rest of the population consists of 
other Pamiri groups, a few Tajiks and Uzbeks, and the Kyrgyz (1,149) in the Great and 
Little Pamirs. Because the Mghan Pamirs are geographically and ethnically distinct from 
the Wakhan river valley, there has been a nascent movement to create one (the Pamir 
wuluswali) or two (a wuluswali for each Pamir) additional districts out of Wakhan. At 
least in the near term, this seems extremely improbable, for two reasons. First, unlike in 
other parts of Afghanistan, where ethnic or tribal solidarity groups have been able to 
exert sufficient political pressure to be rewarded with their own district, the Kyrgyz lack 
the clout in Kabul to affect such an outcome. Second, the Pamirs lack the infrastructure to 
support any sort of administration: no roads, no phone service, and few permanent 
structures. In principle the Kyrgyz support the idea of having a district (or districts) of 
their own, believing that it would bring additional resources and attention to their various 
needs. Overall though it ranks fairly low among their priorities and is usually only 
considered in the context of whether such administrative changes would increase the 
likelihood of a road being built. 
Human Geography 
In discussing the human geography of the Wakhan-Pamir region, there are three 
groups that must be considered: the Kyrgyz, the Wakhi, and the Badakhshis. While each 
group tends to occupy a particular geographical and economic niche, they comprise an 
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interdependent whole in terms of politics and economics. Trade, the main linkage 
between the three groups, is discussed in the next chapter. 
Waklti 
The W akhi are agro-pastoralists practicing a form of "combined mountain 
agriculture" (Ehlers and Kreutzmann, 2000: 17), involving a mixture of crop-raising and 
transhurnance, though largely absent the verticality characteristic of a similar form 
(Alpwirtschaft) found in Europe. Most W akhi farmers are subsistence producers who, in a 
good year, might generate a small amount of agricultural surplus which can be traded for 
other goods. The Wakhi are Nizari Ismailis, Shiites who recognize Prince Shah Karim al-
Husayni, the fourth Aga Khan and the 49111 Nizari Imam, as their spiritual leader. Besides 
Afghan Wakhan, significant numbers of Wakhi live in northern Pakistan (Gilgit-
Baltistan), western China (Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County, Kashgar prefecture, 
Xinjiang province; in Chinese they are called tajike zu), and southern Tajikistan (Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast). The W akhi are only one of a number of Ismaili ethnic 
groups, often collectively called Pamiris or Mountain Tajiks, who speak Southeastern 
Iranian languages and live in the Hindu Kush-Pamir highlands. 
Badakltsltis, Uzheks, and Afghans 
Most of the itinerant traders (tijor; in Dari, tejaar) who visit the Pamirs every 
summer and fall are ethnic Tajiks from other parts of Badakhshan, particularly Faizabad 
and Baharak. They are identified as "Badakhshis" by the Kyrgyz and Wakhi, which has 
the specific meaning of a Tajik from Badakhshan province (although, among the Kyrgyz, 
it often is applied to Tajiks from other northern provinces as well). Despite Wakhan 
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district being mostly Wakhi, Tajiks occupy the pinnacles of political and economic 
power: they control the transportation networks, own most of the commercial 
establishments, run the district government,48 and comprise the security forces (Afghan 
National Police, polis-e milli, which includes both the Afghan Uniform Police, polis-e 
uniform posh-e Afghan but most often just called polis, and the Mghan Border Police, 
sarhad-e polis). While the Badakhshi traders benefit from the predominately Tajik 
bureaucratic and security presence in W akhan, they do not hold a monopoly on trade: 
several Uzbeks, most from western Badakhshan (Argu and Keshem districts), and a 
growing number of Pashtuns from Paghman, a city in Kabul province, are also active in 
the Wakhan-Pamir. The latter are called "Mghans"by the Kyrgyz, harking back to a time 
when "Afghanistan" had a mostly ethnic referent, meaning "land of the Pashtuns." 
The Kyrgyz Geographical Weltanschauung 
By necessity, the closed frontiers nomadism practiced by the Afghan Kyrgyz 
involves a series of short seasonal migration combined with the intensive rather than 
extensive use of pasture. The overarching goal is to maximize the available forage 
resources, whether in terms of grazing or fodder, during every season. The short 
migrations, usually less than 10 km, are undertaken so as to access fresh pastures and 
allow depleted ones a chance to regenerate by leaving them fallow for several months. 
The seasonality of the grazing lands-the condition of the forage and the amount of snow 
on the ground-is the main determinant of when each migration will occur. 
48 Some Pamiris, including Wakhi, do hold prominent positions in influential NGOs present in Wakhan, 
such as the Aga Khan Development Network, but very few, if any, Wakhi are represented in district or 
provincial govermnent, since such figures are appointed by Kabul, not elected locally. 
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Kyrgyz spatial and temporal conceptions of place are interwoven and rotate 
around a seasonal axis. The most elementary division, based on aspect, is between 
kiingoz, south-facing and sunny, and tesker, north-facing and shaded. In winter, one 
ideally wants to be on the kiingof side of a pamir, where the more abundant sun will cause 
the snow to melt faster (Figure 7). In summer, after the pastures on the kiingor side have 
been depleted, one moves across the pamir to spend winter where aspect matters least, on 
the tesker side (Figure 8). In between, during the fall, one heads to the sedge-filled 
riparian area in the middle of the pamir, the suunun boru ("bank of the river"), where the 
best forage is found and the livestock can fatten up before the winter (Figure 9). In the 
spring, if the snows in the adumbral tesker side are slow to melt and the pastures on the 
kiingoz side are exhausted, one will either go to a dedicated spring grazing area or else 
back to the suunun boru for a short period. 
As mentioned earlier, only the Little Pamir (and, if counted as a parnir, the 
Wakhjir valley) lies entirely within Afghanistan; the kiingoz half of the Great Pamir is 
Tajikistani territory. Thus, while it is possible to follow an annual teskef-suunun bozu-
kiingof-tesker migration pattern in the Little Parnir, in the Great Pamir only tesker and 
suunun bozu pastures are available. I discuss specific adaptations to this problem in 
Chapter Three but in general the loss of the kiingoz half of the Great Pamir forced those 
Kyrgyz restricted to the teskez side to devise a different migration strategy to compensate 
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Figure 9. Comparison of fall camp locations and sizes 
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In broad outline, there are two different migration patterns found in each of the 
two Pamirs. In the Little Pamir, the first one is the complete teskez-suunun bozu-kungoz-
teskez migration, involving generally short distances and, owing to abundant pastures and 
low stocking rates, little population dispersal (Figure 1 0). The variant is to go from 
kungoz to suunun bozu to another kiingoz/suunun bozu area by utilizing two or three 
different valley systems (jylga). For example, a number of Kyrgyz move from their 
kiingoz summer pastures in the Kyrchyn or Zor Akjylga valleys to the suunun bozu in the 
middle of the Little Parnir or in the lower Wakhjir valley. For the winter, they then move 
to a kiingozlsuunun bozu area in the upper Wakhjir (Figure 11). In the summer, they 
return to the kungoz aspect. The important thing in both migration cycles is avoiding 
teskef pastures in winter. This strategy usually requires increasing population dispersal as 
the Kyrgyz move from summer to fall and then to winter camps. 
Because the entire Afghan half of the Great Pamir is basically one big teskef area, 
the two migration patterns practiced there are distinct from those found in the Little 
Pamir and both involve considerable fissioning of the camp groups. Besides aspect, the 
Great Parnir offers up two other challenges: altitude and area. As mentioned previously, it 
is higher in elevation than the Little Pamir and most summer camps are above 4,200 
meters. By itself, altitude wouldn't be much of an issue but combined with a north-facing 
aspect it renders the Great Pamir colder and snowier.49 In addition, land area for pasturing 
livestock in the Great Pamir is an issue since despite having a slightly smaller human 
49 All Kyrgyz agree that the Great Pamir receives more snow than the Little Pamir and, by virtue of being 
north-facing, the resulting snowpack is slower to melt and tends to last well into spring. The inescapable 
peril of either Great Pamir migration strategy is deep snow, which unfortunately is the norm. 
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LITTLE PAMIR SEASONAL CAMP MIGRATION 1 
r Winter migration 
T Summer migration 
;e'•• Variant spring migration 
11-'-• Variant summer migration 
0 
0 Fall camp 
e Winter camp 
e Summer camp 
Figure 10. Little Pamir seasonal camp migration 1 
population, significantly less land is available for livestock compared to the Little Pamir. 
Harsher winters, and the higher livestock mortality associated with them, combined with 
more limited grazing areas, account for the generally more complicated migration 
patterns found in the Great Parnir. Collectively, these factors also in part explain the 
greater relative poverty of the Great Pamir. 
The first strategy is to graze extensively m fall and winter, which obviously 
requires a bigger area. To accomplish this, the Kyrgyz spend the summers higher up in 
the valleys and graze their livestock intensively there. In the fall, they move down past 
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LITTLE PAMIR SEASONAL CAMP MIGRATION 2 
Fall migration r Winter migration 
,. Summer. migration 
Other Households 
(Dashed arrows do not necessarily 
indicate direction of migration) 
11
,•• Winter migration 
11
,•• Summer migration 
0 Fall camp 
e Winter camp 
e Summer camp 
Figure 11. Little Pamir seasonal camp migration 2 
the base of the valley, where it debouches into the flat tablelands (dasht or talaa) 
stretching along the southern bank of the Pamir river (Figure 12). During winter, they 
move further north into the dasht, often right along the Pamir river, and pasture their 
livestock as extensively as possible. In some cases, they might have two different winter 
camps to maximize the area they can exploit, in addition to a dedicated spring pasture. 
The other strategy is to intensively utilize entirely separate, parallel valley 
systems, which are occupied in different seasons. The groups that spend the summer in 
the Elgunak valley and then in the fall move onejylga to the west, to the Tolubai valley, 
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GREAT PAMIR SEASONAL CAMP MIGRATION 1 
Fall migration r Winter migration 
~ Summer migration 
0 Fallcamp 
e Winter camp 
e Summer camp 
Figure 12. Great Pamir seasonal camp migration 1. 
exemplify this type of migration cycle. After a month or two spent grazing the middle of 
the valley, they move far up the same valley for the winter (Figure 13). 
Kyrgyz Semi-Nomadism 
Besides the teskef-kiingdf division, the Kyrgyz have four referents for their 
seasonal pastures--jafloo (summer), kiizddd (autumn), kyshtoo (winter), and jazdoo 
(spring)50-which also denote the seasonal camps (afyl, which includes all of the 
households, iif, living in a given camp) associated with such pastures. As noted above, 
ideally the summer pastures are located on the teskef side of a pamir and winter pastures 
50 Jazdoo are known colloquially as baaluu (literally, "valuable"). 
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GREAT PAMIR SEASONAL CAMP MIGRATION 2 
Elgunak households 
Fall migration r Winter migration 
T Spring migration 
r Summer migration 
Other Households 
lDashed arrows do 110! necessarily 
indicate direction of migration) 
Fall migration 
~,-. Winter migration 
~t~~~•• Summer migration 
0 Fall camp 
e Winter camp 
e Spring camp 
Summer camp 
Figure 13. Great Pamir seasonal camp migration 2. 
on the kungof aspect but the main concern is to avoid over-wintering in any teskef area 
due to the likelihood of deep, persistent snow. 
With the exception of two households in the Little Pamir, the total number of uf 
does not vary throughout the year. However, the number of afyl, and how many 
households comprise each, does vary by season (Table 1). In general, a process of 
progressive household fission occurs as the Kyrgyz move from summer to fall to winter 
encampments, with winter camps having the fewest number of uf per camp. 51 When fall 
and winter pasture conditions permit, many Kyrgyz afyl in the Little Pamir will remain 
51 Because the various iii comprising an alyl tend to work cooperatively on tasks such as herding, and 
because a certain number of animals are required to produce enough dung for the winter, single-household 
alyl are uncommon although they do occur. 
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together throughout their seasonal migrations, without any fission, but dispersal is the 
norm in the Great Pamir (Figures 14 and 15). The private ownership of pastures and 
campgrounds, and especially the capital improvements found in most kyshtoo, ensure that 
the same groups generally return to the same seasonal camps on a recurring basis. Poorer 
households or individuals who do not own land exhibit the most flux and sometimes 
change residences every few years based on personal preference and the availability of 
paid labor. 
Table 1. Number of camps (alyl) by season, Little and Great Pamir 
Number of: Little Pamir Great Pamir 
Summer camps (jarloo) 27 15 
Fall camps (kiizdoo) 21 (+10jarloo) 22 
Winter camps (kyshtoo) 41 36 
Spring camps (jazdoo) 0 10 (+25 kyshtoo) 
Source: author (2007-08, 2010) 
Every Kyrgyz iiz will make at least two-and some as many as five-migrations 
per year. The simplest migration alternates between jarloo and kyshtoo; the more 
complicated ones involve kiizdoo and jazdoo as well, and possibly even two different 
kyshtoo. A fairly typical annual migration cycle has the following durations: about three-
to-four months (mid-June to mid-September) in the jarloo and then, after fodder is cut 
(beginning sometime in mid-to-late September), relocation to the kiizdoo for two to three 
months (mid-September to December). Those a'fyl not utilizing fall camps will remain in 
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December, before the other a'fyl move from kiizdod to kyshtoo. The longest seasonal 
residence occurs in the kyshtoo, totaling about six months (December to June). Because 
of the strain such a long residence puts upon the pastures around the winter camps, some 
groups, often those with marginal or limited winter grazing lands, will move to a second 
kyshtoo in the late winter. A few Kyrgyz households have dedicated spring encampments, 
jazdoo, where they move in May and remain for one to two months; the others either 
return to their jalloo around early June, usually as soon as the snow cover starts to 
dissipate, or, if the winter has seen heavy snowfall, they may detour to the fall camp for a 
few weeks until the summer pastures are clear. 
In summer and fall, most households live in portable felt yurts (ak iif, "white 
houses"; sometimes also called boz ill or "grey houses"). Hard structures, made of dried 
mud, are typical of the winter camps; very few Kyrgyz live in yurts during the winter. 
These permanent structures, called tam, are preferred for their greater warmth and 
durability. They also offer a place to store various items when the camp is unoccupied. It 
has become increasingly common for wealthier Kyrgyz to build tam in summer and fall 
camps as well, for reasons of practicality and status. 
All but the poorest a'fyl will also have mefmankana, guest quarters, in their jarloo, 
mostly to house the Badakhshi traders as well as any other non-Kyrgyz visitors. Often 
this is a dedicated guest yurt, or else one occupied by unmarried adult males and/or 
resident workers. Both the prefabricated nylon-and-aluminum Chinese-made yurts given 
to the Kyrgyz by the Aga Khan Foundation for foreign tourists and the canvas school 
tents provided by the Afghan government are also employed as mefmankana. In winter, 
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when most Kyrgyz are living in tam, guest quarters are mostly non-existent, but there are 
few guests from outside the Pamir during the winter in any case. 
Pack animals (camels, male yak, donkeys, horses) are used to transport all 
items-stoves, disassembled yurts, bed frames, etc.-between seasonal camps. Typically 
an entire afyl will work cooperatively to pack and move everything over a couple of days. 
Because the distances are not great and the terrain is easy, the animals can be over-loaded 
and a couple trips back-and-forth will suffice. 
Land Ownership: Pastures, Camps, and Koruk 
Unlike livestock, which are owned individually (or by the household, but 
managed by the senior male), land is owned collectively by all agnatic members of the 
dfyl, female as well as male. Women almost always live in their husband's camp 
(uxorilocal residence), however, so collective ownership, in practical terms, is limited to 
males. 52 Because many camps are composite and not simply limited to a particular 
patrilineal group, there are often non-agnatic male members of any given aryl who have 
only usufruct rather than ownership rights of campgrounds and pasture lands. 
Private ownership of these resources, besides ensuring a regular migration pattern, 
stimulates capital improvements of physical infrastructure (Shahrani, 2002: 175). As a 
result, seasonal camp grounds, especially kyshtoo, host a number of permanent structures: 
dwellings (tam), animal pens (koroo), and storage facilities (kapa). Many pastures and 
fodder producing areas (koruk) are irrigated, and expanding and improving irrigation 
systems has been the focus of every Kyrgyz Community Development Council's 
52 As Shahrani notes, "The Kirghiz on the Islamic provision for women's rights to inheritance of property, 
but in practice many women do not claim their share from their siblings after the death of their father in 
order to guarantee male sibling support in the future" (2002: 144). 
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"priority subproject," undertaken using National Solidarity Program (NSP) block grants, 
as I discuss in Chapter Seven. 
Land ownership-of pastures, koruk, and camps-is more a function of time and 
custom than legal documentation. It is commonly understood that one's claim to an area 
is based on the fact that one's father (or other ancestor in one's patriline) owned or at 
least occupied it. Many Kyrgyz claim to have inherited written title deeds (kadim) for the 
land they purportedly own but the one actual document I was shown, which its bearer 
stated granted him legal title to his campgrounds and pasture lands, turned out to be the 
tazkira (written as "tashkera"), or national identity card, of his deceased father. This 
tazkira had been issued in 1945 and mentioned nothing about land ownership, stating 
only that the person thus identified had been born in the Pamir region and was a current 
resident of the Little Pamir. 
The persistence of such customary traditions of ownership can also be seen in 
those camps in the Little Parnir formerly owned by the Kyrgyz who left for Pakistan, 
never returned to Afghanistan, and settled in Turkey. Even though 30 years have gone by, 
the Kyrgyz who occupy those camps today still considered them amanat, or borrowed, 
and not their own property. Other Kyrgyz scoffed at the notion that these areas could still 
be amanat, chalking it up to irredentism on the part of the Turkish Kyrgyz. As one 
informant mused, "They live there [Turkey], we live here. What are they doing to do, 
shoot us?" In a practical sense, the distinction is moot, since no rents are paid, numerous 
capital improvements have been made, and the right to use these amanat lands, if not to 
own the lands themselves, is heritable. 
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As discussed in Chapter One, the redistribution of land in the Little Pamir 
following the 1978 exodus was relatively straightforward. An abundance of vacant land, 
and comparatively few people (and livestock) to occupy it, allowed everyone to settle 
more or less wherever they pleased, although there was an initial tendency to cluster 
towards the central part of the Little Pamir, around the southern end of Chakmaktyn Kol. 
The more distant pastures, such as those in the Tegirmensuu, were left vacant. In all, 
seven previously occupied valleys were abandoned: Baharak, Shaur (in W akhi: 
Chapdara), Schpodkis, Korumduu (in Wakhi: Warm), the Wakhan River valley, Bai 
Kara, and Tegirmensuu. All but Tegirmensuu were eventually occupied by Wakhi 
(Figure 16). 
Bai Kara and Tegirmensuu had previously been the two most populated and 
intensively used valleys of the seven. The Bai Kara valley, leading to the Irshad Uween 
pass along the Pakistani border in the south, was initially occupied by Wakhi from 
Sarhad-e Broghil following the departure of the Kyrgyz in 1978. In recent years, a few 
Wakhi from Pakistan have also been occasionally grazing their livestock across the 
border in the Bai Kara valley during the summer. 53 The use of former Kyrgyz grazing 
areas by the Wakhi, whether Mghan or Pakistani, is tolerated by the Kyrgyz since at 
present they have little need for these pastures (Figure 17). Perhaps as a face- saving 
gesture, the Kyrgyz still refer to these areas as amanat, owned by them but loaned 
53 Hermann Kreutzmann, Department of Geography, Freie Universitat Berlin, personal communication 
(2006). 
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FORMER KYRGYZ PASTURES 
LITTLE PAMIR 
40km 
~ Valleys Occupied by Wakhi 
,.- Vacant Valley 
Chin a 
Figure 16. Former Kyrgyz pastures, abandoned in 1978 
temporarily to the Wakhi. On one occasion, though, a group of Kyrgyz living in the 
remote northeastern part of the Little Pamir, close to the Tegirmensuu valley, requested 
that the Wakhi leave the Bai Kara valley, as they were interested in moving there. The 
Wakhi refused and the Kyrgyz made little protest. 
An additional point, though one never mentioned by the Kyrgyz, is that many of 
these areas belonged to the Wakhi prior to permanent Kyrgyz settlement of the Afghan 
Pamir in the early twentieth century. From the Wakhi perspective, the Kyrgyz 
abandonment of these pastures in 1978 simply restored them back to W akhi ownership. 
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Division of Wakhi and Kyrgyz Territory in Afghan Pamir 
(Prior to 1978 Kyrgyz Exodus) 
0------·50 Kilometers C3 Wakhi C3 Kyrgyz c:3 Uninhabited 
Division of Wakhi and Kyrgyz Territory in Afghan Pamir 
(2000s) 




Furthermore, the wealthiest Wakhi in Sarhad, Mohammad Toshiboi, who pastures a large 
number oflivestock in the Bai Kara Valley, stated that after the Kyrgyz fled to Pakistan 
in 1978, the Wakhi were asked by the Afghan government to reoccupy these now-vacant 
areas. 
The Tegirmensuu valley, the eastern terminus of the Little Pamir near the 
intersection of Afghanistan, China, and Tajikistan, has remained vacant for 30 years. 
While various Kyrgyz claim ownership of certain parts of it, none have shown any 
interest in (re)occupying it. The main reason, as with the Bai Kara valley, is that there is 
no pressing need to utilize these far-flung pastures at present, since the areas currently 
used for grazing are sufficient, given lower stocking rates compared to 30 years ago. In 
addition, no Kyrgyz have any desire to live in these remote areas, far from other Kyrgyz 
and out of the way of the traders servicing the Little Pamir in summer. Lack of 
accumulated dung to use as fuel as well as the absence of permanent structures in the 
Tegirmensuu, unoccupied for three decades, are also cited as impediments to 
reoccupation. Other problems with the Tergimensuu are the likelihood of livestock 
straying across the open border between into Tajikistan and vulnerability to Tajikistani 
bandits (karakchy), who are often accused of stealing livestock from the Kyrgyz. 
The luxury of excess grazing land is foreign to the Great Pamir Kyrgyz, however. 
Since they were not part of the iirkiin, the 1978 exodus to Pakistan, land tenure in the 
Great Pamir has remained much more consistent by virtue of uninterrupted residence. 
Land, especially grazing land, is also at more of a premium, owing to a smaller overall 
area, but disputes among the Great Pamir Kyrgyz are fairly rare, thanks to well-
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established property rights. Drawn in part by the prospect of available land, a number of 
Kyrgyz from the Great Pamir (men and women) have moved to the Little Pamir over the 
past 3 0 years. 
In theory, since it is privately owned, land can be sold to outsiders, but I recorded 
no instances of this actually occurring. The few W akhi or Badakhshi men who have taken 
up residence alongside the Kyrgyz in the Little Pamir lease certain camps and pastures 
from the Kyrgyz who own them (in some cases those living in Turkey), paying rent in 
livestock. 54 Land transfers between Kyrgyz do occur, either as land swaps or in exchange 
for livestock, but these are infrequent and are usually the result of water sources in a 
given camp drying up, necessitating relocation. 
As in the Little Pamir, tenancy in the Great Pamir is guaranteed primarily by 
multi-generational residence as a heritable right. The importance of this concept, in the 
absence of more formal means to establish ownership, is illustrated by a land dispute that 
occurred in the Great Pamir in the summer of 2010. A few younger Kyrgyz had been 
claiming that several W akhi grazing areas in the Great Pamir rightfully belonged to them 
and, to avert any possibility of violence, both sides agreed to go down to the district 
center, Khandud, and have the district governor (wuluswal) adjudicate their dispute. The 
wuluswal asked how many generations of Wakhi have continually occupied the disputed 
lands and was told "haft posht," a colloquial way of saying seven generations. The 
54 The two Badakhshi and one Wakhi man who have moved to the Pamir and married Kyrgyz women do 
not pay any rents. Each does, however, live in his wife's a'{yl and besides having paid bridewealth, he also 
works collectively with her family on basic tasks (herding, infrastructure repair, cutting grass, etc.). In this 
sense, they are similar in the in-marrying sons-in-law discussed in the next chapter. 
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Kyrgyz claims were dismissed and the Wakhi were given a letter stating that the lands are 
indisputably theirs. 
It appears that this combination of customary practices and ad hoc adjudication 
will remain the norm in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, since the proposed 
Rangelands Law is still only in draft form and has yet to be submitted to the Afghan 
legislature. The first official draft of this law, developed by the Afghan Ministry of 
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), with technical support from the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and various NGOs, was created in March 2007. Since 
then there have been several revised drafts, most of which seem to founder on the 
question of identifying "community rangelands" and assigning "custodial rights" to them. 
Customary (usufruct) rights based on adjacency and fifty years of prior use are 
recognized, but not for determining custodial rights to community rangelands. As the 
example of the Kyrgyz and the Wakhi illustrates, disputes over contested rangelands 
often center on which community will have future rights to use and/or manage the 
resource (custodial rights) based on claims of prior usage (customary rights). The 
proposed Rangeland Law's failure to clearly address these issues offers little hope that 
the multitude of pasture disputes in Mghanistan will be solved by formal legislation. 
CHAPTER3-KYRGYZDEMOGRAPHY 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES 
Kyrgyz demography and demographic processes-the size of their population, 
how many children die before the age of five, what is the ratio of males to females, etc.-
are highly sensitive questions, at least from the perspective of the Kyrgyz themselves. In 
part, this is a reflection of the low levels of social trust and zero-sum thinking endemic to 
Afghanistan, a place where no population census has ever been completed and where 
even today ethnic sensitivities preclude the disclosure of what might elsewhere be 
innocuous information. 
However, the main reason that these topics are sensitive to the Kyrgyz is because 
the near-total absence of actual demographic data gives the Kyrgyz the latitude to define 
their demographic situation in a way likely to bring them attention and aid, which most 
often means portraying it in the direst terms they can. Thus the Kyrgyz claim to have a 
precipitously declining population, an alarming gender imbalance with too many men and 
too few women, and unsustainable levels of mortality, especially among women and 
children. The demographic data I collected partially supports some of these claims, 
although overall the situation is less severe than commonly portrayed by the Kyrgyz, as 
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well as by NGOs peddling dubious claims in what appears to be an attempt to dramatize 
the problems of the Kyrgyz. 55 
Kyrgyz Demography 
As with many groups in Afghanistan, the Kyrgyz invariably inflate their 
population figures, often claiming double or triple their actual number. While this is 
hardly a new practice, the post-Tali ban situation in Afghanistan has offered fresh impetus 
to dissemble not just population numbers but also mortality statistics. Humanitarian 
assistance, whether from the Afghan government or NGOs, is believed by many Afghans, 
including the Kyrgyz, to be disbursed according to need and numbers. As a result, there 
are ample incentives to exaggerate both, especially since taxation and conscription, the 
reality of which served as a check on exaggeration in the past, are no longer concerns. 
Also, political influence is generally correlated with sheer numbers, both in the popular 
imagination and in determining provincial representation at the national level in the 
Wolesi Jirga. 
In the case of the Kyrgyz, they had already learned the value of gaming the 
system prior to 2001, when the NGO Focus Humanitarian Assistance (FOCUS), an 
affiliate of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), began providing them with 
55 In March of20 12, the Central Asia Institute published a number of dispatches in which they claimed that 
the Kyrgyz were suffering from a typhoid epidemic, that 20 people in the Little Pamir had died due to the 
harsh winter (some of them from starvation), and that nearly 2,000 livestock had died in the Little Pamir 
(which would have been about 13% of the total livestock population). These claims are difficult to verifY 
but my experience suggests that they are either completely false (deaths from starvation) or else 
significantly exaggerated (a typhoid "epidemic"). One foreign NGO worker, with several years' experience 
working among the Kyrgyz, noted that every year they receive exaggerated reports from the Little Pamir 





food aid. At the time, in 1998, the Kyrgyz were experiencing grave difficulties due to 
drought and a series of harsh winters. Although their situation has since improved, they 
have consistently maintained an often exaggerated and sometimes lurid narrative of 
crushing livestock losses and human mortality, especially in terms of maternal, infant and 
child-under-five deaths. These claims are deployed towards any potentially sympathetic 
audience assumed to be in a position to provide assistance. They are also used in an 
attempt to gain leverage over the Afghan government, to publicize the difficulties the 
Kyrgyz face living in the Pamirs as well as to give credibility to the claim that in 
aggregate these difficulties are of such magnitude that they Kyrgyz might be forced to 
emigrate from Afghanistan and seek succor elsewhere. For these reasons, the issues of 
Kyrgyz population and demographic process require a full treatment. 
Kyrgyz Population 
Between 2007 and 2008, I was able to make a complete yurt-to-yurt census in the 
Little Pamir. Initially I was often given greatly exaggerated figures but repeated visits and 
consultation with neighbors eventually resulted in what I consider to be the most credible 
census in recent times, which is summarized below in Table 2. For the Great Pamir, 
where I spent a couple of weeks in 2007 and two months in 2010, I was only able to 
collect information on the number of households, through both interviews and actual 
counts. I did not have sufficient time, or trust, to get actual population figures, 56 so 
instead I have taken the average household size from the Little Pamir (4.7), as well as the 
average from several summer camps in the Great Pamir where I was able to get an exact 
56 In several instances, interviews I was conducting on the subject of population figures were interrupted by 
someone who, apparently forgetting I understand Kyrgyz, would interject, "Don't tell him that! If he finds 
out how many of us there are, we'lllose our baksheesh [aid] ." 
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headcount (the average household size was 5.4), to get a multiple of five people per 
household. I then cross-referenced my figures with other credible, field-based estimations 
of Kyrgyz population size (Duncan, 2006; Felmy and Kreutzmann, 2003; Felmy and 
Kreutzmann, 2004). 
Table 2. Kyrgyz population, Little Pamir (2007-08) & Great Pamir (2010) 
Individuals Households 
Little Pamir 614 12857 
Great Pamir 535 107 
Total 1,149 235 
Source: author 
Shahrani's census in 1972-73 found 1,380 Kyrgyz living in the Little Pamir and 
445 individuals in the Great Pamir (2002: 49). The 1978 exodus to Pakistan involved 
about 1,330 Kyrgyz from the Little Pamir, leaving a population of about 40 or 50 people 
there. However, after the return of 40 Kyrgyz from Pakistan in 1978 and another 250-270 
in 1979, the Little Pamir population would still only have been between 330-360 people. 
The population of the Little Pamir appears to have almost doubled in 28 years, whereas 
that of the Great Parnir has only increased by 20%. However, a considerable portion of 
the population increase in the Little Pamir has occurred as a result of immigration of 
Kyrgyz from the Great Parnir. (Immigration is negligible in the opposite direction.) There 
has been insignificant out-migration from either Pamir since 1978-just a few families or 
individuals in the past 30 years. This loss has been partially offset by the immigration of 
57 In the Little Pamir, there are 128 households in winter and 130 in summer. While the number of camps 
(afyl) varies by sea~on, the number of households (iil) in both Pamirs generally remains constant, with the 
exception of two additional households in summer, each consisting of an elderly widower who lives alone. 
In winter, each of these men moves in with a son and the son's family. Because for most of the year there 
are 128 households in the Little Pamir, I use that figure throughout this work. 
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a few W akhi and Badakhshi women who have intermarried with Kyrgyz men, and a few 
cases of Kyrgyz women marrying Badakhshi men, but remaining in the Pamir with their 
non-Kyrgyz husbands,58 as well as the immigration of Kyrgyz women from the very 
small Kyrgyz diaspora within Afghanistan. 59 
Table 3 below shows various iterations of Kyrgyz population figures. Of interest 
are the figures cited to me by Abdul Rashid Khan, when asked how many Kyrgyz live in 
the Pamir. Not only are the overall figures exaggerated, but while those for his own area, 
the Little Pamir, are more than double the actual number, he (intentionally or not) under-
reports the number for the Great Pamir, the home of his rival, the wakil Hajji Turdi 
Akhun. Regardless, this strategy of exaggeration appears to have worked, as can be seen 
from the World Food Program (WFP) figures, which cite a population about 1. 7 6 times 
the actual number. As I discuss at length in Chapter Seven, WFP food aid to the Kyrgyz 
is designed to cover three months' of their subsistence needs; with inflated population 
figures, the Kyrgyz actually receive more than five months' worth of food. 
The WFP population figures for the Kyrgyz are not an isolated example of 
Kyrgyz exaggeration. During a USAID-funded "training and capacity building" trip I led 
to Kyrgyzstan, six Afghan Kyrgyz, while being interviewed by a Kyrgyzstani journalist 
on television about how many Kyrgyz live in Afghanistan, stated a total population of 
4,000, divided into 60 camps and 424 households. Similarly, Greg Mortenson, the 
director of an NGO, the Central Asia Institute, boasts in his book Stones into Schools 
58 I am unaware of any Kyrgyz women leaving the Pamir as a result of marrying a non-Kyrgyz husband. 
59 This diaspora consists of one family in Kabul; another in Kunduz; one family in Zebak, Badakhshan 
(previously, there were three or four families but most have since returned to the Pamir); and one family in 
Khandud, Badakhshan. There is also the case of a Uyghur woman from a small Uyghur community south 
oflshkashim, in Surkh Darra village, who married a Kyrgyz man and now resides in the Pamir. 
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about receiving the "first comprehensive census of every single [Kyrgyz] household in 
the Mghan Pamir" (2009: 85)---provided by the Kyrgyz themselves, who claimed 1,942 
people. 
Table 3. Various iterations of Kyrgyz population figures 
Shah rani FOCUS Callahan WFP Abdul Rashid 
(1979) (1998) (2007-10) (2007) (2006) 
Total Population 1,825 1,264 1,149 2,028 1,600-1 '700 
Total Households 333 237 235 338 418 
Average per HH 5.5 5.3 4.9 6 3.8-4.1 
Great Pamir: 
Population 445 552 ~535 N/A 403-435 
Households 87 102 107 101 106 
Average per HH 5.1 5.4 5 N/A 3.8-4.1 
Little Pamir: 
Population 1380 712 614 N/A 1,186-1 ,280 
Households 246 135 128 238 312 
Average per HH 5.6 5.3 4.8 N/A 3.8-4.1 
Sources: Shahram (2002), FOCUS (1998), WFP (2007), author 
Kyrgyz Mortality and Natality 
Similar to population figures, Kyrgyz claims of extremely high levels of mortality 
need to be understood in the context of extracting humanitarian and development 
assistance. In the case of mortality, however, the Kyrgyz appear to be hewing closer to 
the truth and thus identifying a need rather than a want. I was unable to gather accurate 
mortality data for either Pamir and recorded only six deaths in the Little Parnir between 
2007-08. However, it is likely that infant mortality was under-reported, which is 
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consistent with other researchers' experience among the Kyrgyz (Alex Duncan, personal 
communication, 2008; Shahrani, 2002: 122). 
Lacking empirical data, as well a reliable population baseline for recent times 
against which my census figures can be compared, high levels of Kyrgyz mortality must 
be inferred. In interviews, both Kyrgyz men and women often referenced high mortality 
rates, primarily among women, children and infants. The only hard data come from a 
British doctor, Alex Duncan, who lived with his family in the Wakhan for six years and 
made annual trips to the Kyrgyz areas. His fmdings, discussed below, while based on a 
sample-size admittedly too small to give statistically reliable figures, suggest a declining 
population. 
. Maternal Mortality 
Since 2001, Afghanistan has had the dubious distinction of having the world's 
second highest maternal mortality ratio (MMR), just behind Sierra Leone, with 1,600 
maternal deaths for every 100,000 live births. A 2005 study published in The Lancet 
found that in a remote district in Badakhshan, the MMR was an astounding 6,507, 
"higher than any rate reported anywhere else in the world" (Bartlett, et al. , 2005 : 868). 
This district, Ragh, was described as a "remote region in the Hindu-Kush mountains, 
snowbound at least half the year ... Health care is up to 10 days' ride or walk away" 
(idem, 866). In Ragh, a woman's lifetime risk of maternal death was 1 in 3 (idem, 868)-
about the same risk faced by Kyrgyz women-versus 1 in 6 for Afghanistan as a whole. 
Given that the Pamirs are just as remote but higher in elevation, it is likely that the 
MMR among Kyrgyz women is as high, if not higher, as in Ragh. Duncan, during a 
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survey of the Great Pamir, found "a deficit of women over 16, suggesting an abnormally 
high mortality in this age group" (2006: 7). Based on Kyrgyz reporting of maternal 
mortality over the past year, Duncan calculated that the MMR would be at least 4,000-
not as high as in Ragh but still more than double Afghanistan's overall figure and 
certainly among the highest in the world. As Duncan noted, "There is a strong suspicion 
that maternal mortality amongst the Pamir Kirghiz is extremely high, which would not be 
surprising considering the isolation of the community, resulting lack of medical care and 
high fertility" (ibid). 
Infant and Child Under-Five Mortality 
Anecdotal information from the Kyrgyz suggests that a number of pregnancies do 
not result in live births; either the pregnancy is terminated prior to 20 weeks gestation 
(miscarriage) or the baby dies before birth after the twentieth week (stillbirth). For those 
pregnancies that do result in live births, the first year of the infant' s life is fraught with 
danger, especially if born during the fall or winter when disease, often attributed to 
malnutrition by the Kyrgyz but also undoubtedly influenced by greater amounts of time 
spent indoors in smoky, often crowded dwellings, is more prevalent.60 There is no 
seasonal timing of births among the Kyrgyz, not least due to a lack of contraception, 
although nascent efforts to distribute condoms have begun. 61 Furthermore, there is an 
element of truth behind the Kyrgyz joke that they pass the long winters by "making 
babies." Any child conceived during the winter months (December to March) will be 
60 My observation, made during one winter and three summers with the Kyrgyz, was that the incidence of 
illness, especially contagious diseases, is significantly higher during the winter. 19 out of 20 households 
surveyed by Duncan reported "very cold weather in winter as the cause of most illness" (2006: 6). 
6 1 Condoms, provided by the Afghan government, have been eagerly embraced by Kyrgyz women, not least 
(presumably) due to the recent prevalence of sildenafil (Viagara), sold to Kyrgyz men by traders. 
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born the following fall (September to December), meaning that his or her first few 
months of life will occur during the difficult winter period. 
Afghanistan's infant mortality rate (IMR) is the world's second highest, after 
Angola, with 149 deaths of babies under one year of age for every 1,000 live births. Since 
the maternal and child-under-five mortality statistics from the Kyrgyz areas are 
consistently more than double the average for Afghanistan, it is possible to assume that 
the same is generally true for IMR, which would give a figure of over 300 deaths for ever 
1,000 live births, or roughly one-in-three infants dying. 
Afghanistan's under-five mortality rate is also the second-highest in the world, at 
199 deaths for every 1,000 live births per year, just behind Chad. Among the Kyrgyz, 
Duncan found that under-five mortality was approximately 520 per 1,000 live births, 
meaning that more than half of all children born die before their fifth birthday. Most of 
the deaths were reportedly caused by "pneumonia, measles, or affected by 'djinn' or evil 
spirits" (Duncan, 2006: 7). 
In aggregate, these statistics indicate staggeringly high mortality concentrated 
among women, children and infants, even with the various caveats. They suggest not only 
a population in stasis, or even declining, but demonstrate that there is actual substance 
and dire need behind the Kyrgyz's incessant pleas for assistance-and that it is not just a 
cynical ploy for political advantage but based on a sincere desire to maintain their 
integrity as a community, one faced with extraordinary demographic challenges. 
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Natality 
A more empirical way to infer high levels of Kyrgyz mortality is by looking at 
fertility rates. Amazingly, given no appreciable in-migration, the Kyrgyz seem to have 
been able to maintain a balanced demographic trend, largely through high rates of 
fecundity and fertility. For the period of one year, approximately from August 2007 to 
August 2008, I recorded 28 live births in the Little Pamir. However, the actual number 
may even be higher, since, as mentioned before, infants who died shortly after childbirth 
may have gone unrepmied. 
Table 4. Kyrgyz natality, Little Pamir 
Crude Birth Rate (CBR): 45.6 children per 1,000 women 
General Fertility Rate (GFR): 200 children per 1,000 women 
Child-Woman Ratio (CWR): 607.1 children per 1,000 women 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR): 5.6 children 
Gross Reproduction Rate (GRR): 2.99 female children 
Insufficient mortality data to calculate net reproduction rate 
Source: author (2007-08) 
Looking at these various demographic indices of natality, it is obvious that, at 
least during the year in question (2007-08), the Kyrgyz had a very high fertility rate. 
Assuming that 2007-08 was not anomalous, the Kyrgyz population in the Little Pamir 
should be growing. However, the population pyramid for this period, shown in Figure 18, 
suggests a population close to the first stage of the demographic transition, one 
characterized by high levels of both fertility and mortality. 
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Figure 18. Kyrgyz population pyramid 
Were the Kyrgyz of the Little Pamir experiencing as rapid population growth as 
the fertility rate would indicate, Figure 18 could only be explained by significant out-
migration and/or high mortality. Because, as I have mentioned previously, out-migration 
from the Little Pamir is negligible, especially for females, then the gap between the 
fertility rate and the actual size of the population can only be explained by a high 
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mortality rate. Figure 18 also suggests that mortality is especially high among women of 
child-bearing age (15-44 years) and among children. 
Of interest is the increased survivorship in the 25-29 age-group. Members of this 
cohort would have been born between 1979 and 1983. Survivorship also seems somewhat 
higher than normal in the 20-24 year cohort, members of which would have been born 
between 1984 and 1988. This total period, from 1979 to 1988, would have almost exactly 
overlapped with the Soviet occupation of the Pamir, not incidentally the last time that 
primary health care was available there. Today, many Kyrgyz, especially those belonging 
to more influential families, recall traveling to Tajikistan as children to receive health 
care, including life-saving operations. 
The cohort exhibiting relatively lower levels of survivorship, in the 10-19 age 
group, would have been born between 1989 and 1998, after the Soviet troops had 
withdrew from Mghanistan and during the 1989-2001 civil war period. While it is 
impossible to definitely state that access to medical care and markets during the Soviet 
occupation were responsible for lower levels of mortality, this hypothesis does receive 
some support from Kyrgyz demography. In any event, what is clear is that the Kyrgyz 
have a high rate of fertility yet a relatively low rate of population increase. If the FOCUS 
population data from 1998 are accurate (Table 3, above), then the population in both 
Pamirs is, in fact, declining, having decreased by 9.1% over the past decade. 62 As 
Shahrani noted, high rates of fertility and mortality are historical facts of Kyrgyz life 
62 The FOCUS population data for the Little Pamir is almost certainly the result of exaggeration on the part 
of the Kyrgyz, as otherwise the population of the Little Pamir would have decreased by almost 14% over 
ten years (1998-2008), without any out-migration and despite both a high fertility rate and consistent in-
migration from the Great Pamir. Accordingly, a 9.1% overall population decrease for both Pamirs should 
be considered the extreme high-end figure for any decline. 
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(2002: 122). Assuming that high fertility rates have remained constant over nearly 40 
years, and combined with consistently low levels of out-migration from the Pamirs, it can 
be inferred that mortality rates remain correspondingly high (and possibly higher). This 
conclusion is supported not only by Kyrgyz demographic data but also by Duncan's 
survey work as well as by similar findings in other parts of Badakhshan, close to the 
Pamirs in terms of remoteness and lack of services, including healthcare. 
Tribal Structure: Chong and Kichik Uruu 
The Afghan Kyrgyz genealogical system is based on assumed (stipulated) rather 
than demonstrated descent. It is a strictly patrilineal system but because the (oral) 
genealogies rarely, if ever, trace descent to an apical ancestor, what is really being 
inherited is a clan name. Krader (1963: 332-333) called this a patronymic clan structure 
(or patronymic sib), in which clan "membership and marriage relations are based only on 
a common patronymic." In his ideal-type model, the "retreat of the genealogical principle 
before the patronymic principle" (1963: 333) among Central Asian nomads resulted from 
the encapsulation of nomadic groups by state structures, which steadily replaced the need 
for a "social structure based upon genealogies" (ibid). 
Commenting on Krader's model in the Mghan context, Barfield (1981: 61) noted 
that while in the nineteenth century "the clan was maintained as a device used by the 
sedentary state to control people" dwelling in "areas where direct rule was impractical or 
expensive," as the Afghan state became more centralized in the twentieth century, "the 
tribal groups that had been so useful as a means of indirect rule were now obstacles to the 
implementation of direct rule ... The Afghan policy toward settlement of nomads had little 
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to do in reality with improving the nomads' lot, but everything to do with breaking down 
political structures incompatible with direct state control" (1981: 62). The end result 
among the Central Asian Arabs Barfield studied was that "Collective action has become 
rare among the Arabs because their encapsulation by the national government has broken 
down tribal solidarity while failing to provide a structure which an individual can count 
on if in trouble" (1981: 150). As we will see, a similar situation now exists among the 
Kyrgyz in post-Tali ban Afghanistan. 
Prior to 1978, written genealogies, called sanjyra, existed but most were taken to 
Pakistan and I was unable to locate any in the Pamir. ArifKutlu, Haji Rahman Kul's son, 
confirmed that a number of sanjyra are still extant among the Kyrgyz in Turkey. Perhaps 
for this reason, my experience was that those Kyrgyz visiting from Turkey whom I 
interviewed were much more knowledgeable about genealogical matters than any of the 
Kyrgyz living in the Afghan Pamir. For example, surprisingly few Afghan Kyrgyz can 
still recite the jeti ata, their seven ascending patrilineal ancestors. This is a significant 
development not only because, in most rural Kyrgyz communities, the jeti ata is 
considered a de rigueur competencl3 but also since the jeti ata traditionally served as a 
boundary marker for incest when considering a marriage partner. 
The origins of the term "Kyrgyz" is believed by some scholars to derive from 
"kyr!C' (forty) and "kyz" (maidens}-the forty tribes, born of forty maidens, who were 
united by the Kyrgyz folk hero Manas in the ninth century to defeat the Uyghur 
Khaganate. Historically, the Kyrgyz had three major tribal confederations, two "wings" 
63 In Kyrgyzstan, those ethnic Kyrgyz with poor genealogical knowledge or Kyrgyz language ability are 
sometimes derided as mankurt, an insult directed at those who, like the character in Kyrgyz writer Chingiz 
Aitmatov's novel, The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years, have forgotten their culture and language. 
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(a right wing, ong kanat, and a left wing, sol kanat)-a remnant of Mongolian military 
organization (McChesney, 1996:126)-and an intermediate third group, the ichkilik, 
meaning "those who have been allowed into the interior" (Dor, 1975: 115). This three-
fold division also found expression geographically in what is today the Kyrgyz Republic, 
with members of the ong kanat living north of the Ala Too mountains in the Talas and 
Chui (Chlii) river valleys and the Y syk Kol basin; those of the sol kanat occupied the 
lands south of the Ala Too in the Naryn river valley; and the ichkilik tribes dwelled west 
of the Ferghana mountains along the southern edge of the Ferghana valley, in the Alai 
foothills. Almost all of the clans (chong uruu) and sub-clans (kichik uruu) found in the 
Afghan Pamirs (both prior to the 1978 exodus and at present) are from the ichkilik 
confederation. 
The ichkilik comprise a number of clans, four of which are said to be descended 
from a common ancestor and are thus called the tort uul, or "four sons. "64 These are the 
Teiit, Kesek, Kypchak and Naiman, all of which are considered to be chong uruu, or 
maximal clans, by the Afghan Kyrgyz. However, in other sources, certain clans 
belonging to the ichkilik, including the Naiman and the Kypchak, are said to be of non-
Kyrgyz, often Mongol, ethnicity.65 In part, this is likely due to these being common clan 
names among other Central Asian ethnic groups, including Uzbeks and Kazakhs, yet as 
McChesney notes 
64 The idea of apical ancestry, expressed through a number of clans sharing the affiliation of uul ("sons") or 
uulu/uulloru ("son of/sons of'), is fairly common among the Kyrgyz. For example, the sol kanat is 
sometimes called the "otuz uul," the "thirty sons." 
65 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav060502.shtml 
105 
The Uzbeks of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries should not be 
confused with the modem-day citizen of Uzbekistan ... When individual 
tribes ... supported other lines claiming Chingizid legitimacy, they are 
often differently named ... In this sense, the terms 'Uzbek,' 'Qazaq' 
(Kazakh), or 'Moghul' (Mongol) may better be thought of as political 
rather than ethnic labels. It was not until the 1920s, when Soviet 
authorities decreed the delineation of national homelands, that the terms 
'Kazakh,' 'Uzbek,' and 'Tajik' took on the meanings they have today 
(1996: 126-7). 
In the Afghan Pamirs, members of the Naiman and the Kypchak are indisputably 
considered Kyrgyz yet both do have a lesser status relative to the Telit and the Kesek, 
despite the absence of ranked clans and lineages (Kirchoff, 1955) in the Kyrgyz kinship 
system. While this may have some connection to their putative non-Kyrgyz origins and 
their initial arrival in the Pamir in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as servants of 
the more powerful Teiit and Kesek clans, it is just as likely a result of their smaller 
numbers relative to the larger Telit and Kesek populations. 
Within each chong uruu are a number of kichik uruu, minimal clans (or sub-
clans). Among Kyrgyz in countries other than Afghanistan, kichik uruu are sometimes 
called (or further subdivided into) uruk, lineages united by demonstrated descent ( uruk 
has the meaning of "seed" or "sperm"). While most Afghan Kyrgyz agree on the basic 
outline of the chong uruu, there is considerable variation in identifying kichik uruu 
structure, with various informants providing differing and often contradictory answers to 
genealogical questions. A couple of kichik uruu were identified as having further sub-
divisons but these were not considered uruk, which contra Shahrani (2002: 151) no 
longer appears to be used in a genealogical context. 
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The predominant chong uruu in the Little Pamir is the Telit, comprising 76.4% of 
population. 78.1% households are headed by a member of the Telit clan. There is also a 
significant Kesek minority, as well as smaller numbers of other Kyrgyz clans, as can be 
seen in Table 5. 
Table 5. Little Pamir chong uruu representation 
Chong uruu By Individual By Household 
Teiit 469 76.4% 100 78.1% 
Kesek 110 17.9% 22 17.2% 
Naiman 19 3.1% 3 2.3% 
Kypchak 7 1.1% 2 1.6% 
non-Kyrgyz 9 1.5% 1 0.8% 
Source: author (2007-08) 
The Great Pamir has a similar clan distribution, though there the Kesek are the 
dominant chong uruu, followed by the Teiit and the Naiman. There are also a few 
Kypchak and one Badakhshi households. 
Table 6. Great Pamir chong uruu representation 
Chong uruu By Household 
Kesek 87 81.3% 
Telit 9 8.4% 
Naiman 8 7.5% 
Kypchak 2 1.9% 
non-Kyrgyz 1 0.9% 
Source: author (2010) 
Shahrani identified a number of sub-clan (kichik uruu) divisions within the 
Kyrgyz tribal system. While most of the Kyrgyz I interviewed agreed with Shahrani's 
outline, they noted that because of the 1978 exodus many of the sub-clans are no longer 
represented in the Afghan Pamir and as a result both the genealogical depth of the society 
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and their own knowledge of it are both significantly less than they had been 40 years 
previously, during the period of Shahrani's research. As mentioned above, the general 
division today is between chong and kichik uruu. A few of the kichik uruu are further 
subdivided into lineages (Table 8), though confusingly (from an etic perspective) they are 
still referred to as kichik uruu rather than uruk. Such lineages usually go back no more 
than five generations, at which point a founder (or founders) is inserted. For example, the 
Omiirbek lineage (Shayim sub-clan, Telit clan) is said to have begun just prior to "the 
time of Nikolai" (the Russian tsar Nicholas II, a common referent for the Kyrgyz) in the 
late nineteenth century, when the sons of the Omiirbek apical ancestor, Khojomjai, 
settled in the Afghan Pamir (other versions claim four founders of the Omiirbek lineage, 
including Khojomjar; still other versions say that these four brothers were the apical 
ancestors ofthe Shayim sub-clan). 
Table 7. Breakdown of Little and Great Pamir by chong and kicltik uruu 
Little By individual By household Great By household 
Pamir (n=614) (n=128) Pamir (n=107) 
Number % Number % Number 0/o 
Teiit 469 76.4% 100 78.1% Kesek 87 81.3% 
*Shaiym 133 28.4% 28 28% **Jegjem 17 19.5% 
Alapa 70 14.9% 15 15% Gydyr Shah 16 18.4% 
Kutan 59 12.6% 15 15% Shaltak 15 17.2% 
Kochkor 50 10.7% 9 9% 
Kyzyl 
13 14.9% A yak 
Wotiinchii 34 7.2% 7 7% 
Mama 
13 14.9% Chaar 
Buka 28 6.0% 8 8% Kur Alai 6 6.9% 
Nooruz 26 5.5% 4 4% ShahBulut 5 5.8% 
Kyzyl Bash 16 3.4% 5 5% Boston 1 1.2% 
Diirbowel 15 3.2% 4 4% Porwash 1 1.2% 
Kara Teiit 12 2.6% 2 2% 
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Little By individual By household Great By household 
Pamir (n=614) (n=128) Pamir (n=107) 
Number o/o Number Ofo Number % 
Tekreng 12 2.6% 2 2% Teiit 9 8.4% 
Seiit Mat 8 1.7% 1 1% Kara Teiit 3 33.3% 
Barky 
5 1.0% 2 2% Diirbowel 3 33.3% (Too los) 
Bory 1 0.2% 0 0.0% Chegeter 2 22.2% 
Kutan 1 11.1% 
Kesek 110 17.9% 22 17.2% 
Gydyr Shah 30 27.3% 5 22.7% Naiman 8 7.5% 
Mama 
28 25.5% 6 27.3% 
Chaar 
Kosh Kylak 25 22.7% 5 22.7% Kypchak 2 1.9% 
Kyzyl A yak 13 11.8% 3 13.6% 
Jegjem 10 9.1% 2 9.1% Badakhshi 1 0.9% 
Shaltak 3 2.7% 1 4.6% 
Moshko 1 0.9% 0 0% 
Naiman 19 3.1% 3 2.3% 
Kypchak 7 1.1% 2 1.6% 
Kalmuk 1 0.2% 0 0% 
Badakhshi 5 0.8% 1 0.8% 
Wakhi 2 0.3% 0 0% 
Zebaki 1 0.2% 0 0% 
Source: author (2007-08, 2010) 
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Table 8. Sub-divisions of two kichik uruu 
*Shaiym By individual (n=133) 
Omiirbek 78 58.7% 
ShaHan 30 22.6% 
Melke 18 13.5% 
BiilOk 7 5.2% 
**Jegjem By household (n=17) 
Kara Teke 9 52.9% 
Uu Kelek 8 47.1% 
Source: author (2007-08, 2010) 
In the past, certain kichik uruu (and two chong uruu) were closely associated with 
one another, providing cooperation and mutual aid. Today, this tradition is remembered 
more than it is practiced owing to the departure of many members of various kichik uruu 
in 1978, leaving many sub-clans with just a few members. However, kichik uruu 
affiliation was still cited to explain certain behaviors, such as why one man (a Kyzyl 
Bash) gave amanat animals to another (a Kutan), despite the latter being a fairly 
irresponsible opium addict. 









Marriage: Kalyng, Kudalashuu, and Kiich kiiioo 
When the suitability of a couple to wed is being considered, one of the main 
determinants is that of relatedness. (Financial situation and the ability to pay bridewealth 
are also major considerations.) As with most Turko-Mongol groups, the Kyrgyz do not 
marry close patrilineal relatives and in contrast to other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, 
parallel cousin marriage rarely occurs among the Kyrgyz. Matrilineal cross cousin 
marriage (mother's brother's daughter), typical of many Turkic groups, is permitted, 
although Dor's reference to it as "the preferred union" (1975: 121) is no longer accurate. 
Unlike many other Kyrgyz (and Kazakhs) elsewhere, though, the Afghan Kyrgyz no 
longer practice jeti ata-"seven forefathers"-a "traditional rule of exogamy" 
(Privratsky, 2001: 116) in which the prospective bride and groom trace their patriline 
back seven generations to determine whether the marriage is permissible. One possible 
reason, according to a nineteenth-century Kyrgyz mullah quoted in Hudson' s study of 
Kazakh social structure, is the preference for parallel cousin marriage found in many 
Muslim societies: "Formerly among the Kara-kirghiz [Kyrgyz] they married ... a bride 
from the seventh generation, now they take her from the third, and are even beginning to 
marry from the second generation, in conformity with the shariat" (1938: 43). 
The more proximate reason for their lack of adherence to the jeti ata is that the 
Kyrgyz population is too small for them to follow the traditional rules of exogamy, so 
instead they simply avoid marrying close consanguines within their own lineage. For the 
same reason, the Kyrgyz do not practice clan or sub-clan exogamy which, as Privratsky 
notes, "runs back much further than seven generations" (2001: 117). In any case, the 
111 
inability of many Mghan Kyrgyz to even name their jeti ata today would limit its 
usefulness as an exogamic rule. 
A high degree of clan (chong uruu) endogamy is found among the Kyrgyz elite, 
although I was unable to discover any positive marriage rule governing marriage between 
various clans or sub-clans, so it is more likely a desire to build or strengthen alliances 
between wealthy (j.lld/or influential families within a dominant clan. For example, Abdul 
Rashid Khan belongs to the Omiirbek lineage of the Shayim sub-clan of the Teiit clan. Of 
his 15 offspring, 10 are married and 2 are engaged to be married (the other three 
offspring are juveniles). All of the spouses of the married offspring are Terit, two of 
whom belong to the Shayim sub-clan and one of these is also Omtirbek (but not a 
cousin).66 Of Abdul Rashid's ten married offspring, seven have spouses from very 
wealthy families (including Apendibai, the wealthiest man in the Parnir; he is married to 
one ofthe khan's daughters and two of his offspring-from a different wife-are married 
to the khan's children) and three spouses are from influential Terit allies of the khan. The 
future spouses of the two betrothed children are both members of the Kesek clan and 
were doing brideservice (kiich kiizod) for the khan. 
Polygyny does occur but I did not record any cases of a man with more than two 
concurrent wives. As Hanafi Sunni Muslims, Kyrgyz men are allowed up to four wives, 
though high bridewealth combined with Islamic strictures governing plural marriage 
(namely, that each wife be provided for equally, often interpreted as mandating that each 
66 If the Afghan Kyrgyz still practiced the jeti ata, this pairing would be considered incest, at least 
according to the Omurbek genealogy I was given. In a different instance, one of the khan's sons refused a 
marriage proposal from another Omiirbek family, telling me that the genealogical relationship was too 
close ("bir tuugan"- "one family" or kin group). 
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wife should have her own accommodation) mean that even the wealthiest men are rarely 
able to support more than two wives. Much more common than polygyny is serial 
marriage and it is not unusual to find men who are married to their third or even fourth 
wife. The reason behind serial marriage is the exceptionally high rates of maternal 
mortality, rather than divorce or other causes. For example, Abdul Rashid Khan's current 
wife is his fourth, the previous three having died in childbirth. 
One of the most common complaints voiced by the Kyrgyz is "kyz jok:'-no girls. 
By this they mean that overall there is a shortage of women to marry and, as a result, 
those unmarried women available command a very high bridewealth67 (kalyng). Kalyng is 
invariably said to be 100 sheep (jiiz ko'f) but more often it works out to be considerably 
less, often paid to the bride's family in an assortment of livestock including some sheep 
but still totaling, in livestock equivalents converted to sheep, less than 100. For example, 
the kalyng paid by Abdul Rashid Khan to the family of the girl one of his sons was to 
marry consisted of one horse, two yak cows (unak), two yak calves aged one-to-two years 
(tar torpok), two yak calves less than one year old (torpok), and 19 sheep (ko'f). When it 
was pointed out that this equaled only about 34 sheep, Abdul Rashid replied that the 
67 Among the Kyrgyz, "bridewealth" is more accurate than "brideprice" because the latter "emphasizes 
only one of the functions of this wealth [the livestock transferred to the bride's family], an economic one, 
to the exclusion of other important social functions" (Evans-Pritchard, 1931 : 36). "Bridewealth" also better 
captures the idea that the bride's family is being indemnified for the loss of a daughter (Radcliffe-Brown, 
1929: 131). The difference may appear minor but, as Dalton notes, "To use the term 'brideprice' is to imply 
that payment at marriage is a market or commercial transaction and therefore that marriage entails a 
commercial purchase of rights or services" (1966: 732). Dalton helpfully adds this analogy: "In the United 
States, marriage and prostitution are superficially similar in that both entail an exchange of sexual services 
for material payments ... [but] once the different folk views and social circumstances of each are taken into 
account, marriage and its material components are clearly seen as a reciprocal transaction while prostitution 
is a market purchase" (1966: 737). 
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bride's father was deceased and in any case he hadn't been very wealthy; a 100 sheep 
kalyng is only paid for the daughters of wealthy men.68 
Kalyng is also calculated according to jambu, which Shahrani describes as "an 
early Chinese silver ingot, once widely used in Central Asia. Although no longer in use 
as a medium of exchange, it remains the standard for determining bridewealth" (2002: 
143). Perhaps because of its archaic origins, the value of a jambu appears to have 
remained constant over time and today, as it was 40 years ago, one jambu is equivalent to 
10 sheep. 10 jambu (100 sheep, or equivalent number of other animals) is, as noted 
above, the cost of marriage typically cited by the Kyrgyz. The kalyng, whether 
denominated in sheep or jambu, is negotiated between the two families after the marriage 
proposal has been accepted by the bride's family. The negotiations are held at the bride's 
camp and, once concluded, are followed by a ceremonial feast (tol) called the patta tof. 
Several months later, elder males from the bride's family will go to the camp of the 
groom to collect the bridewealth and to participate in the kalyng tof. Only after the kalyng 
has been paid will the final ceremony, the zor ("great") tof, held at the bride's camp, 
occur. Not long afterwards, the new wife will move, together with her dowry, to the 
husband's natal camp. In addition to the bridewealth and the wedding costs, the groom is 
also responsible for providing a yurt for himself and his new wife. 69 While most 
68 Kyrgyz daughters receive an inheritance upon the death of their father, though they only get half the 
amount that sons inherit, in accordance with Islamic law. In addition, women provide a dowry (sep) as part 
of the marriage ceremony, consisting of household items: quilted blankets (toshok), a reed screen 
(ashkana), a robe for the husband (chapan), kitchen implements, and woven bands to secure the yurt. 
69 Dor suggests that there may be symbolism involved in the gendered production of the nuptial yurt, with 
the man providing frame and covers and the woman making all the bands to hold it together: "Reciprocity 
is thus maintained, perhaps even in a way that adds a sexual nuance: for the yurt is made without being tied 
or attached to anything else since ties and straps, especially at the time of marriage, represent a menace for 
the fecundity ofthe woman" (1975 : 126). 
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newlywed couples will thus live separately (except in winter, when they will often move 
into the tam ofthe groom's parents or siblings, at least until they can afford to build their 
own), in the case of less well-off men or the youngest son, the new couple may co4abitate 
with the groom's parents year-round (especially if one parent is deceased). 
As seen in the above example with Abdul Rashid Khan, wealthy or high-status 
men usually pay the bridewealth for their sons' wives, which is part of their anticipatory 
inheritance ( enchi). The majority of Kyrgyz males are not so fortunate, leaving them a 
few alternatives. The most common strategy is for a man to try and build up his own 
herd, and borrow from close relatives if possible, so that he can eventually afford to pay 
the kalyng. For this reason, there is a sizeable cohort of men in their 30s (or even 40s)-
old by Kyrgyz standards of marriage-who remain unmarried and live with either their 
parents or siblings. Sometimes, such men will also engage in wage labor as hired 
shepherds, but the typical shepherd's wage is about one sheep per month, or 14 sheep if 
an entire year is worked, so several years of labor will be required to accumulate 
sufficient livestock for paying kalyng. 
Another strategy is the reciprocal exchange (kudalashuu but sometimes referred 
to as bada!/0 as it is known throughout the rest of Afghanistan) of daughters for 
marriage. Badal marriages are common in rural Afghanistan among families who cannot 
afford to pay full bridewealth;71 according to a study by the AREU, "The most common 
excuse given for marrying sons by exchanging daughters is economic necessity ... families 
70 Badal, referring to reciprocal exchange in marriage (or reciprocity more generally, to include the taking 
of revenge in Pashtun society), is not to be confused with with baad, the giving of a daughter to settle a 
dispute. 
71 Since the Kyrgyz avoid parallel cousin maniage, kudalashuu unions do not have the effect of ensuring 
that inheritance remains within the extended agnatic family as they do in other parts of Afghanistan. 
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are often resigned to having to marry their children through exchange" (Smith, 2009:45). 
In a typical kudalashuu arrangement, family A with son Wand daughter X will approach 
another family B with daughter Y and son Z and suggest that son W marry daughter Y, 
who, following the virilocal rule of residence, will live with family A. In exchange, 
daughter X will marry son Z and move to the camp of family B. Kalyng is usually paid by 
each family, for reasons of status, though the amount is typically much less than in a non-
kudalashuu marriage. As Dor notes, "most of the time only people who know each other 
well would engage in such an exchange [kudalashuu]" (1975: 125). In addition, this 
system of reciprocal exchange only occurs if all of the potential spouses are of similar 
marriageable age; rarely is delayed exchange practiced, possibly due to high mortality 
rates and the complications which would follow the death of a betrothed son or daughter. 
The third strategy, performing brideservice, is the least common, because it 
requires a wealthy family willing to forego receiving kalyng for their daughter, as well as 
a man willing to suffer the social stigma which attaches to uxorilocal residence in a 
strictly patrilineal society. Kuch kufaa-literally, "a husband by effort or work"-is 
usually the marriage strategy of last resort. It often involves a man who is poor or 
addicted to opium (or both), and sometimes a less-than-ideal wife as well (such as one 
with a physical handicap), who might not be able to command a decent kalyng. Or, as 
Shahrani notes, in families lacking adult males or otherwise short of male labor, kuch 
kuzoo might be preferable to receiving kalyng for a marriageable daughter (2002: 144 ). 
In kuch kuzoo, the man will work for between seven to ten years in the camp of 
woman's family as a shepherd and a general hired hand. In reality, the marriage almost 
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always occurs after two to three years of uxorilocal residence but the expectation is that 
both husband and wife will remain with the wife's family for the seven to ten years' 
duration. After this period, especially if the wife's father has died, they are free to move 
back to the husband's natal camp, though permanent uxorilocal residence seems to be the 
norm. This tendency of permanent uxorilocal residence among in-marrying sons-in-law is 
fairly common in patrilineal societies ( cf. Freedman, 1966). I documented seven kuch 
kufdd marriages in the Little Pamir and six in the Great Parnir; in each case, the married 
couple was still resident in the wife' s natal camp. 
As mentioned previously, two men were doing brideservice in the camp of the 
khan, where labor was always in short supply due to opium use and the resulting 
sluggardness among his sons. One man doing kuch kufdd was the hard-working son of an 
opium addict with few livestock of his own, and the other was an opium addict with no 
animals, who supported himself (and his opium habit) through wage labor. Respectively, 
they would eventually marry the youngest daughter of the khan (who was only 12 when 
the agreement was initially made), and an older but unmarried daughter of the khan who, 
though able to perform most normal activities required of a Kyrgyz woman, suffered 
from a paralyzed arm and a leg, most likely the result of childhood polio. 
Among the Mghan Kyrgyz, ala kachuu (bride kidnapping), 72 is never practiced. 
In part, this is because everyone realizes that non-consensual bride kidnapping would 
virtually guarantee violent conflict, given the financial stakes of kalyng and the dishonor 
that the girl's family would suffer. Additionally, there is considerable debate in 
Kyrgyzstan whether ala kachuu actually constitutes a well-established, pre-Soviet 
72 Formally, it is known as kyz ala kachuu, literally "running away with a maiden/girl." 
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tradition that has been "rediscovered" in the post-Soviet period or if it is simply an 
"invented tradition" used to justify not paying kalyng (Kleinbach and Salimjanova, 2007: 
230). Similarly, consensual elopement or other types of non-arranged, "love" marriages 
are virtually unheard of in Afghan Kyrgyz society, although "It is possible, but happens 
rarely, that the young man chooses his fiancee himself' (Dor, 1975: 124). 
Though sons are highly desired, the promise of an eventual kalyng payment and 
extra female labor in the interim mean that the birth of a daughter is not perceived by the 
Kyrgyz as an inherently bad thing. After the wife of one of the khan's sons gave birth to a 
daughter, the couple's first child, I asked him if he was disappointed that a son wasn't 
born. He shrugged his shoulders and simply said, "Juz ko'f''-"one hundred sheep." Still, 
he intends to keep having children until a son is born, the typical Kyrgyz response to any 
lack of male offspring. 
CHAPTER 4 -LIVESTOCK AND TRADE: 
THE KYRGYZ SUBSISTENCE SYSTEM 
In the popular imagination, pastoral societies are often wrongly believed to be 
autarkic and thus economically independent from the "outside world," a fallacy critiqued 
at length by Khazanov (1994: 3). Such assumptions often derive from external 
perceptions of pastoralism as a "timeless" or "traditional" activity, based on the existence 
of a materially simple culture and often reinforced by the geographical isolation of many 
pastoral peoples. Isolation in marginal environments, however, generally serves to 
undermine autarky while at the same time obscuring the economic interconnectedness so 
essential for subsistence in remote areas (Callahan, 2012). 
The Kyrgyz of the Afghan Pamirs, living on the Bam-e Dunya, the "Roof of the 
World," are an example par excellence of such a bucolic trope. For example, a recent 
article in The New York Times described the Pamir as "a no-man's land," "cut off the 
from Afghan heartland," its population "sealed off from the currents of history" by virtue 
of dwelling in a place "so remote that the people still live on a barter economy," and fated 
to "probably remain cloistered in their world of wind and ice, as they have for centuries" 
(Wong, 2010). 
The continuing evolution of Afghan Kyrgyz strategies to maximize pastoral 
production and maintain market access, both with the overarching goal of meeting their 
subsistence needs, illustrates how pastoralism is anything but an archaic, "traditional" 
economic activity. Even on the isolated "Roof of the World," Kyrgyz pastoralists 
demonstrate resourcefulness and dynamism, though both are easy to miss as neither is 
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readily apparent in terms of Kyrgyz material culture, with the possible exception of the 
occasional satellite dish, incongruously situated next to a felt yurt. 
Were the Kyrgyz agriculturalists producing cash crops for export, it would be a 
simple matter to look beyond their geographical isolation and see them in a broader 
regional context, one involving trans-national urban markets, government policies, and 
sophisticated trade networks. Pastoral production, however, is more subtle; as Barfield 
(1981: xviii) observed, "among the nomads, the sheep remained the same; it was changes 
in the regional economy that transformed the sheep from a 'subsistence crop' to a ' cash 
crop' without any conscious decision by the nomads themselves." 
Barfield's comment gets at the flip-side of Kyrgyz economic instrumentality: 
despite their resourcefulness in meeting the many challenges they have faced, Kyrgyz 
agency is fundamentally reactive, a response to forces and events outside of their control 
and often beyond their comprehension. The Kyrgyz are active agents in adapting their 
livelihoods to largely exogenous forces and constraints-in their boundaries, their 
markets, their political situation- which they were (and remain) powerless to negotiate. 
Accordingly, they have adjusted their behavior opportunistically to changing exigencies, 
making strategic decisions based on desired political and economic outcomes while 
maintaining a deceptively traditional appearance of their nomadic pastoral society. 
Pastoral Production 
The mainstay of the Kyrgyz economy is their reproductive pastoral capital, 
namely a) grazing lands and b) those animals that reproduce in the Pamir and which have 
either subsistence or market value. Capital, in this sense, follows Paine's definition of "a 
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resource of which one controls its reproductive value" (1971: 15 8), rendering it distinct 
from non-reproductive assets such as seasonal campgrounds (plus associated 
infrastructure) and other kinds of livestock not bred in the Pamir. Unlike other types of 
property, reproductive pastoral capital must be conserved for future utilization: 
Capital represents a stock of goods and services not devoted to immediate 
consumption but operated to increase the volume of consumption in future 
periods, either directly or indirectly, through production. A primary 
criterion of capital is thus its capacity to assist future consumption, and it 
is oriented towards the future, not merely held back in the present. Put 
another way, the stock of capital at any moment of time is the sum of the 
existing assets, i.e. resources capable of yielding goods and services in a 
future period (Firth, 1964: 18). 
Reproductive livestock capital consist of fat-tailed sheep (Ovies orienta/is aries, 
also known as Karakul or Turki sheep), domestic goats (Capra aegagrus hicus), yak (Bos 
grunniens),73 and, somewhat less so, Bactrian camels (Came/us bactrianus).74 The 
Kyrgyz depend on these species to meet their subsistence needs and for trade. In both 
cases, how livestock are utilized can be divided into two categories: primary and 
secondary pastoral products. Primary pastoral products (also known as carcass products) 
usually involve the culling of animals for meat (and hides) but also encompass the trading 
of livestock for other commodities. Secondary pastoral products refer to renewable 
livestock derivatives--dung, wool, and milk-which can be used for subsistence or trade 
purposes without incurring the gross loss of an animal (Sherratt, 1981: 262). Utilizing 
livestock as primary pastoral products is viewed by the Kyrgyz in zero-sum terms, since 
the disposal of an animal also means losing both the animal' s reproductive value and the 
73 Following Ekvall (1968 : 13), I use "yak" to refer to both singular and plural. 
74 Recently, a few households have been experimenting with raising chickens (for eggs), with limited 
success owing to cold, predation, and possibly altitude. 
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secondary pastoral products that it provides. As Barth notes, " ... among pastoralists 
nearly every instance of consumption threatens the productive capital itself, and must be 
considered and evaluated by the nomad ... In short, the management of pastoral capital 
requires a constant awareness of savings and investment policy" (1964: 79). Because 
female livestock of breeding age are the key reproductive capital, males and older (>5 
years) females are most often culled or traded by the Kyrgyz. 
A second category of animals includes horses and donkeys, which are used 
primarily for transport (riding and carrying loads) but are not considered pastoral capital75 
(Shahrani, 2002: 105), as equids do not offer any economic value (aside from their utility 
as a means of transpmi; horses are also eaten, but never culled) and neither species is 
bred by the Kyrgyz.76 The economics of tourism in the Pamir may increase the value 
added by horses and donkeys, however. The Kyrgyz prefer to use these animals to 
transport tourists and their luggage because they are usually pastured close to the camps 
(and so are more easily fetched); can be ridden, even while laden; and move faster (and 
are more tractable) than either yak or camels. The going rate to hire a pack (or riding) 
animal for one day in 2010 was 800 AFN ($18), regardless of species. For any rural 
Afghan, this is a considerable daily wage; by comparison, Wakhi men are paid the 
equivalent of $3 a day to work on road construction, which is much harder labor. Still, 
75 Camels are also ridden and used as pack animals but, because they reproduce in the Pamirs and provide 
milk and wool, are considered capital. 
76 Claims that equids are unable to breed in the altitude of the Pamirs (cf. Shahrani, 2002: 15) are incorrect; 
after all, horses breed in the higher altitudes of the Tibetan plateau and the South American Andes. The 
actual reason that equids are acquired by trade, rather than bred, is cultural : the Kyrgyz desire the strength 
and endurance of stallions but as a result the Kyrgyz horse population consists only of male horses, so the 
introduction of breeding mares would make the stallions more aggressive and less controllable. 
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the Kyrgyz feel that it is too low a rate and often refuse to rent animals to visiting tourists 
(and anthropologists). 
Although the Kyrgyz have specific referents for their livestock according to age-
classes (Table 10), they often use generic labels. Jandyk (or sometimesjandar) refers to 
both sheep and goats but often koz (sheep) is used in reference to mixed herds, even if not 
exclusively comprised of sheep. When reckoning herd sizes, sheep and goats are usually 
aggregated and my efforts to get specific counts of each species separately were 
invariably met with exasperation. 
Table 10. Kyrgyz livestock terms (highlighted terms indicate breeding animals) 
Sheep (kol) Bactrian camel (too) 
kozu (lamb; 1-year-old) tarlak (1-2 years-old) 
shishek (male; castrated; 2-years-old) boto (2-3 years-old) 
kochkor (ram/male; uncastrated; 2-years-old) too (adult) 
koz (ewe/female; 2-years-old) 
Yak (kotoz) 
Goat ( ecltkz) torpok (calf; <1-year-old) 
ulak (kid; 1-year-old) tar torpok (calf; 1-2 years-old) 
serke (male; castrated; 2-years-old) kunan (male; 2-years-old) 
teke (buck/male; uncastrated; 2-years-old) kunaajyn (female; 2-years-old) 
echki (female; 2-years-old) pishti kotoz (male; 3-years-old) 
pishti kunaajyn (cow/female; 3-years-
OR (male; castrated; 3-years-old) old) 
6giiz (castrated adult male) 




Primary and Secondary Pastoral Products 
Livestock are more often culled for social rather than subsistence purposes and as 
a result animals are rarely slaughtered unless there is a social occasion (religious holiday, 
life-crisis ritual, hospitality demands) to warrant doing so. One of the informal metrics of 
wealth is how often a given household eats meat and the wealthiest ones might have meat 
every day, at least during the summer, when guests are frequent. Poorer families, by 
comparison, will rarely if ever cull any of their animals, unless it appears likely to die 
anyway (the common situation in which horses and camels are eaten). Subsisting off 
dairy products rather than meat and rice is one of the examples commonly cited by the 
Kyrgyz to illustrate the inequality that prevailed during Haji Rahman Kul's time: kiin 
sazyn byshtakganajedibiz-"everyday we only ate curds." · 
While a sheep might be slaughtered any time the occasion warrants (goats too, 
although mutton is greatly preferred), yak are only culled during the winter when the 
excess meat will keep in the cold. Regardless of the species, nearly every part of the 
animal is either consumed or put to some use and only the blood (being forbidden, 
haram) and the hooves are left for the dogs. One recent exception to this rule are the 
hides. Whereas previously they were preserved and used for clothing or hats, today, 
because most clothing and footwear are bought and not made by the Kyrgyz themselves, 
the hide is discarded as often as not. 
Although the consumption of meat is limited to special occasions (except, as 
noted above, for wealthier households), dairy products together with bread and tea are the 
mainstays of the Kyrgyz diet. There is a considerable variety of dairy products, 
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depending on how they are prepared once the milk had been gotten from the animal. The 
usual preparations are kazmak (cream, skimmed from the top of fresh milk), azran or 
chalap (sour milk; yoghurt is also colloquially called azran), byshtak (partially 
dehydrated curds, similar in consistency to mozzarella cheese), kurut (fully dehydrated 
curds, pressed into slabs, dried, and then broken off into chunks), siizmd (curds and whey, 
akin to cottage cheese), ejgez (cheese curd product, with the whey boiled off), meshge 
(unclarified butter), and maz or sarymaz (clarified butter, used as shortening or cooking 
oil; also called ghee in South Asia). Only meshge, sarymaz, kurut, siizmd, and sometimes 
byshtak and ejgez, are available year-round, especially in winter when the female 
livestock are no longer milch. The lack of fresh dairy products or other nutritious food 
(ghezaaye) in winter is often cited by the Kyrgyz as one of the reasons behind the greater 
incidence of illness during that period. 
Sheep, goats, yak, and camels are all milked. While sheep and goats are milch for 
about five months of the year, yak produce milk for six to nine months, and with a much 
higher fat content. This is one reason why poor households, with few livestock of their 
own, tend to have yak cows (ynak) rather than sheep or goats. Another reason is the 
greater resilience of yak, which are less prone to predation, starvation, and disease 
compared to sheep and goats. 
In addition to milk and milk products, two other secondary pastoral products-
wool and dung-are crucial components of the Kyrgyz subsistence system. Wool is 
harvested from sheep, goats, yak, and camels during the summer. Depending on the end 
product, it is either placed into plastic sacks (booji) and eventually traded (yak and camel 
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wool are traded in bulk, as raw wool; sheep wool is not, as there is little demand for it) or 
else used domestically. If it is to be made into felt (kiliz), the wool will be separated by 
hand, laid on the floor of a yurt, and beaten with twin sticks to interlock the fibers. 
Boiling water is then poured over the felt, which is beaten further and then placed atop a 
reed mat and rolled up, with a long wooden pole in the center. The felt roll is hitched to a 
horse by both ends of the pole, which acts as an axle. After an hour of being dragged 
behind the horse, the felt is unrolled, more boiling water is added, and then it is rolled 
back and forth and pressed by hand. Finally, ropes are then tied around the bundle and it 
is pulled altematingly in two directions. Because it is so labor-intensive, felt is usually 
made only for domestic purposes, such as yurt covers, and rarely for trade, since the 
return on it is not commensurate with the labor involved in production. 
The raw wool (fun) is used for a number of different purposes. Camel and yak 
wool is taken down to Pakistan or W akhan and bartered. Sheep and goat wool is used for 
a variety of domestic purposes, such as filling the ubiquitous quilts (toshok) 77 that are 
stacked atop one another in every Kyrgyz household and laid out for guests to sit upon 
(or bed down in at night). Wool is also spun into strands of yam which are then either 
twisted to make ropes (arkan) or woven to produce a number of items, ranging from 
saddlebags (kurjun) to horse covers (at jawuu). The latter, while limited in quantity by 
their time-consuming production, are a valuable trade item, regarded by some as the 
finest horse blankets in all of Afghanistan. The value ofthejawuu depends on the kind of 
77 Toshok are quilts used for bedding at night but are folded and employed as floor cushions during the day. 
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wool used: goat hair is considered poor quality, sheep or yak wool is fair quality, and 
camel wool the best. 78 
While dung may seem to be a minor subsistence need, it bears remembering that 
the entire Pamir lies above tree-level and that without a substitute for woody plants to 
burn, life on the roof of the world would not be possible. There are two naturally 
occurring fuels: peat ( chym) and two different genera of an herbaceous plant. Chym, 
found most commonly along the banks of the small streams and rivers running down the 
center of each valley, requires considerable effort to harvest, dry and ignite, and gives off 
a good deal of smoke. For this reason, it is used most commonly to heat large cauldrons 
(kazan) outdoors for a long period, such as when boiling water to pour over wool when 
making felt. 
The two types of dwarf shrubs are · tersken (Krascheninnikovia ceratoides, 
formerly known as Ceratoides papposa) and shywak (Artemisia spp.). They are harvested 
by uprooting the entire plant, which does not need to be dried before it can be burned, 
owing to the low moisture content. Because of the low primary productivity of the Pamir, 
these plants regenerate slowly and wide-scale commercial harvesting across the border in 
the Eastern Pamirs of Tajikistan has been a significant cause of desertification (GTZ, 
2006). Tersken and shywak are more commonly burned as fuel in the Great Pamir than in 
the Little Pamir and over-harvesting is a contributing factor to the comparatively greater 
78 In 1970, while encamped with a Kyrgyz camel caravan in Sarhad, a French couple were told that camel 
wool is "so valuable that my camels have to be guarded at night to prevent the Wakhis coming and stealing 
tufts of wool" (Michaud, 1977). 
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degraded state of rangelands in the former, 79 especially since "dwarf shrubs are important 
fodder plants, especially in winter when they still have high protein content and can be 
accessed by animals" (Samimi, et al., 2010). Massive amounts of both tersken and 
shywak are stockpiled throughout the summer and fall in the winter camps, before 
snowfall covers all the vegetation. 
The main fuel of the Kyrgyz hearth, however, is dung, of which there are two 
types: tezek and kyk. Tezek is yak dung and in most camps during summer young children 
can be found scouring the surrounding area for it. In winter camps, before the arrival of 
the snows, the previous season's tezek is gathered and stacked for future use. Kyk refers 
to compressed sheep and goat dung and provides the main fuel for winter (tezek, when 
excreted by yak, tends to disappear into the snow, making it an impractical source of 
winter fuel). It is carved out in slabs from the pens (koroo) where the animals are kept at 
night as, over time, the mechanical action of their hooves compresses the dung pellets 
into a solid mass. Dried kyk from the previous season is excavated :from the koroo of each 
camp prior to its occupation, and several times thereafter, depending on the period of 
residence. The need for adequate supplies of kyk is one reason why the Kyrgyz herd their 
animals collectively and is a factor in determining camp composition, since a minimum 
number of sheep and goats is required to produce sufficient quantities of kyk to get 
through the winter. In the fall camps, lack of fuel-insufficient kyk due to a short period 
of residence, other types of fuel (tezek, chym, tersken, and shywak) buried under snow-
is a recurrent problem. 
79 Don Bedunah, Professor of Range Resources Management, University of Montana, personal 
communication, 2006. 
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While in summer the cooking is done on an open fire indoors, using a tripod 
(tulga), during the winter nearly all households use a bukhari, a metal stove similar in 
design to a wood stove, having a single door and a chimney (nal). A bukhari distributes 
heat better and bums more efficiently, and with less smoke, than an open fire. However, 
since the women prefer an open fire for baking bread and heating large cooking vessels, 
there are also cooking yurts (ashpaz ill), often run cooperatively, in most winter camps 
(the women also enjoy having a social venue separate from the men). A typical bukhari 
costs between two to four sheep, since all the materials have to be brought up to the 
Pamir and assembled by specialized craftsmen. 
Grazing and Fodder 
The vegetation of the Pamirs, converted by Kyrgyz livestock into primary and 
secondary pastoral products, is the most important factor in making human habitation 
possible. According to Vanselow, "the majority of the Pamirian plants are characterized 
by a high nutritive value, which compensates to a considerable degree for the low 
productivity of the pastures" (2012: 156), which perhaps explains why the Pamir 
pasturelands have been praised by numerous visitors, including Marco Polo: 
When the traveller leaves this place [Wakhan], he goes three days' journey 
towards the north-east, through mountains all the time, climbing so high 
that this is said to be the highest place in the world. And when he is in this 
high place, he fmds a plain between two mountains, with a lake from 
which flows a very fine river. Here is the best pasturage in the world; for a 
lean beast grows fat here in ten days. (1958: 79-80). 
The present occupants still extol the vegetative virtues of the Pamir, claiming that, 
"A single blade ofPamir grass is as good as a haystack" (Michaud, 1972: 458). However, 
surveys by Petocz in the 1970s noted extensive overgrazing in many parts of the Pamirs 
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(Petocz, 1978a and 1987b; Petocz et al., 1978), though the 1978 exodus from the Little 
Pamir subsequently permitted many areas to recover: "The Kirghiz agree that the 
conditions of the rangeland now is much better than it was during the 1970s, with fewer 
households and less livestock [at present]" (Schaller, 2004: 6). 
As in many parts of northern Afghanistan, pastures and campgrounds in the 
Pamirs are privately owned, either individually or by a particular patriline consisting of a 
number of male agnates. The private ownership of land ensures that for most Kyrgyz, 
their seasonal movements are predictable and recunent, spatially as well as temporally. 
Knowing where and generally when they will be at any given time of year, the greatest 
variable encountered by the Kyrgyz is that of pasture conditions, namely the quality and 
availability of both natural grazing and fodder. Many of the capital improvements made 
by the Kyrgyz on their lands are done with the goal of boosting pastoral production by 
increasing the availability of vegetation for both forage and fodder. Provisioning 
adequate fodder has been a problem for the Kyrgyz since they were cut off from their 
traditional winter pastures in Tajikistan in the 1930s; as Kreutzmann notes, "Basically, 
winter pastures are missing everywhere today" (2009: 113). As a result, fodder 
production, rather than the availability of pastures, is the main limiting factor of Kyrgyz 
pastoral production, at least in the Little Pamir. 
While natural grazing un-supplemented with fodder is the norm during the 
summer and fall, it is almost always necessary to augment grazing with fodder during the 
latter part of the winter and throughout much of the spring, even given ideal forage 
conditions. Typically, sheep, goats, and both female and juvenile yak are given 
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supplemental fodder, particularly during the birthing period in the spnng. Horses, 
especially if ridden often, are also given fodder, but camels and donkeys are generally 
able to fend for themselves. Male yak are grazed in the upper reaches of a number of 
valleys only occupied during winter, as they are able to dig through deep snow to fmd 
forage and are usually able deter predators, mostly wolves but also snow leopards. 
Another key variable directly affecting pasture condition is the weather and in 
particular the depth and extent of the seasonal snow cover. As a general rule, the more 
snow that is on the ground, the more fodder the animals will require and the longer they 
will require it. When natural grazing is not possible, in whole or in part, because either 
the pastures have been exhausted or owing to deep snow, the only option the Kyrgyz 
have is to provide fodder to their livestock. Remaining in the winter camp while trying to 
find unutilized adjacent grazing lands is rarely possible because in most cases all the 
nearby winter pastures are privately owned and in use (or depleted) . Moving to a 
different camp, whether a summer (ja'floo) or fall (kiizdoo) one, is most likely to be of 
little avail since these pastures will probably be buried under snow as well, especially if 
they are north-facing (teskel). In any case, they will not yet have regenerated from the 
previous season's use and there will be little forage available. Deep snow occurring in a 
south-facing (kiingdl) winter camp usually means even deeper snow everywhere else, 
except possibly in the middle of the valley (suunun bofu), where the scouring action of 
the wind is most pronounced. 
The problem with trying to ride out bad conditions by relying on fodder 
supplementation is that fodder stocks are limited and generally insufficient to replace 
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natural grazing for any longer than a few days. As an adjunct to natural grazing, the 
stockpiled fodder will last two to four months, though it is typically budgeted for four 
months (Jadi, Dalwi, Hut, Hamal; from December 22 to April 20). Whenever possible, 
fodder supplies will be conserved for use later in the season but they are usually 
exhausted by the end of Hamal or in early Saur at the latest (roughly April 20 to May 1 ). 
In almost any given year, the Kyrgyz response to the exigencies of fodder is to hedge 
their bets and simply cut as much as they can in the fall, depending on availability, 
knowing that it might mean the difference between disaster and salvation. 
Similar to camps and pastures, fodder preserves (koruk) are also privately owned, 
although there are a few open-access ones. Typically these are kuzdoo (autumn) and 
kyshtoo (winter) pastures, which are left fallow all summer and the fodder is then cut 
beginning in mid-September, over a period of two to four weeks, just before the Kyrgyz 
move fromjarloo to kiizdoo. Only after the grass has been cut will these areas begin to be 
grazed; the seasonal allocation of pasture use ensures against inadvertent grazing, since 
rarely will livestock be pastured anywhere near koruk during the summer. However, since 
koruk are not fenced or otherwise enclosed, responsibility for keeping livestock out of 
them falls to the shepherd tending the flock. Because of the importance of fodder, koruk 
boundaries are generally well know and respected, so there are few disputes over them. 
Autumn is one of the most intense periods of Kyrgyz activity in the entire year. 
Besides cutting fodder, a task that occupies all Kyrgyz males for a few weeks, they are 
preparing to go to Pakistan for trade (in the Little Pamir) and then down to the Wakhan 
(for the Kyrgyz in both Pamirs) to collect their food aid and provision for the long winter. 
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Immediately upon their return, most households will move to their fall camp and will 
then begin preparing the winter camps for occupation--cutting slabs of kyk from the 
koroo, repairing stone walls, fixing their tam, etc. 
Most of the fodder cut by the Kyrgyz is of two genera, Car ex and Kobresia, in the 
family Cyperaceae, more commonly known as sedges. The yields per unit area tend to be 
low and the nutritional quality of the fodder can be poor if it is cut too late in the season, 
once the weather turns cold. 80 Whenever possible, the Kyrgyz try to irrigate fodder 
producing areas by digging basic channels (aryk) from natural streams and directing 
water so that it seeps down onto lower lying koruk. The rivers and streams from which 
the channels radiate experience significant diurnal fluctuation during summer, increasing 
in volume during the day as snowmelt from solar radiation increases. Most channels are 
dug so that water will flow into them even with low river volumes, as might occur during 
a prolonged period of cloudy weather with little snowmelt. The disadvantage of this 
system is that as river volumes rise, the aryk tend to flood, inundating the koruk and 
potentially raising the water table and/or increasing soil salinity. With technical 
assistance provided as part of the National Solidarity Program, larger irrigation channels 
have been built, more immune to flooding and capable of transporting greater volumes of 
water. 
Cut fodder is transported to the winter camps and stored in chop kapa, open-
topped, stone-walled bins. Despite the considerable effort that goes into harvesting fodder 
every year, the total amount reaped is typically modest. For example, one kyshtoo had 
80 Don Bedunah, Professor of Range Resources Management, University of Montana, 2006, personal 
communication. 
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just a single, large chop kapa measuring 7 x 4.3 x 2 meters (23' x 14' x 6Yz') and thus 
capable of holding, when full, 60 cubic meters (2,093 feet3) of cut grass (Figure 19). This 
Source: author 
Figure 19. Chop kapa, Karajylga, Little Pamir. March, 2008. 
amount of fodder, during a bad winter, would have to support 250 sheep and goats, 16 
horses, six camels, and six donkeys, in addition to newborn livestock.81 
One inherent problem the Kyrgyz face in deciding when to give fodder is that 
disaster, when it strikes, usually occurs in the spring. By this time of year, the lambs have 
dropped and most of the livestock have lost weight after a winter of lean grazing and are 
at their weakest. The worst scenario is the occurrence of jut, when a temporary warming 
81 This list does not include the 80 yak owned by members of this camp. Though the male yak would be 
pastured higher up in the valleys, the juveniles and the ·female yak would be kept in the camp and would 
also likely require fodder under such a scenario. 
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is followed by a brief, intense cold snap. 82 The melting snow freezes solid, draping the 
ground in a shroud of ice and preventing any animals from digging through to reach the 
underlying vegetation. Especially if fodder supplies are already running low, jut can 
result in massive livestock mortality, wiping out entire household herds. Shahrani was 
told of one jut in 1972 in which "more than three thousand sheep and goats and over two 
hundred yak" died, as well as another one which occurred in 1974-75, killing about 4,000 
sheep and goats and more than 100 yak, all belonging to a single household (2002: 176). 
More recently, an American photographer, Beth Wald, who was in the Little 
Pamir in April 2005, witnessed one of the worst cases ofjut in recent memory. Coming 
on the heels of an unusually cold and snowy winter, two big stmms, separated by a week 
of relatively warm weather, hit the Pamir. The second storm dumped over a meter of 
snow in places and was accompanied by extremely cold temperatures. The effect of this 
weather on the livestock was disastrous. W ald reports encountering "piles of dead 
animals" and desperate shepherds leading their steadily diminishing flocks in search of 
pasture, in one case leaving behind "twenty dead and dying sheep who could no longer 
walk" (2005: 7). In one Kyrgyz winter camp, Achyktash, the camp leader told her that 
they had lost "120 sheep and goats out of approximately 200, and about V4 of their yak" 
(ibid). Wald estimated that "between Y4 to Y2 of the domestic livestock wintering along 
the upper W akhan River and in the Little Pamir was lost" over the course of one week 
(ibid). While jut can happen Pamir-wide, as the result of major storm systems such as 
82 Jut is different from the Mongolian tenn zud (or dzud), which refers to an extremely cold and/or snowy 
winter. Jut refers to a discrete event, usually a particular storm or series of storms, rather than a seasonal 
pattern. 
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those described above, more often though it occurs locally, affecting relatively limited 
areas (Shahrani, 2002: 176). 
The Great Pamir Kyrgyz, living across the narrow Pamir River from Tajikistan, 
have recently devised a simple solution to their lack of kungof grazing lands and limited 
fodder reserves: when faced with deep snow, a number of households wintering close to 
the border take their livestock (sheep, goats, and yak) across the frozen Panj River to 
Tajikistan, where the south-facing pastures tend to have less snow. This cross-border 
migration is unofficially sanctioned by the local Tajik Border Force commander, who is 
based at the permanently occupied border post at the foot of the Khargushi pass, along to 
the road leading from the Pamir River basin over the Alichur range to the main M41 
"Pamir Highway." Because of the "tax" levied by the border post commander on Afghan 
livestock grazing in Tajikistan (approximately one yak for every 100-150 livestock, 
which, depending upon the species composition, could mean a tax as high as 5%) this 
option is only exercised in extremis, usually deep snow combined with dwindling fodder 
supplies. 
Trade 
While many ofthe Kyrgyz's subsistence needs are met through the use of primary 
(meat and hides) and secondary (dung, wool, and milk) pastoral products, the majority of 
them must be satisfied through trade. Cash, whether in Afghanis (AFN), dollars (USD), 
or, less often and only in the Little Pamir, Pakistani rupees (PKR), is increasingly 
common. Whereas previously the main source of hard currency had been the few tourists 
and NGO workers who visited the Pamirs, now with National Solidarity Program-funded 
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wage labor widely available, more Kyrgyz have access to cash. But cash transactions are 
still limited to minor purchases and barter remains the predominant form of exchange, 
involving two Kyrgyz commodities: livestock (sheep, goats, and yak) and secondary 
pastoral products (wool and dairy products). These commodities are exchanged for any 
manufactured item or agricultural product the Kyrgyz require. Additionally, as mentioned 
earlier, the Kyrgyz depend on trade to procure horses and donkeys, neither of which is 
bred in the Pamir. 
Meat and dairy products derived from livestock, a few wild-harvested vegetables 
available during the summer (mostly onions, Allium spp.), game meat (Siberian ibex, 
Capra sibirica; Marco Polo sheep, Ovis ammon polii; and the Pamir hare, Lepus 
tibetanus pamirensis, are all hunted), and fish (mostly Sattar snowtrout, Schizopyge 
curvifrons) comprise the only locally-sourced foods in the Kyrgyz diet; everything else is 
acquired through trade. Besides dairy products, the other main dietary staples-flour 
(un), tea· (chal), rice (giiriich)-are all imported. While it would be possible for a given 
household to subsist primarily upon dairy products, personal preference and the norms of 
hospitality require every Kyrgyz family to expend considerable economic resources in 
exchange for these imported commodities. Other imported food items include rock salt 
(tuz), 83 sugar (shakar or sheker), spices, dried fruit, candy, and, on rare occasions, 
potatoes, beans, and other vegetables. 
83 The Kyrgyz are fortunate in that the Pamirs abound in solontchak (or solonchak) fields (shor in Kyrgyz), 
where "the ground-water level is close enough to the surface so that the salts migrate upward and 
effloresce" (Jenny, 1994: 84), thereby "satisfying the needs of the animals and some poorer families for the 
otherwise scarce commodity of salt" (Shahrani, 1978a: 237). But while the salt has a neutral pH, the 
alkaline ground water that leaches it imparts a bitter flavor, which is why the Kyrgyz prefer to purchase salt 
instead of harvesting it locally. 
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Flour rather than cereal grains is preferred and always wheat (buudal) flour; the 
Kyrgyz detest the more economical barley (arpa) flour used by the Wakhi to make bread. 
Wheat flour, the most important Kyrgyz staple, is primarily used for bread (nan) as well 
as for a few other prepared foods (boorsok, fried dough; kattama, a rich puff pastry made 
from layers of dough filled with butter and cream; atala, a flour-based gruel). The flat, 
round unleavened loaves (kalama) are served with every meal; often, they are the meal, 
together with some fresh cream or butter. 
Tea is the main beverage of the Kyrgyz. It is brewed using loose leaves (versus 
tea bricks) and there are three varieties: green tea (kok chal), black tea (kara chal), and 
salted milk tea (kattyk char or shor chal). The last is the default option, consisting of 
black tea, (rock) salt, and milk or cream (often butter is added too, in cold weather). Tea 
together with bread is consumed for breakfast and then throughout the day; guests are 
always provided with both immediately upon arrival. 
Rice, while not quite a luxury, is more selectively eaten, due to its greater cost and 
longer preparation time. It is most commonly eaten for dinner and is usually prepared 
with considerable quantities of mar. Leftover rice is often made into a sort of rice 
porridge (shoola or shir brenj), often served for breakfast. The Kyrgyz generally prefer 
Afghan-grown (watani) rice from Takhar or Kunduz over the more common imported 
Pakistani (or Kazakhstani) rice. 
One mystery of the Kyrgyz diet concerns how it meets their nutritional needs. 
Few, if any, Kyrgyz, suffer from chronic hunger (lack of food) but presumably many are 
138 
malnourished (undernourished) due to the absence of certain vitamins and minerals in the 
typical diet. Some examples are: 
• Vitamin C: Few plant sources of vitamin C occur in the Kyrgyz diet. While organ 
meats contain an abundance of vitamin C, these are eaten infrequently, especially 
for women and children. Vitamin C deficiency can lead to anemia and, in extreme 
cases, scurvy. 
• Vitamin D: The Kyrgyz have few dietary sources of vitamin D but receive ample 
sun exposure, at least in summer. During the rest of the year, when there is less 
sun and the Kyrgyz spend more time indoors due to cold weather, they are at risk 
of vitamin D deficiency, which over time can lead to osteomalacia, a softening of 
bones (in children, it is known as rickets). 
• Iron: A shortage of iron, estimated to affect up to 80% of women in developing 
countries (Murray-Kolb and Beard, 2009:946S), is the most common cause of 
anemia. Iron-deficiency anemia is a risk factor for a number of pre- and post-natal 
conditions affecting both mother and child (Allen, 2000: 1280S). While meat is 
rich in (heme) iron, few Kyrgyz households eat it regularly enough to prevent iron 
deficiency. Most of the non-heme (plant-based) iron in the Kyrgyz diet likely 
comes from wheat flour and rice. Food provided by the WFP, such as wheat flour, 
is usually fortified with a number of vitamins and minerals, including iron. But, 
while some of the flour from Tajikistan is fortified with iron, in Afghanistan 
"flour imports are not generally fortified and importers are unaware of the 
importance of fortified flour. .. no national regulation mandates that imported flour 
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be fortified, even though all countries exporting to Afghanistan have the capacity 
to fortify such flour" (Levitt, et al., 2010:108). 
• Iodine: The rock salt used by the Kyrgyz is not iodized and probably does not 
contain enough iodine to prevent iodine deficiency diseases such as 
hypothyroidism, goiter (although I am unaware of any cases), and cretinism. They 
are given iodized salt as part of the food aid they receive but it is often traded for 
other goods, rather than consumed. 
The Kyrgyz are aware at some level that their diet is insufficient to meet their 
nutritional needs, especially during winter. Many individuals take vitamin supplements, 
especially vitamin C, which they purchase from the traders. But the inability to trade for 
many food items during the long winter, when fresh dairy products are unavailable, is 
regarded by all Kyrgyz as a problem, one that they believe could only be alleviated by 
having a store, serviced by a road, in the Pamir. 
Mandatory Subsistence Expenditures 
Each Kyrgyz household has annual subsistence requirements necessitating the 
production of both primary and secondary pastoral products that can then be exchanged 
for other goods imported from outside of the Pamirs. These household economics revolve 
around two types of imported commodities: staples and luxury goods. While 
expenditures, averaged across all Kyrgyz households, are greater for staples, luxury 
goods (discussed below) consume a considerable portion of Kyrgyz disposable income. 
Staples include edibles (flour, rice, tea, sugar) and non-edibles (fabric and clothing, 
footwear, kitchen implements, tools, etc.). Edible staples are better thought of as 
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consumables since in contrast to most non-edible staples-the lifespan of which the 
Kyrgyz are expert at extending--consumables need to be replaced on a frequently 
recurring basis. For reasons of availability and cost-savings, the Kyrgyz prefer to buy 
them in bulk (Table 11). 
Table 11. Kyrgyz units of commercial weight 
Unit Weight Equivalent to84 
1 booji85 (rice) 70 kg (or 50 kg) 10 seer (or 7 seer) 
1 booji (flour, sugar) 50 kg 7 seer 
1 booji (tea) 30kg 4 seer 
cherek86 8 kg >1 seer 
seer 7.6 kg <1 cherek 
shishek 2kg ---
pau (Kabuli) .453 kg ---
Source: author 
The Afghan traders working in the Pamirs are not able to provide bulk quantities 
of consumables at competitive prices so while many of them sell smaller amounts of 
edibles that the Kyrgyz might need on an ad hoc, one-off basis, most of their business 
involves non-edibles and luxury goods. Bulk items are procured by the Kyrgyz from 
Pakistan (for the Little Pamir Kyrgyz) or in the Wakhan, usually in conjunction with the 
food aid that the Kyrgyz receive annually in the fall. 
Discretionary Spending and Luxury Goods 
In addition to mandatory subsistence expenditures, the Kyrgyz purchase a number 
of luxury goods which, aggregated in terms of annual household expenditures, can 
84 The equivalents are approximate, not exact. 
85 Booji is a Dari word referring to a large plastic sack; in Kyrgyz, it is sometimes called sandyk (trunk, 
bale), though this usage is uncommon. 
86 Not to be confused with the Afghan unit charak, which is approximately 1.75 kg. 
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sometimes exceed subsistence spending. The drain on household wealth as a result of 
such discretionary spending was noted by 40 years ago by Shahrani, especially regarding 
tea, "without a doubt the largest single item of trade in the Wakhan Corridor" (2002: 
199). Tea, however, is such an integral part of the Kyrgyz diet, not to mention culture, 
that I follow them in regarding it as a staple rather than a luxury good. The main luxury 
goods obtained by the Kyrgyz as a result of trade are sweets (shirini-candy and dried 
fruit), opium, tobacco, and Chinese-made electronics (radios, televisions, DVD players, 
DVDs, satellite dishes, mobile "smart" phones),87 imported via Pakistan.88 Most 
households now have solar panels, connected to a car battery, from which light bulbs and 
radios are run. Expensive electronics, such as televisions, that require a generator (and, in 
tum, fuel, which, owing to transport difficulties, is always in short supply), are typically 
owned only by wealthier households. 
Unlike electronics, which tend to be one-off purchases, regular opmm and 
tobacco use can consume a significant portion of household wealth. Opium use, in fact, is 
one of the main drivers of the re-stratification of Kyrgyz society, at least in the Little 
Parnir. Its consumption imposes a number of costs: health, economic, and social, to name 
a few. While opium use is nothing new among the Afghan Kyrgyz-the Pamirs, after all, 
lie on one of the trade routes along which opium was transported from Badakhshan to 
China in the nineteenth century, and the merchants often paid Wakhi and Kyrgyz 
87 With a SIM card from a Tajik mobile provider, it is possible to receive a signal in much of the lower 
Wakhan and this has been a huge boon to the Wakbi living there. However, there is no coverage in either 
Pamir, so the Kyrgyz use the phones to take pictures and record videos. 
88 A small television or a portable DVD player sells for about two sheep, whereas a large television can cost 
up to five sheep. Much of the cost is associated with the difficulty of bringing relatively fragile and bulky 
electronics up to the Pamirs. 
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caravaners in opium for their services (Shahrani, 2002: 79)-its pernicious influence 
seems to have become more widespread over the past 40 years. Shahrani, writing in the 
1970s, noted that among 1,825 Kyrgyz "about one hundred persons are believed to use 
opium" (2002: 138), or 5.5% of the population. Today, opium-taryaak or afyun-is 
used by between 88 to 112 people out of a population of 1,149 (7.6-9.8%). 
The usual reason offered by the Kyrgyz to account for the increase in opium 
use-which they acknowledge as a problem-is that the mujahideen "forced" them to 
buy it during the 1990s when they held sway over the region. This explanation accords 
with the massive increase in opium cultivation in northeastern Afghanistan under 
mujahideen rule, to fund their war against the Taliban and to offset declining Western 
support after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991: "In order to support their power 
bases and to remunerate their followers, strong and influential regional rulers expanded 
their share in poppy cultivation, which reached a peak first in 1994 ... Under the Taliban 
rule, poppy cultivation remained at high levels and reached another peak in 1999. The 
Taliban and the Northern Alliance derived substantial funds from the narco-economy for 
the perpetuation and sustenance of their respective rule" (Kreutzmann, 2007: 612). 
However, drug addicts rarely have their addiction foisted upon them and a more 
likely explanation for the rise in opium use among the Kyrgyz is that increased opium 
cultivation in Badakhshan and elsewhere during the 1990s, combined with the economic 
imperative among Northern Alliance commanders to derive revenue from both 
international trafficking and the less lucrative domestic market, resulted in more opium 
being available in the Pamirs than ever before. Kreutzmann notes that, "The share of 
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opmm consumption by the mountain fanners and nomads [in Badakhshan] has 
significantly increased smce the rule of the commanders dominates political and 
economic affairs in northeastern Afghanistan, where their power is stabilized and 
sustained by the narco-economy" (2007: 617). Some Kyrgyz informants admit that they 
were never forced to buy opium from the mujahideen but note that it was often sold at 
below-market prices by the traders, or even given away for free, in order to promote 
consumption, after which the price rose accordingly. 
Many addicts get started smoking opium to self-medicate painful conditions (such 
as tooth abscesses) and opium use is often framed by the Kyrgyz as a necessary, if 
regrettable, response to a lack of healthcare and medicine. All of these factors-the 
increased prevalence of opium, a steady decrease in price since 2001, greater disposable 
income spread move evenly across the Kyrgyz population, continuing lack of healthcare 
and medicine, and the absence of strong (moral) leadership militating against the use of 
opium89 -explain high rates of opium use among the Kyrgyz. 
Today, opium consumption has taken two different trajectories in each Pamir. In 
the Great Parnir, there are far fewer casual users and those who might qualify as addicts 
tend to be older. I recorded 12 people (2.25% percent ofthe population) considered to be 
taryaaki, moderate-to-heavy users, although the actual number is likely higher. The 
relatively low levels of opium consumption there, compared to the Little Pamir, are 
typically cited with a measure of pride. In contrast, both casual use and addiction are 
89 The spiritual leader (pir) of the Wakhi , Pir Shah Ismail, has taken a very strong and public stand against 
opium use and his activism, as well as the AKDN's efforts at treating addiction, is credited with declining 
use among the Wakhi. Similarly, in the 1970s, Haji Rahman Kul Khan was strident in his opposition to 
opium. 
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rampant in the Little Pamir, where I recorded 76 taryaaki (12.4% of the total population 
or 20.3% of all adults).90 Equally insidious is that a high proportion of taryaaki in the 
Little Pamir are younger, between 25-35 years old, and their addiction represents a 
substantial loss of productive labor, not to mention wealth. For example, it is estimated 
that through the purchase of opium, "the local economy is deprived of at least $9000 [per 
annum] that could be spent productively" (Schaller, 2004: 16). Furthermore, since opium 
is sold by itinerant traders-mostly Tajiks from southern and central Badakhshan-the 
income flows out of the W akhan and often into the coffers of local commanders involved 
in opium production and trafficking. 
The difference in opium use between the two Pamirs can most obviously be 
explained by the greater wealth of the Little Pamir Kyrgyz. An additional reason offered 
by the Kyrgyz is the stronger Wakhi influence in the Little Pamir, where a number of 
W akhi opium addicts work as shepherds and traders. While significant strides have been 
made by the AKDN in curbing opium use in the Wakhan, most of the success has been 
concentrated in lower Wakhan; in upper Wakhan, though rates of addiction and 
recidivism have declined in the past five years, opium is still fairly common. 
Most traders deal a bit of opium on the side, in addition to whatever other 
consumer goods (tea, sugar, cloth) they peddle. This is unsurprising, given that opium has 
the highest value-to-weight ratio of anything sold in the Pamirs. A few traders, often with 
connections to provincial security forces (the Afghan Border Police, or ABP), specialize 
in dealing opium, but in general, demand in either Pamir is insufficient to make selling 
90 Some Kyrgyz informants thought this number too low and believed the actual total to be closer to I 00 
tmyaaki (16.3% ofthe total population or 26.7% of all adults) . 
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opium alone a profitable endeavor. A significant p011ion of the annual opium trade is 
conducted in the fall, around October, when the WFP food distribution occurs in Gaz 
Khan and Sarhad. In the days leading up to the arrival of the WFP trucks, the villages are 
flooded with opium dealers, often ABP sub-commanders, who barter opium for WFP 
food aid (usually lentils and cooking oil) and then resell the food. Opium, like other 
goods, is also sold on credit for livestock during this time and the debt is collected the 
following summer. For this reason, food aid to the Kyrgyz has been described as akin to 
an opium subsidy (Schaller, 2004: 15-16) since not only is much of the food exchanged 
directly for opium, but the livestock savings the Kyrgyz realize as a result of receiving 
the aid are often spent instead on luxury goods (electronics, tobacco, opium). 
The cost of opium, as with other goods, is usually at its highest in the late winter 
and early spring, when there are few traders servicing the Pamirs and the Kyrgyz are 
often running low on supplies. The quality of the opium also affects the price. In general, 
the price of a tuli (about 24 g) fluctuates between 200-300 AFN, and the cost of a pau 
(453 g) varies between one-half and two sheep (Table 12). 
Table 12. Opium units and cost 
Unit Weight Equivalent to Cost (in October 2010) 
pau (Kabuli) 453 g 24 tuli 1 sheep 
tuli 24 g 6 tanggak 200AFN 
tanggak 4g --- 35 AFN 
Source: author 
While there is no generally agreed upon metric of addiction, a heavy user 
(taryaaki) might consumer almost one tuli per day. For example, Aziz, an addict in 
whose camp I lived, smoked (together with his wife) on average 20 g a day (slightly less 
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than a tuli) or 1.3 pau (604 g) a month. His monthly expenditure was 1.3 sheep (at a cost 
of 1 sheep per pau of opium), or 16 sheep a year. The most notorious Kyrgyz addict was 
Apendibai, the wealthiest man in the Little Pamir, who died in August 2008. He was 
rumored to "smoke for three days and then sleep for three days" and the volume of his 
daily opium consumption was legend; I was given figures ranging from 65 to 230 g. The 
various traders I spoke with stated that he spent roughly 180 sheep per year on opium, an 
astronomical sum for even the richest Kyrgyz.91 
Few, if any, Kyrgyz use hashish (charas) and none have taken to heroin (powdar) 
yet, although their enthusiasm for injections combined with an intense desire to alleviate 
boredom and treat pain with whatever is on hand make the advent of heroin use a distinct 
possibility. Small amounts of heroin have been trafficked to China through the Little 
Pamir, though the degree to which any Kyrgyz were involved is unclear. Some opium is 
also smuggled into Pakistan via the Little Pamir, mostly by Pakistani traders. Reportedly, 
this trade originated to serve Wakhi emigrants from the Wakhan living in northern 
Pakistan, who brought their addiction with them.92 The Kyrgyz strenuously deny ever 
bringing opium into Pakistan themselves during their annual trade caravan to Hunza, not 
only for fear of being caught but also owing to the likelihood that any incident would 
result in the border being closed. If anything, Kyrgyz concerns about maintaining access 
to the vital Pakistani market have led to a degree of self-policing in terms of ensuring that 
the Pakistani traders are not trafficking in opium. 
91 Apendibai' s wife and one adult son, as well as various hangers-on, are also addicts, so this figure is 
plausible. 
92 An ethnic Wakhi from Hunza, Pakistan, working in Afghanistan, personal communication, 2010. 
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Besides opmm, many Kyrgyz men (and a number of women) use tobacco 
products, cigarettes (papiros) and nasybaz (naswar in Dari), a kind of chewing tobacco. 
Tobacco consumption tends to be high-one of my hosts smoked three packs a day, and 
suffered mightily during the Ramazan fast-and in addition to the obvious health 
impacts, tobacco consumes a significant portion of household expenditures. A kg of 
naswar costs 200 AFN and will last a few months, making it a minor expense. A carton 
of cheap Chinese cigarettes (10 packs or 200 cigarettes), on the other hand, costs 50 AFN 
and will only last five days for a two-pack-a-day smoker, meaning an annual individual 
expenditure of 3,650 AFN, or one sheep. For a household of heavy smokers, the total 
might be several sheep traded per year just for cigarettes. 
Kyrgyz Economic History 
Closed frontiers not only necessitated pastoral production innovations, they also 
forced the Kyrgyz to fmd new markets where they could trade pastoral products for staple 
goods. In the years prior to the 1978 exodus, Kyrgyz commercial activity was limited to 
the territory of Afghanistan, with the exception of a few Wakhi traders from Gojal, 
Pakistan, who would come to the Pamirs to trade. During the summer, both Pamirs were 
visited by Afghan traders who would exchange manufactured and agricultural 
commodities for Kyrgyz livestock and secondary pastoral products, either directly or on 
credit. A few wealthy, entrepreneurial Kyrgyz herd owners also participated in an annual 
livestock caravan to Kabul, where rates of exchange for Kyrgyz commodities and prices 
of market goods were better than those offered by the traders (Shahrani, 2002: 207-8). 
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The Soviet occupation ( 1979-1989) disrupted this system but provided an 
unexpected economic boon, in two ways. As mentioned before, the Soviets helped the 
Kyrgyz who returned from Pakistan rebuild their herds and the base at Bozoi Giimboz 
offered a dependable, year-round trading venue where the Kyrgyz could barter with the 
Soviets for agricultural and manufactured commodities, at a better rate of exchange than 
the Kyrgyz had previously been offered by the Mghan traders, who had employed a 
number of strategies to maximize their commercial advantage (Shahrani, 2002: 196). In 
addition, Badakhshan, traditionally a food deficit area with correspondingly low food 
security, received subsidized cereals during the Soviet period (Goodhand, 2000: 268), 
which kept the price of wheat low. Collectively, this meant that the Kyrgyz had to trade 
proportionally fewer animals to acquire the imported goods they required. And, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the increased survivorship rates from this period 
suggest that the proximity of the Soviet base and the medical care available there also 
made for a healthier community overall. 
The civil war (1989-2001) which followed the Soviet withdrawal was, for the 
Kyrgyz, the antithesis of the stable and prosperous period of Soviet occupation. Besides 
suffering under the capricious and often predatory rule of various commanders after they 
took over all of Badakhshan in 1992, the Kyrgyz had to contend with the progressive 
ruination ofthe regional economy. As Pain (2010: 11) notes, "The cost ofliving began to 
rise with the emergence of a siege economy in Badakhshan due to the blockades imposed 
by the surrounding Taliban forces." The subsidized cereal imports ended with the 
collapse ofthe Soviet Union in 1991 (Goodhand, 2000: 268). These economic difficulties 
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were further magnified by an epic drought that descended upon Afghanistan in 1998, was 
at its worst from 2000-2001, and finally subsided in 2003. 
Differing Economic Trajectories 
There were two positive economic developments for the Kyrgyz that occurred 
during the civil war. First, they began receiving food aid from Focus Humanitarian 
Assistance (FOCUS), an NGO affiliated with the Aga Khan Development Network with 
considerable experience working in war-tom Tajikistan. Second, they were able to access 
external markets following the opening of the Pakistani border in 1992 (Kreutzmann, 
2001: 55) and through occasional bazaars held along the Tajik-Afghan border, beginning 
in 1997 (Felmy and Kreutzmann, 2004: 115). Access to these markets, combined with 
food aid provided by FOCUS, was critical in enabling the Kyrgyz to weather the worst 
economic period of the Afghan civil war, between 1999 and 2001. These developments 
did not benefit the Kyrgyz in the two Afghan Pamirs equally, however: the Little Pamir 
Kyrgyz derived excess benefit from the food aid and, while the ability to trade for Tajik 
goods was important for the Great Pamir Kyrgyz, in the long run the Little Pamir 
Kyrgyz's access to the markets of Pakistan was to prove far more significant. 
FOCUS began delivering food aid to the Kyrgyz in both Pamirs in 1998. This 
humanitarian aid-"necessary due to the failure of Tajikistan to respond to requests from 
the Kirghiz nomads of the [Great] and Little Pamir regions to help them cushion the 
impact of severe supply shortages" (Kreutzmann, 2000: 9)-was brought overland, 
across the Tajik border, where it was distributed to the Kyrgyz. Because the Little Pamir 
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Kyrgyz had inflated their population figures somewhat, they received a small excess of 
food. 
In 2005, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) took over distributing 
food to the Kyrgyz. WFP's intent was to provide three months' worth of food aid to the 
Kyrgyz, consisting of (per household) 150 kg wheat flour, 18 kg legumes, 1.5 kg iodized 
salt, and three 4-liter cans of vegetable oil. However, the Little Pamir Kyrgyz, having 
learned from their experience with FOCUS how to game the system, inflated their 
population figures 85.2%, claiming 237 households (compared to an actual figure of 
128). As a result, they received an annual allotment sufficient for nearly six months. 
Unfmiunately for the Great Pamir Kyrgyz, WFP only gave them food aid sufficient for 
101 households, when there were actually 107. 
Not-so-closed Frontiers 
Just as important for the Kyrgyz as the windfall of several months' worth offood, 
provided for free and with no reciprocal obligations, has been the progressive opening of 
formerly "closed frontiers." While the Chinese border remains sealed and the Kyrgyz are 
still officially prohibited from entering Tajikistan, they are permitted to cross the 4,979 m 
Irshad Uween pass into Pakistan's Chapursan Valley, where every fall (late September to 
early October) a number of Pakistani traders set up a temporary bazaar and barter 
manufactured goods (insulated coats, boots, hats, gloves, and electronics, mostly from 
China) and Pakistani agricultural products for Kyrygz commodities. 
In Tajikistan, following the end of the Tajik civil war in 1997, Russian "Moskva" 
border guards, backed by the Russian 201 st Motorized Rifle Division, assumed 
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responsibility for securing Tajikistan's borders. Besides facilitating the movement of 
relief supplies to the Kyrgyz across the border (Kreutzmann, 2000: 9), they also 
permitted occasional bazaars to occur along the Tajik-Afghan border (Felmy and 
Kreutzmann, 2004: 115). The latter have not occurred since 2005, when the Russian 
border guards were withdrawn from Tajikistan, but the Soviet-era road into the Little 
Pamir (~md across the Pamir River into the Great Pamir) is still used on occasion by 
visiting government officials and to deliver aid to the Kyrgyz (Mortenson, 2009: 340). 
Access to Pakistan, though, has been the dominant factor influencing the different 
economic trajectories of the Little and Great Pamirs. Because of high transport costs 
involved in bringing their merchandise up to the Pamir, the Afghan traders charge a 
substantial mark-up for their goods, typically 100-150% of the retail cost (Table 13). 
They also tend to deal in items with a high value-to-weight ratio, such as cloth and 
opium. Their real profit, though, comes from the livestock (sheep and goats) they acquire 
from the Kyrgyz, which, when sold in urban markets, might fetch double or even triple 
their exchange value in the Pamirs (Table 13). As livestock prices in Afghanistan have 
risen since 2001, due to an increasing demand for meat, more traders have been coming 
to the Pamirs. A consortium of Pashtuns from Paghman (a town in Kabul province), 
seemingly well-resourced, spend the summer among the Kyrgyz and then together with 
their livestock walk to Kabul, a trip requiring about fifty days. The other traders generally 
sell their livestock in Faizabad, the provincial capital ofBadakhshan. 
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Table 13. Commodity prices, October 2010 (all prices in Afghanis- AFN; $1 = 45 AFN) 
Pamir 








medium size 8,000 15,000 
black tea, 1 sheep + 1 lamb 3,000-
4,800 4,800 5,700 4,110 




(or .5 sheep) 
2,000 1,400 1,200 1,150 800 
50 kg booji 
rice (domestic), 
.75-1 sheep 3,000 2,000-3,500 4,000 2,500 1,520 70 kg booji 




1 sheep 1 sheep n/a n/a n/a n/a (453 g) 
Chinese synthetic 




cloth (tikka), average 
3,600- 2,000-
quality, 1 sheep <1 sheep 8,000-10,000 
6,000 4,000 1440 
40 m bolt 
Source: author 
The Kyrgyz have not marketed their own livestock in Kabul (or any other urban 
center) since the 1970s. Such long-distance trade caravans were unnecessary during the 
Soviet occupation and too hazardous during the civil war era. Today, the Kyrgyz lack the 
contacts-for safe passage and to provide temporary grazing areas-necessary for 
making the long journey out of the Wakhan, down through southern Badakhshan, over 
the Anjuman pass into the Panjsher valley, and then through the Shamali plain to Kabul. 
Although an annual Kyrgyz trade caravan to Faizabad or even Ishkashim would be 
93 The price of livestock (and other commodites) in Pakistan dramatically increased soon after these data 
were collected, following the flooding that devastated large swathes of croplands and pastures. 
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possible94 and certainly much less arduous than going all the way to Kabul, in general, 
they would rather pay a premium for the convenience of not having to leave the Pamir. 
The Kyrgyz are very much aware that they are offered a generally poor rate of 
exchange by the traders. Furthermore, the tijor will often try to negotiate different, more 
profitable rates of exchange in each Kyrgyz camp, in contrast to the 1970s, when the 
rates were standardized: 
.. . the itinerant traders usually consult with the Kirghiz khan and other 
elders to reach a particular rate of exchange for their goods, and once such 
a rate is sanctioned it is followed without deviation. Any difference would 
result in disputes and termination of payments to the traders. This is 
without a doubt another important area of the khan's political influence in .. 
protecting the economic interests of his group (Shahrani, 2002: 203). 
Lacking similar leverage today, the Kyrgyz try to defer making substantial 
purchases (especially of heavier and thus more expensive items, such as flour and rice) 
until they go to Pakistan or down to the Wakhan valley in the fall to collect the WFP food 
aid. The latter event has become something of a major trade fair. Besides the WFP 
convoy, which distributes aid in two locations (Gaz Khan for the Great Pamir and 
Sarhad-e Broghil for the Little Pamir), a number of merchants (including opium dealers) 
as well as Wakhi trading partners of the Kyrgyz are present. The food aid is collected and 
then the Kyrgyz make the rest of their purchases for the winter, usually on credit. A 
94 Suggestions made by an NGO that the Kyrgyz pool their livestock and collectively hire a Kamaz truck to 
transport their livestock to market were greeted with derision. Due to low levels of social trust between 
various Kyrgyz groups, all assumed that somehow they would get cheated in such an arrangement, unless 
they were to go themselves-which no one showed any interest in doing. Interestingly, linguist Remy Dor 
was told basically the same thing in 1972: "We have more than once asked the Kirghiz why they do not 
organize themselves to sell their livestock and skins in Fayzabad, where they could gain a substantial profit. 
The response we receive always highlights the distrust the Kirghiz have: since not everyone could go to 
Fayzabad, the few who made the trip would have to be entrusted with the herd, and who would dare to take 
on this responsibility? No one, because everyone is sure that whoever did this would steal from the till. 
Thus, it is better to be cheated by an Afghan than by a Kirghiz!" (1975: 304). 
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second, lesser trade fair (minus the WFP aid) often occurs in May, as the Kyrgyz are 
usually low on supplies after the winter. 
Because of a very limited industrial base m Afghanistan, most manufactured 
goods are imported from Pakistan, Iran, China or, less so, India, Russia, and Turkey. 
Accordingly, prices within Afghanistan tend to be higher than in neighboring countries.95 
In addition, Afghanistan is not self-sufficient in agriculture and is a net importer of two 
key staples, wheat and rice. For example, Afghanistan requires 5.2 million metric tons 
(MT) of wheat annually to meet demand but rarely produces that much.96 Partially 
because of a poor transportation network, most of the domestically produced wheat "is 
consumed by the farming households and less than 1 0% of output reaches national food 
markets" (IRIN, 2011b). As a result, urban markets are dominated by imported wheat 
flour, mostly from Kazakhstan and Pakistan.97 Imported wheat flour, though of higher 
quality, tends to be significantly more expensive and is highly susceptible to fluctuations 
in price and availability. Pakistan has banned wheat exports several times in recent years, 
most recently in 2010, after widespread flooding destroyed 500,000 MT of stored wheat 
(Anis and Pearson, 2010). Furthermore, 35% of Afghanistan' s domestic wheat crop is 
grown on rain-fed (lalmi), rather than irrigated (abi), land, leaving it extremely 
vulnerable to drought. In 2011 , inadequate spring rains along the "wheat belt" on the 
95 An exception occurs in many parts of Pakistan where, based on the terms of the 2010 Afghanistan 
Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (or APTTA, which replaced the 1965 Afghan Transit Trade Agreement), 
imported goods bound for Afghanistan are allowed to transit Pakistani territory duty-free. Many of these 
goods, ranging from black tea to tires to electronics, are then smuggled back into Pakistan and sold on the 
black market for less than licit impmts for which a duty has been charged. Illegal trade under the APTT A is 
estimated to cost Pakistan about $140 million per year in lost customs revenue (Zyck, 2011: 5). 
96 In 2010, a bumper wheat harvest throughout much of Afghanistan provided only 4.5 million MT, 87% of 
total demand. 
97 Pakistan is the primary source of wheat for Afghanistan, from which it imports, on average, 500,000-
700,000 MT of wheat annually (IRIN, 20llb). 
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northern slope of the Hindu Kush mountains, where more than 90% of Afghanistan's 
lalmi wheat crop is grown, led to severe food shortages affecting millions of Afghans 
(IRIN, 2011c). Although the Afghan government has attempted to establish strategic 
reserves of grains in the wake of the 2008 global food crisis, at best these are sufficient 
for 1 0% of the population for one year and even that seems like an overly optimistic 
projection (IRlN, 2011a). What little buffer exists comes primarily through international 
aid agencies, such as the World Food Program (WFP), which in 2011 planned to 
distribute food to 7.8 million Afghans (ibid). 
Among the Great Pamir Kyrgyz, both of their trade options-with the traders in 
the Pamir or down at Gaz Khan in Wakhan-are limited to Afghanistan now that the 
Tajik border bazaars have been discontinued. In addition to the other factors that make 
the Great Pamir a harsher place than the Little Pamir (primarily more severe winters, 
resulting in greater livestock mortality), the lack of alternate trading partners and venues 
is most commonly cited as the reason for the greater relative wealth of the Little Pamir, 
with its proximity to and trading links with Pakistan. For all of these reasons, the Great 
Pamir Kyrgyz still manufacture many of the items they require, rather than acquiring 
them by trade, as is done in the Little Pamir. For example, a handful of Kyrgyz craftsmen 
still produce wooden yurt frames and bukharis, and most households make the felt covers 
for their yurts themselves. 
Traveling to Pakistan allows the Little Pamir Kyrgyz to avoid much of the cost 
and volatility associated with imported goods. Access to Pakistani markets also gives the 
Little Pamir Kyrgyz additional bargaining power with the Afghan traders, since many 
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purchases can be deferred until the fall caravan to Pakistan, unlike the past, when the 
Kyrgyz had two choices: accept unfavorable rates of exchange with the traders or take 
their livestock directly to market themselves. Now, the Little Pamir Kyrgyz can acquire 
almost everything they require while staying in the Pamir (with bi-annual trips to Sarhad) 
and not be at the mercy of the Afghan tijor. 
Besides cheaper agricultural products, they are also able to buy manufactured 
items, many from China, for less than they would cost in Afghanistan. The better 
availability and lower cost of these goods in Pakistan mean that the Little Pamir Kyrgyz 
have to exchange propotiionally fewer pastoral commodities to satisfy their subsistence 
needs compared to what they would pay for the same market goods in Afghanistan 
(Table 14). 
Table 14. Kyrgyz commodities, 2009 rates of exchange (in wheat flour) in 




1 sheep, medium size 100 kg 152 kg 
1 goat, female or castrated male ( echki) 50 kg 100 kg 
1 yak calf (tar torpok) 100 kg 152 kg 
1 3-year-old yak, uncastrated (pishti kotoz) 300 kg 300 kg 
1 seer (7.61 kg) kurut 15-23kg 23-38kg 
2-3 seer (15.22-22.83 kg) meshke or sarymar 61 kg 76kg 
1 horse cover, fair (sheep wool) 61-114 kg 61-76 kg 
1 horse cover, best (camel wool) 76-152 kg 76-114 kg 
1 booji (23 kg) raw wool, yak 38 kg 50 kg 
1 booji (23 kg) raw wool, camel 61-76 kg 100 kg 
Source: author 
157 
Access to the Pakistani market has also allowed the Little Pamir Kyrgyz to trade a 
more diversified basket of commodities. In contrast to the Afghan market, for which the 
Kyrgyz produce mainly sheep and secondarily goats and kurut,98 in Pakistan there is 
demand for additional primary (yak and goats) and secondary (sarymaf,99 clarified butter; 
horse blankets made from yak or camel wool; raw wool) pastoral products (Table 15). 
The market for secondary pastoral products is especially important since it allows the 
Little Pamir Kyrgyz to trade renewable livestock products (wool and dairy) without 
diminishing their livestock capital. 
Table 15. Kyrgyz commodities and trading partners 
Country Trading Partner Kyrgyz Commodity Traded 
Afghanistan Wakhi kurut, horse covers, sheep, yak 
Afghanistan Badakhshi/tijar kurut, sheep, goats 
Pakistan Hunzakuts sarymaf, kurut,jiin, sheep, goats, yak 
Source: author 
The Pakistani market in the Chupursan Valley of upper Hunza, and access to it, are 
both fairly recent developments. The Karakoram Highway (KKH) was finished in 1978 as 
part of a spurt of road building that resulted in 97% of the villages in the Hunza Valley 
becoming accessible by motorized transport (Kreutzmann 1993: 36). These road linkages, 
together with price controls on key staples and government-subsidized transport from 
producing regions in the south to deficit areas in the north, facilitated the flow of goods to 
formerly inaccessible, food insecure regions in Pakistan (Kreutzmann 1991 : 724 ). 
98 Kyrgyz kurut is very well-regarded in Badakhshan and fetches a higher price than other types of kurut, so 
many Afghan traders are keen to barter for it. 
99 Sarymaz is stored and transported in sheep stomachs, with an average weight between two to four seer. It 
is also commonly exchanged with the Wakhi but rarely with the Badakhshi traders as there is little 
domestic market for it in Afghanistan. 
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KYRGYZ TRADE ROUTES and REGIONAL ROAD NETWORKS 
• Village " Peak = Highway ---· Foot Trail 
~ Pass * Gravesite - Secondary Road - Trade Route 
Source: author 
Figure 20. Kyrgyz trade routes and regional road networks 
For the Kyrgyz, market opportunities in Pakistan resulted from the confluence of 
several factors: the construction of a road almost to the Afghan border in the early 1980s, 
terminating at the shrine (mazar or ziyarat) of a local saint, Baba Ghundi, located at the 
foot of the Irshad Uween pass; the greater availability of (subsidized) market goods in 
upper Hunza; and increased demand for Kyrgyz pastoral commodities. The last factor 
occurred because the rise of more remunerative, non-agrarian economic opportunities for 
the youth of Hunza created a shortage of herding labor and led to a steep decline in 
domestic pastoral production. This decline, in turn, caused "a severe deficit in meat 
supply" (Kreutzmann 1993: 30) and a shortage of artisanal dairy products (kurut, 
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sarymaz, and others) much desired by Pakistanis (Kreutzmann 2004: 66). Since 2001, 
overall economic decline in Pakistan has led to a contraction of non-agrarian jobs, such 
as those linked to tourism. Poor economic prospects combined with a high cost of living 
in the cities have forced many younger men to return to their villages and resume animal 
husbandry as their primary occupation. Part of this process has involved the rebuilding of 
herds, especially yak, which had dwindled as the "task of shepherding" devolved into 
"the hands of elderly men and women" (Kreutzmann 2004: 65). 
Pakistan, however, may offer limited advantage to the Kyrgyz in the near future. 
Since 2007, prices have risen steadily, especially during the 2007-08 global food crisis, 
when Pakistan banned wheat flour exports to Afghanistan in an effort to stabilize 
domestic prices. Between 2007-08 and 2008-09, Pakistan's overall consumer price index 
(CPI) rose almost 21% and the food CPI increased nearly 24% during the same period 
(State Bank of Pakistan, 201 0). 
The inundation of a 19 km section of the KKH in January 2010-the result of a 
landslide near Attabad, in Gilgit-Balitstan, which blocked the Hunza River and created a 
21 km long lake, 116 m deep in places-further contributed to rising prices and led to 
temporary supply shortages due to the closure of the KKH in the Hunza Valley. Although 
the Kyrgyz were still able to trade in Pakistan in 2010 and 2011, prices were reportedly 
higher than in the past and for some goods, such as wheat, they were more expensive than 
in Afghanistan. The Little Pamir Kyrgyz were still able to acquire all the market goods 
they needed for the winter, but at a greater overall cost than in the past. The long term 
implications of any disruptions in the Pakistani market for the Little Pamir Kyrgyz are 
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uncertain, but already some Kyrgyz in the Great Pamir are predicting that, gtven a 
continued decrease of purchasing power in Pakistan, the Little Pamir Kyrgyz will lose 
their advantage. One informant from the Great Pamir told me, with barely disguised glee, 
" In a few years, we'll be richer than them." 
CHAPTER 5- LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP AND INEQUALITY 
Livestock are central to the Kyrgyz for meeting their subsistence needs by 
providing primary and secondary pastoral products, which are either consumed directly 
or else traded for other commodities. Ownership of reproductive capital, such as breeding 
stock, pastures, and fodder producing areas, is therefore primarily an economic matter. 
But, as with any critical, limited resource, there are additional social and political factors 
related to the ownership and utilization of reproductive capital in Kyrgyz society, such 
that an exclusive focus on economics would be distorting. It is therefore necessary to 
consider inequality and stratification in a broader historical and social context, since 
many of the political changes discussed in subsequent chapters resulted from the leveling 
effects of the 1978 Kyrgyz exodus. 
While the recent history of pasture ownership in the Pamirs has already been 
discussed, another important change over the past forty years has been the shift from a 
highly stratified pattern of livestock ownership to one predominately consisting of self-
sufficient smallholders. Lessened inequality has occurred concurrently with a decline in 
the importance of the amanat system as a means of subsistence, which has had secondary 
political effects of great consequence. At present in the Pamirs, amanat is mostly of 
interest as a vehicle for outside investment in the pastoral economy, with greater number 
of animals pastured, but not owned by, the Kyrgyz. 
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Changing Patterns of Livestock Ownership 
Viewed side-by-side, one of the most striking economic differences between the 
situation of the Kyrgyz in post-Taliban Afghanistan compared to 40 years ago is the 
vastly different structure of the livestock population and herd ownership. Comparing 
livestock populations between these two periods is potentially misleading, so some 
caveats are necessary. First, I was unable to get an exact count of livestock in the Great 
Pamir (I did get an approximate head count for the Little Pamir). By combining select 
household livestock ownership surveys I was able to complete for the Great Pamir (which 
I averaged and then multiplied by the total number of households, to get an approximate 
total) together with other estimates of Kyrgyz livestock ownership in the Great Pamir 
(FOCUS, 1999; Duncan, 2006; Ostrowski, et al., 2007), I was able to derive the estimated 
total livestock ownership for the Great Pamir. 100 However, these figures are necessarily 
approximate and rely upon certain extrapolations and assumptions. 
An additional difficulty concerns disaggregating livestock owned by non-
(Afghan) Kyrgyz living outside the Pamirs, which are loaned to the Kyrgyz as amanat, 
from livestock owned by the Kyrgyz themselves. Table 16 shows the aggregate number 
of livestock, including both Kyrgyz-owned animals and outside amanat, which I refer to 
as the total livestock population. Table 17 shows only livestock owned by the Kyrgyz101 
but does not include amanat animals owned by outside investors. 
100 Nearly every Kyrgyz I spoke with in both Pamirs, as well as the various traders, believed that there are 
more livestock in the Little Pamir. 
101 Some of these animals are loaned to other Kyrgyz as amanat, so the figures should be understood as the 
total number of Kyrgyz-owned livestock, not necessarily the actual number of animals occurring in either 
Pamir. 
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Table 16. Total livestock population (owned and amanat), Little and Great Pamir 
(2008-10) 
Livestock Little Pamir Great Pamir Total 
Sheep/goats 11,533 9,850 21,383 
Yak 3,327 1,329 4,656 
Camels 53 82 135 
Source: author 
Table 17. Livestock owned by Kyrgyz, Little and Great Pamir (2008-10) 
Livestock Little Pamir Great Pamir Total 
Sheep/goats 10,608 9,000 19,608 
Yak 3,120 1,275 4,395 
Camels 53 82 135 
Source: author 
The structure of the livestock population has changed considerably in both 
absolute and relative terms, with a sharp decrease in sheep and goats but significant 
increases in both yak and camel populations (Tables 18 and 19). 
Table 18. Comparison of total livestock population, 1972-73 and 2008-10 
Livestock Shahrani (1972-73) Callahan (2008-10) %Change 
Sheep/goats 38,600 21,383 -44.6% 
Yak 3,544 4,656 +31.4% 
Camels 83 135 +62.7% 
Source: Shahrani, 2002; author's data collectiOn 
Table 19. Comparison of livestock ownership, 1972-73 and 2008-10 
Livestock Shahrani (1972-73) 102 Callahan (2008-10) 0/o Change 
Sheep/goats 38,600 19,608 -49.2% 
Yak 3,544 4,395 +24% 
Camels 83 135 +62.7% 
Source: Shahrani 2002; author's data collection 
102 Presumably the entire livestock population cited by Shahrani consisted of animals owned by the Kyrgyz 
and did not include amana! livestock owned by non-Kyrgyz investors from outside the Pamir. 
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While a smaller overall livestock population is to be expected based on human 
population changes between these two periods (Table 20), the current number of sheep 
and goats owned by the Kyrgyz is still strikingly small in relative terms, nearly half of 
what it was previously. 
Table 20. Comparison of Kyrgyz population and households, 1972-73 and 2008-10 
Shahrani (1972-73) Callahan (2008-10) %Change 
Kyrgyz population 1,825 1,149 -37% 
Kyrgyz households 333 235 -29.4% 
Source: Shahrani 2002; author' s data collection 
However~ livestock ownership in the 1970s was concentrated among a small elite 
and, within that elite, just one family, that of Hajji Rahman Kul, owned 16,400 sheep and 
goats (42.3% of the total livestock), 720 yak (20.3%), and 18 camels (21.7%) (Shahrani, 
2002:176-177). When averaged among the total population and then compared to actual 
current figures, versus what would be expected based on population figures (Table 21), 
the current sheep and goat population, while still smaller than expected, is less surprising. 
Table 21. Livestock ownership, expected vs. actual based on Kyrgyz population, 
2000s 
Sheep/goats Yak Camels 
1970s, total 38,600 3,544 83 
Averaged among 1970s population (1,825) 21.15 1.94 .046 
Expected for current population (1,149) 24,301 2,229 53 
Actual for current population (1 ,149) 19,608 4,395 135 
Averaged among current population (1 ,149) 17.07 3.83 .118 
% difference, expected vs. actual 
19.3% 97.2% 154.7% 
less greater greater 
Source: Shahram, 2002; author 
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When the same calculations are made on a household, rather than population, 
basis, a similar pattern is observed, as shown in Table 22. 
Table 22. Livestock ownership, expected vs. actual by households, 2000s 
Sheep/goats Yak Camels 
1970s, total 38,600 3,544 83 
Averaged among 1970s households (333) 115.92 10.64 .249 
Expected for current households (235) 27,240 2,500 59 
Actual for current households (235) 19,608 4,395 135 
Averaged among current households (235) 83.44 18.7 .575 
% difference, expected vs. actual 
28% 75.8% 128.8% 
less greater greater 
Source: Shabram, 2002; author 
A few basic conclusions can be drawn by looking at these data. First, the present 
sheep and goat population is much less than would be expected based on figures from the 
1970s. Second, there are considerably greater numbers of yak and camels than would be 
expected. Therefore, either the 1970s were anomalous in terms of having a very high 
population of sheep and goats relative to other livestock or the present population of 
sheep and goats is abnormally small. Felmy and Kreutzmann (2004: 115) suggest that 
reduced sheep and goat numbers were a result of the constrained market access the 
Kyrgyz faced in the late 1990s, when livestock were "predominately bred for home 
consumption and utilization" rather than trade. Subsistence rather than market production 
followed the collapse of livestock prices between 1999 and 2000: 
.. . sheep prices often fell by 25% and sometimes by as much as 40% .. .In a 
number of villages people simply said that they could not sell their 
animals because no one wanted to buy. Given that livestock are sold to 
make up the wheat deficit, what is even more important is the change in 
terms of trade between livestock and wheat. Whereas in 1999 a sheep 
would purchase between 7 and 21 sers of wheat, depending on location, in 
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2000 the maximum was 8 sers (in Brogil [Sarhad-e Broghil] in the 
Wakhan conidor) and in many villages it was as little as 3 sers. By March 
2001 this had dropped still further, to only 2 sers in many 
villages .. . (Strategic Monitoring Unit, 2001 :22). . _ ... · - ~ _ .. · 
. .-:~ ~·-~;; . ::-,::.: ~_t .:.·~·~·':·~~· :·· . 
The continuing phenomenon of a smaller-t~exp.eW:.d:l~ep~::and:~ goat 
>· .· . •·:~ ;~~~~:~-.-;:~~<'~~· ~ · . 
population, relative to other commercial livestock such as yak, and despite comparatively 
robust market access in the post-2001 period, is also partially attributable to greater 
mortality among sheep and goats during winter. For example, Wald (2005) reports that 
during an especially severe April stmm (jut), sheep and goat losses were typically 50-
60%, compared to 10-25% for yak. Despite a reduced overall sheep and goat population 
relative to the past, when looked at from the perspective of the proportion of households 
in the Little Pamir owning reproductive livestock (sheep, goats, yak, camels), a different 
pattern emerges, one showing much more widespread ownership, especially of sheep and 
goats (Table 23). 
Table 23. Household ownership by livestock type, 1972-73 and 2008-10 
Households owning: 
1970s (both Pamirs, 2000s (Little Pamir only, 
333 HH) 128 HH) 
Sheep/goats 105 HH (31.5%) 94 HH (73.4%) 
Yak 228 HH (68 .5%) 109 HH (85.2%) 
Any productive livestock 228 HH (68.5%) 119 HH (93%) 
No productive livestock 105 HH (31.5%) 11 HH (8.6%) 
No livestock at all 70HH(21%) 3 HH (2.3%) 




Another way to comprehend the changing patterns of livestock ownership over 40 
years and the shift from a highly stratified society to a diffuse smallholding system is to 
look at these two discrete periods from the perspective of economic inequality. Despite a 
tendency, both ernie and etic, to view pastoralists as fundamentally egalitarian, economic 
inequality and stratification are common features of most pastoral societies (Borgerhoff 
Mulder, et al, 2010: 45). Economists apply a number of distinctions to the quantitative 
measurement of inequality, some of which are worth reviewing prior to a discussion of 
Kyrgyz economic inequality, past and present. 
Economic inequality is usually measured in terms of wealth or income. The 
foundational theorists of inequality theory, writing in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, were mostly concerned with wealth, though later the focus shifted to 
income inequality. Regardless, most theoretical approaches to economic inequality use 
wealth and income more or less interchangeably. While income could be measured for 
the Kyrgyz in terms of livestock reproduction (gross) minus livestock losses (net), a 
simpler metric of inequality is wealth, measured according to the number of livestock 
owned. 
At its most basic, inequality is simply a measure of departure from perfect 
equality, in which everyone has the exact same amount of wealth (Young, 1917: 4 7 6). At 
the opposite end of the spectrum lies perfect inequality, in which all wealth is owned by a 
single individual (Lorenz, 1905: 209). Measuring the concentration of wealth at the latter 
end of the spectrum is not, however, the same thing as measuring inequality: "Wealth 
168 
might be distributed unequally, without there being any amassing or concentration of any 
relatively large part or it in the hands of any one group or portion of society. 
Concentration means, then, a particular kind of inequality in distribution" (Young, 1917: 
476). 
There are various "indexes of inequality" that can be selected to measure the 
"inequality displayed by given frequency distributions" of wealth (Champernowne, 197 4: 
787). However, the Gini coefficient (or Gini index) is the most common measure of 
inequality (Gastwiith, 1972: 307) and is regarded by some economists as "the best single 
measure of inequality" (Morgan, 1962: 270). It is a measure of inequality based on the 
distribution of some quantitative variable of interest (wealth or income), with a value of 0 
indicating perfect equality and a value of 1 indicating perfect inequality. The Gini 
coefficient is based on a graphic representation of inequality, the Lorenz curve, which 
shows the proportion of some total variable (wealth or income, plotted on they-axis) held 
or received by the poorest x% of the population when the population is ordered (on the x-
axis) by the amount of the variable they hold (wealth) or receive (income). The Gini 
coefficient represents twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect 
equality, a 45° line where, at every point, cumulative population equals the cumulative 
variable of interest (Figure 21 ). 
More simply, the Lorenz curve measures the actual distribution of some variable 
throughout the population in question. With perfect equality, the Lorenz curve and the 
line of perfect equality will be the same and the Gini coefficient will be zero. In any 
society deviating from perfect equality (a Gini coefficient greater than zero), there will be 
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Cumulative share of people from lowest to highest incomes 100% 
Source: design by Prof. Michael Smith 
Figure 21. A typical Lorenz curve 





















a measurable area between the line of perfect inequality and the Lorenz curve falling 
beneath it. The slope of the Lorenz curve affects the area beneath the line of perfect 
equality: the more inequality there is within the population, the steeper the slope of the 
Lorenz curve and the more area there will be between it and the line of perfect equality 
(Lorenz, 1905: 216-217). Since the Gini coefficient is twice the area between these two 
lines (area A, in Figure 21 above), a higher Gini coefficient indicates greater inequality. 
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Lorenz curves for the percentage of the total wealth held by the poorest x% of all 
Kyrgyz households in the 1970s and at present were calculated (Figures 22 and 23). 103 
Both productive (sheep, goats, yak, camels) and non-productive (horses and donkeys) 
livestock owned by the Kyrgyz were counted as wealth, though other non-livestock 
property that might be considered wealth was not included. All wealth in livestock was 
converted into standardized animal units based on an adult (breeding) ewe (kol). Because 
I do not have complete data for household livestock ownership in the Great Parnir, the 
Lorenz curve was only calculated for the Little Pamir, based on data for 2007-08. 
Shahrani ' s data from the 1970s, however, was aggregated for both Pamirs, so the 
comparison of the Lorenz curves for these two periods is only approximate. 
Cumulative Wealth Distribution -1970s 
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Source: data from Shahrani, 2002. Graph created by Professor Michael J. Smith, Boston 
University School of Management. 
Figure 22. The percentage of total wealth held by the poorest x% of households 
for Shahrani's data from 1972-73. The Gini coefficient is .857. 
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Cumulative Wealth Distribution-2000s 
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Source: data collected by author. Graph created by Professor Michael J. Smith, Boston 
University School of Management. 
Figure 23. The percentage of total wealth held by the poorest x% of households 
for the author's 2007-08 data. The Gini coefficient is .619. 
Between 1972 and 1973, in both Pamirs, the poorest 50% of households held 
about 4% of the total wealth (Figure 22) and the overall Gini coefficient (for all 
livestock) was .857 (Figure 24). In the Little Pamir, for the period between 2007 and 
2008, the poorest 50% of households held about 12% of the total wealth (Figure 23) and 
the Gini coefficient for all livestock was .619 (Figure 24), demonstrating a much lesser 
degree of inequality. However, compared to a sample of Gini coefficients calculated for a 
number of pastoral groups in Africa and the Middle East (Borgerhoff Mulder, et al., 
2010: 42), which (for material wealth) ranged from .346 (the Juhaina Arabs of Chad) to 
.694 (the Sangu of Tanzania), with a weighted average of .42, Kyrgyz society remains 
relatively stratified. 
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Figure 24. Gini coefficient for all livestock owned, 1972-73 and 2007-08 
The substantial decrease in inequality between the 1970s and the 2000s is even 
more revealing when the Gini coefficient is calculated for specific types of livestock 
(Table 24). As shown below in Figure 25, the distribution of sheep and goats in the 1970s 
was approaching perfect inequality, with 86.9% all sheep and goats in both Pamirs owned 
by just 18 (out of 333) households (5.4% of the total number of households) (Shahrani, 
2002:181). 
Table 24. Livestock-specific Gini coefficients, 1972-73 and 2007-08 
1970s 2000s 
Sheep/Goats .95 .75 
Yak .75 .59 
All Livestock .857 .619 
Source: Shahrani, 2002; author 
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Livestock~specific Gini coefficients, 1970s and 2000s 
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Figure 25. Livestock-specific Gini coefficients, 1972-73 and 2007-08 
1 
In both past and present, Afghan Kyrgyz society has exhibited extremes of wealth 
and inequality, ranging from vast private holdings of livestock to utter destitution. Since 
the 1978 exodus, the really significant change in the Little Pamir has been the 
development of a "middle class" of smallholders, neither rich nor poor, who own 
sufficient animals to meet their subsistence needs and generate a surplus for trade, 
without being completely dependent upon amanat livestock. And while there are a 
number of reasons why Kyrgyz society in the 1970s was approaching perfect inequality, 
one ofthe main drivers ofthis trend was the amanat system. 
The Amanat System and Inequality 
Amanat, an Arabic loanword based on the root amaan (u~l - safety, security), 
occurs in both Persian (~~1, amaanat) and the Turkic languages (a.MaHaT, amanat), 
where it has an essentially similar meaning, that of "safekeeping" and "deposit" as well 
as "honesty" and "trustworthiness." In Kyrgyz it can also mean "hostage," presumably 
dating back to Mongolian times when hostages were exchanged as a sign of good-faith 
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and as an assurance that pledges would be honored (at the expense of the hostage ifthey 
were not). In a legalistic sense, amanat denotes a contractual anangement between two 
parties in which a good owned by one party is entrusted to the other. In casual usage, it 
can refer to anything borrowed, usually to signify lack of ownership, but when used in 
reference to livestock, it has the more specific meaning of a formal agreement. 
As a system of livestock loaning, 104 amanat involves the transfer of livestock 
from one party to another. The loan can be for a fixed or an indefinite period but is 
usually subject to annual review, based on performance. The borrower does not enjoy any 
rights of ownership or disposal and is thus forbidden from selling or consuming amanat 
livestock. In exchange for tending the animals, the borrower is entitled to use any 
secondary pastoral products-milk, wool, dung-either for subsistence needs or for 
profit. This fiduciary relationship leaves the borrower responsible for ensuring the 
welfare of all amanat animals and it is expected that amanat livestock will demonstrate 
normal rates of reproduction. A certain margin is allowed for death due to natural causes, 
including disease, exposure, starvation, or predation, provided none occurs as a result of 
negligence. 
In the event of amanat losses due to gross negligence, the borrower incurs a debt 
equal to the value of the dead amanat animals. If restitution cannot be made with an 
equivalent number of livestock, the debt will be repaid through labor, such as herding, 
digging kyk, or cutting grass. In addition, the provision of more amanat animals, at least 
in the near future, is unlikely. Given the tight-knit, essentially public, nature of Kyrgyz 
104 "Loan" is more accurate than "lease" in describing the amanat system since no rents are paid for amanat 
livestock. 
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society, it is a simple matter for livestock owners to evaluate the likelihood of negligent 
behavior on the part of any potential amanat borrower. The hassles that would follow the 
loss of significant numbers of livestock are thus avoided by not giving them to 
irresponsible persons in the first place and I did not hear of any significant, outstanding 
debts due to negligence. 
Amanat serves two purposes m Kyrgyz society: it allows wealthy livestock 
owners to disperse their livestock and it functions as a sort of welfare. For those with 
many livestock, especially sheep and yak, amanat is also necessary in practical terms, 
since it would be impossible for a single household (iil) or camp (a'iyl) to herd, milk, and 
pen thousands of livestock. Outsourcing these responsibilities is seen as a better 
alternative than hiring labor, not least since giving amanat also means distributing one' s 
risk. Amanat is also a way for wealthy Kyrgyz, forced to practice an intensive form of 
pastoralism because of international borders and the private ownership of grazing lands, 
to adopt a more extensive form of pasture utilization by distributing their animals. 
Distributing risk is crucial in the Pamir because many potentially disastrous 
events--jut, epizootic outbreaks, theft, and predation-are highly localized. For example, 
in the winter I would often find a temperature difference of 9.4°C (15°F) between two 
camps only a couple of hours apart, enough to mean the difference between mildly cold 
weather and a snap freeze resulting in jut. As a general rule, those Kyrgyz households 
with more than 250 sheep and goats and/or 70 yak will distribute a portion of their herd 
as amanat. Furthermore, a few Kyrgyz households with above-average livestock holdings 
(but not wealthy) simultaneously give and receive amanat animals. These practices 
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suggests that the Kyrgyz are consciously spreading their risk rather than simply 
outsourcing labor, since, for example, a herd of 250 livestock could be easily managed by 
a single aryl or even just by a couple ofhouseholds. 
Another aspect of amanat is the provision of charitable assistance to less wealthy 
Kyrgyz who, without the benefit of amanat animals, would be unable to meet even their 
most basic subsistence needs. 105 Shahrani tended to emphasize the social welfare and 
altruistic aspects of the amanat system and it is true that in the past, and to a lesser degree 
at present, amanat livestock provide an important and often the sole means for poor 
Kyrgyz with few or no livestock of their own to subsist. 
However, just like the house always wins in casino gambling, the odds over time 
inevitably favor the wealthy herders. 106 During the 1970s, smallholders did not have the 
option of distributing their animals through the amanat system, at least in any appreciable 
quantity, since they needed a certain number for subsistence purposes (and even then 
what they had was often insufficient). Having all of their pastoral capital concentrated in 
a limited, often sub-optimal grazing area meant that not only were they more likely to 
suffer some adverse event, but that such an event would have a greater proportional 
impact upon them. 
So, in contrast to the smallholder, who is continually exposed to having all or a 
portion of his herds die, the wealthy herder, by spreading out his assets, has distributed 
his risk. It is the pastoral equivalent of a diversified investment strategy-buying stock in 
105 A different form of amanat, called saagun, also exists. Saagun involves milch animals and their 
sucklings, given to the poor for a shorter period than normal amana! animals (usually the late spring and 
summer). Today, however, because most households have at least some animals of their own, saagun is of 
marginal importance and saagun animals are only loaned to the poorest and most vulnerable Kyrgyz. 
106 My thanks to Tom Barfield for providing this insight as well as the casino metaphor. 
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several companies versus investing entirely in a single one. As Shahrani noted, these 
risks were very much the norm following permanent, year-round settlement in the 
Afghan Pamirs: 
For most [Kyrgyz], however, with the plivate ownership of range, the 
traditional freedom of nomads to search after better weather and pasture 
within their restricted environment has not been possible [after the borders 
were closed]. Therefore, if a natural disaster befalls a particular locality it 
is likely that all those who live in the area face either total, or a very 
heavy, loss of their livestock. Unpredictable and erratic weather had 
significant effects on the distribution of herd ownership during the early 
periods of confinement [to the Mghan Pamir], especially for those oey [ill] 
units that owned relatively small herds (2002: 178). 
Shahrani credits Hajji Rahman Kul with devising the amanat system as a solution 
to these problems. As a pragmatic response to the problem of closed frontiers, it was 
undoubtedly one of the key innovations allowing the Kyrgyz to remain in the Afghan 
Pamirs, especially for the poor. However, amanat was also one of the structural bases for 
inequality in Kyrgyz society, stratified as it was into two classes: a small, wealthy elite 
and the rest of the Kyrgyz, mostly poor and dependent upon the rich for their livelihoods. 
While not inherently exploitative, the amanat system often had that effect; for it to 
function to the degree that it did in the 1970s required a large segment of the population 
to own few, if any, animals of their own. Under Rahman Kul, 33,550 sheep and goats 
(out of38,600 in total) and 1,754 yak (out of3,544 in total) were owned by just 18 out of 
333 households, who parceled out 22,346 of their livestock holdings (21 ,645 sheep and 
goats and 701 yak) as amanat to over 200 households (Shahrani, 2002: 181). Put 
differently, 5.4% ofthe population owned 84% of all the sheep, goats, and yak, and 63% 
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of their herds were loaned out as amanat to over 60% of the population, many of whom 
had few (if any) livestock oftheir own. 
Although the amanat system, as observed during Shahrani's fieldwork in the 
1970s, indisputably brought some benefit to the poorer segments of Kyrgyz society, it 
appears more exploitative than altruistic when viewed from the perspective of social 
welfare. As Dalton noted: 
A partial analogy [to the effects of the distribution of income upon the 
distribution and total amount of economic welfare] would be found in the 
problem of measuring the inequality of rainfall in the various districts of a 
large agricultural area. From the point of view of the cultivator, what is 
important is not rainfall as such, but the effects of rainfall upon the crop 
which may be raised from the land. Between rainfall and crop there will be 
a certain relation, the discovery of which will be a matter of practical 
importance. The objection to great inequality of rainfall is the resulting 
loss of potential crop. The objection to great inequality of incomes [or 
wealth] is the resulting loss of potential economic welfare [italics mine]" 
(1920, 348-349). 
In some ways, a degree of inequality in Afghan Kyrgyz society was (and is) 
inevitable, given the private ownership of livestock and land combined with the boom-
and-bust nature of pastoralism, a high-risk, high-reward economic activity "where the 
rich oftoday may be the poor of tomorrow, since wealth located in animals is notoriously 
unreliabl~" (Lindholm, 2002: 24). But besides promoting inequality in any given 
generation, the amanat system also functioned to ensure that such stratification was likely 
to endure between generations as well, since it offered a means of preserving as well as 
accumulating wealth. 
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Post-1978 Levelling Effects 
Differential access to productive resources such as land and livestock had been 
one of the main drivers of inequality and the resulting economic stratification witnessed 
by Shahrani. The 1978 exodus served to completely reshuffle the deck by leveling pre-
existing economic inequalities and temporarily eliminated much of the inequality that had 
previously been so characteristic of Mghan Kyrgyz society. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the exodus of some 1,300 Kyrgyz left the Little 
Pamir essentially vacant. After roughly 300 of them returned from Pakistan, in two 
waves, they (together the few who remained in the Little Pamir) redistributed the existing 
pastures, fodder producing areas, and camps among themselves, with the end result that 
most families were able to claim better lands than they had occupied previously. This 
redistribution was especially significant since, as Shahrani noted, "During the initial 
period of settlement of the Pamirs [in the 1800s], the more powerful herders used their 
influence and/or wealth to secure the better pasturage and camping grounds" (2002: 176). 
With many of the descendants ofthese early pioneers now living in Pakistan, it presented 
an opportunity for the Kyrgyz returnees to acquire better lands than they had owned (or 
had access to) previously. Even those households which, for whatever reason, failed to 
obtain the best seasonal camps at least no longer had to utilize the marginal parts of the 
Little Pamir, now that there was a human population less than one-quarter of what it had 
been pre-1978. And with only a fraction of the previous livestock population, pasturage 
was plentiful. 
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A second leveling effect was the redistribution of livestock. Most of the wealthy 
livestock owners brought their animals with them to Pakistan, leaving the Little Pamir 
virtually bereft of livestock. Among those Kyrgyz who returned, only a few arrived back 
in Mghanistan with any animals, as most died en route to Pakistan or had subsequently 
been sold there due to lack of pasturage. For various reasons, including the lateness the 
season, they did not receive any assistance from the Great Pamir Kyrgyz. 
The returnees to the Little Pamir were thus forced to rebuild their herds 
essentially from scratch. Upon coming back from Pakistan, they received support from 
the Mghan government, which provided foodstuffs, additional livestock, and non-food 
supplies (medicines, etc.). Although at this time-autumn, 1979-the Soviet Union had 
not yet invaded Mghanistan, the relationship between the communist People's 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDP A) government and the Soviets was very close and 
both were keen to capitalize on the propaganda value of the Kyrgyz returnees, who had 
abandoned their "feudalistic" khan and returned to the workers' paradise of Afghanistan. 
The Kyrgyz gladly accepted the largesse proffered by the government and for most of 
them, private livestock holdings actually increased on a household basis compared to 
before the exodus, with the average herd consisting of around five sheep, one yak, and 
one donkey. 
One exception was Astanabek, a wealthy man who had been khan between 194 7 
and 1949, while Rahman Kul was living in China, having been forced to flee Mghanistan 
under pressure from Soviet cross-border raids from Tajikistan. Astanabek was able to 
keep most of his livestock alive while in Pakistan, which he then brought back with him 
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when he returned to the Little Pamir in 1979. These 500 sheep and goats made him the 
richest man in the Little Pamir, a status which his son, Apendibai, inherited. (During my 
fieldwork, Apendibai was still by far the richest Kyrgyz.) Additionally, it is said that 
Astanabek had a number of gold coins dating from the time of "Tsar Nikolay'' (Nicholas 
II of Russia, r. 1894-1917), 107 which he also brought back to Mghanistan with him. 
Aside from Astanabek, no Kyrgyz had sufficient livestock to distribute as amanat 
following their return from Pakistan. Within a couple years, thanks to the assistance they 
received in rebuilding their herds, private livestock holdings were sufficient to meet 
household subsistence needs, but not for loaning out as amanat. After several years, 
Astanabek and Apendibai were eventually joined by other individuals who, by dint of 
skill and luck, had amassed sufficient wealth in livestock to begin distributing animals in 
excess of their immediate subsistence needs as amanat. And, like before, the amanat 
system generally worked to reward with larger herds those wealthy individuals who were 
able to distribute their risk. As a result, the brief moment of near-equality in the late 
1970s did not last and Kyrgyz society in the Little Pamir began to re-stratify 
economically, though nowhere near the extremes it had exhibited previously. 
Both of these post-1978 leveling effects-the redistribution of land and the 
flattening of livestock ownership-led to the formation of an incipient "middle class" 
comprised of smallholders, neither rich nor poor but able to meet their subsistence needs 
and generate a surplus for trade, using only their own livestock rather than depending on 
amanat animals. While members of this "class" were happy to accept amanat animals, 
they did so mostly to boost the amount of tradable commodities that they could produce, 
107 It is likely that these were five ruble gold coins, which were minted from 1897 to 1911. 
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rather than out of dire need. For them, amanat was a boon rather than a lifeline and only 
became truly necessary if they lost a number of their animals, for example over the 
course of a hard winter. Even then, by virtue of occupying better campgrounds and 
grazing areas, and having unutilized pastures in reserve, massive die-offs impoverishing 
large segments of the population and leaving them entirely dependent upon amanat 
animals were less common than before. 
The Great Pamir Status Quo 
In contrast to the upheavals occurring in the Little Pamir, life in the Great Pamir 
went largely uninterrupted by the departure of Hajji Rahman Kul and 1,300 other Kyrgyz 
for Pakistan. The exodus of the wealthy livestock owners from the Little Pamir offered, if 
anything, a windfall: once it became clear that they weren't coming back (following the 
Soviet occupation of the Little Pamir in the summer of 1980 and the closure of the border 
with Pakistan), all of the livestock Rahman Kul and the others owned in the Great Pamir 
became, in effect, a gift to their amanat clients. However, the terms of amanat existing 
between the wealthy herders in the Great Pamir and those who received animals from 
them remained the same. And none of the redistributive events occurring across the 
mountains in the Little Pamir were replicated in the Great Pamir: the ownership of 
campgrounds and pasture lands was largely unchanged, preexisting wealth inequalities 
between rich and poor continued, with pastoral wealth still concentrated among a small 
elite, and the amanat system remained politicized, with many recipients of amanat 
livestock dependent upon their patrons for their subsistence, lacking any animals of their 
own. 
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The departure of most of the Little Pamir Kyrgyz did have two significant effects 
upon those in the Great Pamir, both unmitigated by the eventual return of some Kyrgyz 
from Pakistan to the Little Pamir, and both never to return to the status quo ante. First, 
despite their windfall gain of the Little Pamir Kyrgyz's amanat livestock, the departure of 
Rahman Kul and the other wealthy herders also meant that no further amanat animals 
would be forthcoming from the Little Pamir. Post-1978, not only were there too few 
animals in the Little Pamir to outsource any as amanat but there was no longer any need 
to do so either, given the abundance of unutilized grazing lands. Previously, the practice 
of sending amanat animals to the Great Pamir had occurred mostly due to amanat 
saturation and over-stocking in the Little Pamir. The Great Pamir, with its teskez aspect 
and frequently deep snow, generally experiences greater seasonal livestock mortality, 
making it a less desirable location to send one' s animals in an effort to mitigate risk. 
Thirty years later, the Little Pamir Kyrgyz still do not have any amanat livestock in the 
Great Pamir. 
The second effect, intertwined with the first, was that the Great Pamir Kyrgyz had 
just lost not only most of their amanat patrons but their khan as well. Despite the distance 
and the difficult terrain separating the two Pamirs, all Kyrgyz had recognized Hajji 
Rahman Kul as khan and accorded him the respect and deference his position demanded. 
However, his authority among the Great Pamir Kyrgyz tended to be more nominal than 
exercised and on a practical, day-to-day basis, political leadership (as discussed later in 
Chapter Six) was in the hands of a qaryadar, a position comparable to village headman. 
The departure of Rahman Kul created an opportunity for the more ambitious Great Pamir 
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leaders, including the qaryadar, to assert themselves, unhindered by the existence of a 
more powerful political figure to whom they were politically subservient. Possibly more 
significant from their perspective was the absence of competitors for the role of amanat 
patron; without the pastoral wealth of the Little Pamir Kyrgyz, the wealthy men (bazs) 
among the Great Pamir Kyrgyz became the amanat lenders of both first and last resort 
there. 
Amanat in the Twenty-First Century 
The amanat system is still extant in both Pamirs but compared to the 1970s it is 
much diminished in both scale and importance (Table 25). The proximate cause is that 
livestock are now more evenly distributed throughout the society, as shown previously in 
the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient for today versus 40 years ago. As a result, there are 
fewer individuals with sufficiently large holdings to loan out significant quantities of 
amanat livestock, at least compared to the past, when livestock ownership was more 
concentrated. The ultimate cause, in the Little Pamir, was the departure of most of the 
extremely wealthy herd owners, together with their livestock, in 1978, and the great 
leveling which subsequently followed the return of 300 Kyrgyz from exile in Pakistan. 
One key difference between amanat as practiced at present compared to Rahman Kul' s 
time is that now those households which accept amanat livestock do so primarily to 
maximize the secondary pastoral products that they can produce, rather than out of dire 
need. Having additional animals means more dung, milk, and wool, which they can use 
for subsistence or trade purposes, since greater quantities of wool and milk allow 
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Table 25. Relative proportions of livestock owned by Kyrgyz distributed as amanat, 
1970s-2000s 
Sheep/Goats Yak 
1970s 2000s 1970s 2000s 
(both (Little (both (Little 
Pamirs) Pamir only) Pamirs) Pamir only) 
Total owned by Kyrgyz 38,600 10,608 3,544 3,120 
Total given out as 21 ,645 
amanat 
2,595 701 617 
Proportion of total given 
out as amanat 
56.1% 24.5% 19.8% 19.8% 
Source: Shahraru, 2002; author 
them to produce more commodities. Amanat livestock also allows them to trade (or 
otherwise cull) some of their own animals while maintaining a herd size sufficient to 
meet their household subsistence needs. Larger herds do involve additional labor, in 
terms of milking and herding, but the benefits derived offset the increased labor 
requirements, which in any case are fairly minimal. Most smallholders have a labor 
surplus that can accommodate extra amanat animals. 
Even though the amanat system is less necessary now than in the past, the 
average percentage of household herds consisting of amanat animals is still considerable. 
As Table 26 shows, amanat sheep and goats make up half of the herd for those 
households in the Great Pamir receiving amanat, whereas the number is less than one-
third in the Little Pamir. This is another example of the two Pamirs' different historical 
and economic trajectories post-1978. In addition, the greater livestock mortality in the 
Great Pamir makes the amanat system more important for both the wealthy, who need to 
distribute their risk, and the poor, who need to offset their recurring losses. 
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Table 26. Average proportion of household herds consisting of amanat livestock 
Sheep/Goats Yak 
Little Pamir 30% 25% 
GreatPamir 50% 25% 
Source: author 
Another significant change in the amanat system concerns the source of livestock 
given out as amanat (Table 27). The majority of amanat animals are provided by wealthy 
Kyrgyz herd owners, usually those with more than 250 sheep/goats and/or 70 yak. Unlike 
the 1970s, though, a smaller yet growing proportion of amanat animals are loaned to the 
Kyrgyz by outsiders seeking to invest in the Kyrgyz's pastoral economy. These investors, 
for whom the amanat system offers an excellent vehicle for absentee ownership, 
represent an important source of pastoral capital for the Mghan Kyrgyz. The biggest 
outside investors at present, led by Hajji Rahman Kul's filth-eldest son, Muhammad Arif 
Kutlu, are the very Kyrgyz (and their descendants) who fled the Little Pamir in 1978. The 
Turkish Kyrgyz first returned to Mghanistan in 2003 and have come back almost every 
year since. While Arif Kutlu and others seek to portray these visits as primarily social-a 
chance to visit the old country, ride horses, and, for some Kyrgyz from Turkey (old and 
young alike), 108 smoke opium-the Afghan Kyrgyz believe the main motive to be 
economic, a way to check on their existing amanat investments and to look for additional 
ones. 
108 Those Turkish Kyrgyz who do return to Afghanistan annually are mostly older ones who were born in 
the Pamirs. Only very few younger (under 35) Kyrgyz males (and no younger females) participate in this 
trip. Having been reared in the comfortable fold of sedentary Turkish society, none of this younger cohort, 
born in either Pakistan (1978-1982) or Turkey (after 1982), evince any desire to return to Afghanistan for 
any longer than the usual three- month visit. 
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Table 27. Sources of amanat livestock, Little Pamir 
Sheep/Goats 
%of all 
Yak %of all 
amanat amanat 
Other Kyrgyz in 
2,595 73 .7% 617 74.9% 
Little Pamir 
Outside Investor 925 26.3% 207 25.1% 
Total 3,520 100% 824 100% 
% of Total Livestock 30.5% 24.8% 
Population 
Source: author 
Besides the Turkish Kyrgyz, other outside investors include the W akhi, 
Badakhshi traders, Kyrgyz from the Great Pamir (who have amanat animals in the Little 
Pamir), and a handful of government officials (Table 28). The political aspects of outside 
investment in the amanat system are discussed in the next chapter but, in brief, absentee 
ownership, combined with the other changes discussed previously, has, in terms of 
amanat, supplanted patron-client relations with purely fiduciary responsibilities. The 
Afghan Kyrgyz reap the benefits of having amanat animals, as discussed above, and the 
outside investors, having outsourced their herding needs, are able to return to the Pamirs 
every summer, collect their animals, and take them to market. 
Unlike sheep and goats, which are consistently loaned out as amanat on an annual 
basis, yak are given in much greater numbers during the winter. Because male yak are 
hardier-less prone to disease, predation, and starvation-and less likely to wander far 
afield than other livestock species, in winter they can be left to graze with minimal 
supervision, much as adult camels are during the summer. A number of Kyrgyz in both 
. Pamirs specialize as kotozchu, yak-herders, during the winter. Typically, they own 
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Table 28. Outside investment in the livestock economy, Afghan Pamirs 
Little Pamir GreatPamir Total 
Investor Sheep/Goats Yak Sheep/Goats109 Yak Sheep/Goats Yak 
Turkish Kyrgyz 375 89 275 (250-300) 0 650 89 
Badakhshi traders 300 20 250 (200-300) 6 550 26 
Wakhi 100 38 150 (100-200) 8 250 46 
Kyrgyz from other Pamir 150 60 0 0 150 60 
Government officials UNK UNK 175 (150-200) 40 175 40 
Total 925 207 850 (700-1,000) 54 1,775 261 
Source: data collectiOn by author 
(or claim) a number of high pastures at the heads of certain side valleys (jylga), running 
perpendicular to the main pamir valley, where male yak can be grazed in large numbers, 
ranging from 115 to 600, throughout the winter (Figure 26). A couple of younger, often 
unmarried male herders 110 live at the heads ofthesejylga during the winter, where they 
can check on the yak periodically to ensure that none has been lost to predators such as 
wolves or snow leopards. Although still called amanat, in the sense that the yak are not 
owned by the kotozchu, the te~s are more commercial than with normal amanat 
livestock: because the kotozchu derive no subsistence benefit from being loaned yak that 
they pasture in remote areas, they are acting as hired shepherds111 rather than amanat 
borrowers and are paid a small amount in-kind, often in sheep but sometimes in yak 
calves as well. In other cases, yaks are herded collectively in the highland pastures during 
109 Because I received a range of answers to my questions about amanat sheep/goats in the Great Pamir, I 
correlated the most consistent and credible responses and then used the mean as the actual figure. 
110 Older opium addicts in need of income will also often work as kotozchu, as the solitude and the slow 
pace of the job allow them to devote most of their time to smoking. 
11 As with all hired shepherds in the Pamirs, there are no fmmal written contracts governing the terms of 
the relationship. 
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the winter; a number of households or camps will pool their male yak and then take turns 
providing labor to watch over them. 
WINTER YAK PASTURES 
ei& Pasture Extent 
Figure 26. Winter yak pastures, Great and Little Pamir 
CHAPTER 6- THE KYRGYZ KHANSHIP: 
PRE-2001 POLITICS 
The political organization of the Kyrgyz of the Afghan Pamir is unique among 
twenty-first century Kyrgyz communities, pastoral and sedentary. As a result of their 
torturous history of migration in an effort to avoid coming under communist rule, the 
Afghan Kyrgyz successfully managed to avoid any sort of collectivization, unlike their 
brethren in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China. They also avoided complete encapsulation 
by the Afghan state and were able to maintain a greater degree of political autonomy than 
any other Kyrgyz community in the world. 
Kyrgyz semi-autonomous political structures exist mainly for two purposes: to 
maintain internal order and to manage relations with the outside world (Dor, 1975: 87; 
Dor and Naumann, 1978: 52; Shahrani, 1986: 265). In most instances, neither function 
requires centralized authority or strong leadership. Patriarchal authority at the household 
or camp level, consisting of elders (aksakals; literally, "white beards"), 112 suffices to 
handle domestic matters, whereas the khan represents Kyrgyz interests externally. In the 
past, the khan (based in the Little Parnir) as well as the qaryadar (village headman) 113 in 
the Great Pamir would also mediate and settle any internal disputes that could not be 
solved by the aksakals. Less powerful khans than Hajji Rahman Kul, including the 
11 2 Although aksakal may appear to be merely an ascribed status, based simply on age, not every elderly 
male automatically acquires patriarchal authority. One must be recognized as possessing certain qualities 
(wisdom, gravitas, piety, good judgment, etc.) to be considered an aksakal beyond just the literal meaning 
of having a white beard (Dor, 1975: 90). 
113 Qmyadar, in Kyrgyz usage, is generally synonymous with other terms for village headman or 
representative (arbab, nomayenda, malik). 
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current one, Abdul Rashid, now merely act as primus inter pares in resolving domestic 
disputes. 
It is primarily the institution of the khan that renders the Afghan Kyrgyz 
recognizably distinct from other Kyrgyz communities. The Mghan Kyrgyz khanship is 
fundamentally different from, for example, those governing structures found in 
Kyrgyzstan that symbolically reflect the politicized nostalgia for an oft-mythologized 
pre-Soviet past. The profusion of "traditional" political forms in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
such as the inauguration of the People's Kurultai (congress) and the celebration of 2,200 
years of Kyrgyz statehood, both in 2003, have often been the result of "the [Kyrgyz] 
government's efforts to build ethnic and state identities through a national-level notion of 
relatedness [which] were an attempt to foster unity, especially during a tense political 
period" (Gullette, 2010: 5). Many ofthese efforts are "invented traditions" in the sense of 
being: 
... a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules 
and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values 
and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies 
continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to 
establish continuity with a suitable historic past. .. However, insofar as 
there is such reference to· a historic past, the peculiarity of 'invented 
traditions' is that the continuity with it is largely fictitious. In short, they 
are responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old 
situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition 
(Hobsbawm, 1983:1-2). 
By contrast, in the post-1978 period, the Afghan Kyrgyz have had to invent not 
backward-looking traditions but entirely new approaches to dealing with the modem 
world, often manifested through novel political structures as well as the redefinition of 
more ancient ones. In doing so, they have not had the convenience of an idealized past to 
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which they can look for invented traditions "establishing or legitimizing institutions, 
status or relations of authority" (Hobsbawm, 1983:9). Lacking alternate forms of 
authority to draw upon, Afghan Kyrgyz politics has tended to have more of a material 
than a traditional, charismatic, or legal-rational basis, and leadership is established and 
legitimized based more on efficacy, the ability to deliver, than tradition. For the Kyrgyz 
khan, who presides over an input-based patronage system, the dilemma is that he does not 
have control over the resources that undergird his leadership. His legitimacy depends on 
his efficacy, and that efficacy depends on his ability to act as a patron, attracting and 
distributing resources. When these resources are his own property, as they were with pre-
1978 amanat-based patronage, it is a fairly simple matter to mobilize them. However, 
when the "currency" of political capital changes . to an exogenous resource, it makes the 
task of governing much more difficult. 
Amanat as Patron-Client Relationship 
The preceding two chapters considered Kyrgyz economic strategies in historical 
context, surveying how pastoral production strategies were adapted to the exigencies of 
closed frontiers and how closed frontiers nomadism produced significant socio-economic 
changes. In particular, the loaning of livestock through the amanat system exacerbated 
pre-existing economic inequalities based on differential access to productive resources 
and contributed to the extreme stratification of Kyrgyz society, as documented by 
Shahrani in the early 1970s. The effects of the amanat system were not only limited to 
economic inequality, however; amanat also served as the basis for widespread 
clientelism, in which the 31.5% of the population without pastoral capital of their own 
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were completely dependent upon the wealthy livestock-owning elite for their subsistence. 
Amanat recipients were not just the extremely poor, though; more than 200 households 
(out of a total of 333) received amanat animals (Shahrani, 2002: 179). 
For the khan, with 135 amanat client households-40.5% of the total number of 
Kyrgyz households (Shahrani, 2002:181)-the amanat system offered a structural basis 
upon which to build an extensive patronage network. Amanat solved the problem of "how 
wealth can be created, accumulated, and preserved in a pastoral environment" 
(McChesney, 1996:50) and allowed Rahman Kul to "create an enormous estate for 
himself' (ibid). It also served as the vehicle that allowed him to convert his pastoral 
capital into political capital. McChensey notes that the dependency the khan fostered 
among his clients through the giving of amanat served, by a bit of circular reasoning, to 
legitimate his vast wealth: "Rahman Qui, [was] the owner of most of the wealth of his 
tribe ... which he justified as necessary for the protection of his people, who could not 
survive, he claimed, without his financial support" (McChesney, 1996:50-51 ). 
The wealthier the khan became, the more amanat clients he could support which, 
in tum, allowed him to disperse his livestock holdings further, thereby ensuring that his 
wealth would only be more likely to increase in both relative and absolute terms. As 
Kyrgyz society became more stratified, with pastoral capital increasingly controlled by 
just a few families, many Kyrgyz faced a simple choice: become amanat clients or else 
leave the Pamir and sedentarize. The latter option was both unpalatable and impractical, 
owing to a lack of locally available non-pastoral opportunities. For example, unlike one 
sedentarizing process among the Basseri nomads described by Barth, in which "members 
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who fail to retain the productive capital in herds which is required for an independent 
pastoral existence ... must seek other temporary sources to augment their income, all of 
them connected with sedentary communities" (1961:108-109), there was hardly any 
absorptive capacity in nearby Wakhi areas to accommodate impoverished Kyrgyz 
herders. Limited options increased the dependency of the amanat clients upon their 
wealthy patrons-as their dependency grew, so too did the leverage the wealthy 
stockowners had over them. 
The patron-client structure of the amanat system also allowed Rahman Kul, the 
wealthiest man in the Pamirs and the most powerful leader in living memory, controlling 
the most extensive patronage network, to exert much more authority than was typical of a 
Kyrgyz khan (Shahrani, 2002: 184). Few Kyrgyz had the luxury of challenging his rule, 
as many of these families were entirely dependent upon his largesse for their subsistence. 
And, whereas Kul could always fmd new amanat clients, those seeking amanat livestock 
could not always count on finding a new patron. As Nancy Tapper noted, many amanat-
receiving households were 
wholly dependent on the Khan's goodwill. He [Rahman Kul] subjects 
them to moral as well as economic dependency, and freely interferes in all 
aspects of their lives. He forces them to regard the careful husbandry of 
his animals as a moral duty, to which end they should work harder, sleep 
less, and restrict their pleasures even to the point of drinking less tea! 
There are no contracts to govern clients' relations with the Khan, and they 
have little change of appeal against his authority (1976:6). 114 
Because the khan had a self-sustaining, structural basis for his authority, 
predicated on resources he directly controlled, he was freed from many of the constraints 
114 In his rebuttal letter (1976a), Shahrani characterized Tapper's comments as "value judgements and 
personal attacks" against the khan and called them "unjustified, unjustifiable, and quite unethical." 
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typical of consent-based leadership in a politically egalitarian society lacking a tradition 
of ascribed (inherited) status. While Rahman Kul was no different from previous Kyrgyz 
khans in terms of exercising leadership as a prerogative of his position, he could also, 
when necessary, dispense with the necessity of consent and, instead, compel others. 
This distinction between leadership and authority was noted by Ibn Khaldun in 
the fourteenth century, who described the latter as "more than leadership. Leadership 
means being a chieftain, and the leader is obeyed, but he has no power to force others to 
accept his rulings. Royal authority means superiority and the power to rule by force" 
(1967:108). The difference between leadership and authority hinges on power-the 
ability to compel. Although power is often backed by the threat of violence, Rahman 
Kul' s "royal authority" was instead predicated on the threat of withholding or 
withdrawing amanat. This threat, whether implicit or explict, was ultimately what 
allowed him to convert and expand his pastoral capital into political capital and ensured 
the obedience of his Kyrgyz clients, who accepted "the validity - though not necessarily 
the morality or desirability - of his positions and acts; it implies a confirmation of his 
value, in terms of ideals of strength and wholeness. It is incompatible with a record of 
failures of ineffectiveness by the person; whereas it is fully compatible with fear of the 
person" (Barth, 1985: 178). 
The Kyrgyz were fortunate that Hajji Rahman Kul was by all accounts a benign 
autocrat and more often than not acted in the interests of the community. Andre Singer, 
an anthropologist who visited the Kyrgyz in 1975, wrote that the khan 
... sees himself as a man who looks after his people in a fatherly way, 
doing his best to preserve Muslim traditions, . and as someone who is 
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saving his people from the fundamental changes that communism has 
brought to the Kirghiz over the borders .. .It may well be that in their 
situation of isolation, the Kirghiz need such an authoritarian figure and 
system to survive the limitations oftheir environment (1976:157). 
Despite their power, "which can only be thought of as feudal" (ibid), Kul and the other 
amanat-giving elite were by no means oriental despots, and the amanat system was not 
akin to Marx's "Asiatic mode of production"; they did not constitute a despotic ruling 
class siphoning off surplus from the rest of the population or overseeing the ovine 
equivalent of a "hydraulic empire" (Wittfogel, 1957: 18) based on forced labor. If 
anything, the social welfare benefits that accrued from the redistribution of animals were 
in line with Marx's dictum, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs!" (1875: 531). As Lindholm (2002: 24) notes, in the Middle Eastern context, 
Furthermore, the client herding his patron's animals may actually feel no 
sense of oppression whatsoever, since the patron's stable capital primarily 
comes from the way he uses the profits from sale of animals in urban trade 
opportunities and in particular of farmland. All the poor herdsman does is 
care for his patron's herd, an honorable and manly job. In return, the 
shepherd can take his pay in animals, which, with luck, will multiply and 
give him the possibility of independence in the future. Hence, from the 
point of view of the ordinary shepherd, the wealthy man is just someone 
who has succeeded in this pathway he himself hopes to follow. 
The antipathy of Kyrgyz have-nots towards the extremes of inequality that 
prevailed under Rahman Kul, especially their resentment of those who were rich by 
virtue of having inherited (rather than earned) their wealth in livestock and land, was 
indeed tempered by the understanding that the game is not completely rigged and that 
inequality has to do with a host of other intangible factors, including luck, thrift, and 
individual aptitude. Even the khan offered a sort of Horatio Alger story: 
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When I started off, I had very few animals. My father owned about 2,000 
animals but most died in the snow and blizzards. He gave me about 200 
and I increased them. But in 1941 the Russians raided here and took away 
all my animals. Once again I started from scratch with about 20 animals. I 
looked after them well for many years, and little by little my herd 
increased. When I had enough, I gave some to one or two families to look 
after. For the past 20-30 years I have enjoyed owning many animals 
(Singer, 1976: 157; cf. The Kirghiz of Afghanistan, 1975). 
Nonetheless, the highly efficient means of distributing risk and attracting clients 
made possible by the amanat system ensured that the wealthy maintained control of the 
key productive resources: land and livestock. And, by controlling these resources under 
the conditions of closed frontiers, the wealthy also dominated Kyrgyz political life 
according to a politics centered on the question of "who gets what, when, and how" 
(Lasswell, 1936), leaving sedentism the only option besides clientelism for many Kyrgyz, 
The conflicted feelings that the Kyrgyz have towards Hajji Rahman Kul, dating 
from this period, remain unresolved today. On one hand, he is spoken of reverentially, his 
beyond-the-grave gravitas still sufficient to bring a hush to a crowded yurt whenever a 
photo of "Khan Hajji" is shown. On the other hand, there is a barely latent bitterness 
towards the system he presided over and for which he is mostly blamed, as its architect 
and main beneficiary. Among the Kyrgyz in the Little Pamir, who lived most directly 
under his rule, several informants referred to his reign as zar zaman, "the time of 
sorrow," to convey how difficult life was for the poor and how much they resented the 
inequality that permeated all facets of Kyrgyz life. 115 A few informants even made 
115 In a historical sense, zar zaman usually refers to the period of Russian colonization of Kyrgyz and 
Kazakh lands in the late nineteenth century. Although it is unlikely that my informants were directly 
alluding to it, there is also a zar zaman geme of Kyrgyz poetry from this time that mournfully 
"enumerated ... the impoverishment of local cattlemen through the Russian appropriation of grasslands" 
(AIIworth, 1994:407). 
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vituperative comments about the khan, calling him "ach" (literally, "hungry," but with 
the connotation of "greedy") and accusing him of lying to them about the threat posed by 
the Soviets, thereby deceiving them into accompanying him to Pakistan in 1978. 
The unpleasant memories of Kul's time are by no means universal, especially in 
the Great Pamir, where a more benign recollection prevails. For example, Hajji Turdi 
Akhun, the wakil (senator), took exception to others' characteriz~tions of Rahman Kulas 
anything other than a great leader and an incredibly successful herder, stating, "It wasn't 
his fault that other people didn't have animals. He gave them his livestock, paid their 
debts, and did other good deeds for them." Even Abdul Rashid Khan admitted that 
Rahman Kul was "a good man," one who cared about his people, but complained that 
there was no room for dissent in Kul's system of government. Every Kyrgyz I spoke 
with, however, agreed that the present is preferable to Hajji Rahman Kul ' s time, mostly 
because of lessened economic inequality and greater prosperity on a per capita basis. 
Politics and the Soviet Occupation 
As described in the previous chapter, the 1978 exodus from the Little Pamir to 
Pakistan fundamentally altered the previous pattern of livestock ownership and, with it, 
the amanat system. As I have shown, the leveling effects that followed the return of 300 
Kyrgyz to Afghanistan between 1978 and 1979 not only lessened economic inequality, as 
measured by the differential holdings of privately owned animals and other productive 
resources, but also transformed the dynamics of giving and receiving amanat livestock. 
The new class of smallholders, who accepted amanat livestock because doing so made 
good economic sense, was not as susceptible to implicit or explicit threats that certain 
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actions on their part might put them at risk of losing their amanat. Since it was now much 
more difficult to convert pastoral capital into political capital through the loaning of 
livestock, the amanat system became less of a patron-client relationship and more of a 
vehicle for economic investment, replacing clientelism with purely fidicuary 
responsi bili ties. 
The Soviet occupation coincided with these changes to the amanat system and 
contributed to the new political dynamic, especially in the Little Pamir. This was the first 
time in their history that the Kyrgyz had to contend with an external power actually 
present alongside them in the Afghan Pamir, rather than in distant Faizabad or Kabul. 
But, according to the Kyrgyz, the Soviet troops stationed in the Pamir from 1980 to 1989 
were content to leave them to run their own affairs and only wanted to deal with liaisons 
representing the Kyrgyz community, rather than all and sundry. Presumably, it was 
preferable for the Soviets to have a single point of contact, a capable, respected individual 
who could liaise between the Kyrgyz community and the occupying forces. Philip 
Salzman, writing about "the encapsulation of tribes by more extensive political units" in 
North Africa and Southwest Asia, observed that: 
... the agents of the encapsulating unit need to deal with the members of 
the encapsulated unit. Information, such as orders, and resources, such as 
taxes and material aid, must be passed between the agents of the 
encapsulating power and the members of the encapsulated tribe. A tribal 
centralized structure for collecting and distributing information and 
resources is desirable from the perspective of the agents of [the] 
encapsulating unit because it allows them to deal with the tribe at only one 
contact point (1974:203-4). 
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The Soviet presence required that some modus vivendi be reached between the soldiers 
and the Kyrgyz, thereby creating an opportunity for Kyrgyz leaders, both established and 
would-be alike, willing to act as middlemen. 
Encapsulation is simply the process by which larger political structures-the 
state, occupying armies, colonial powers-enclose smaller ones. Bailey (200 1: 149-151) 
identified three types of encapsulation: nominal, in which the enclosed polity shares the 
territory of the larger one but no interventions are attempted; extractive, whereby the 
encapsulating structure is paid revenue but otherwise interference is minimal; and 
assimilative, in which considerable efforts are made and resources expended to fully 
integrate the smaller structure within the encapsulating one. Joseph Hiatt, writing about 
the enclosure of Bedouin tribes by the Jordanian state, suggests a fourth type of 
encapsulation, intermediate between the nominal and extractive forms: administrative 
control, or "enclosure with interference, resulting in changes within the smaller structure 
but no extraction of resources from it" (1984: 1). 
Nominal encapsulation would probably be the most apt description of pre-1978 
relations between the Kyrgyz and the Afghan state. As Shahrani noted several years prior 
to the Soviet invasion: 
Official Kirghiz relationships with government authorities are handled 
through the Kirghiz khan, an early political and economic entrepreneur, 
often at the higher level of government bureaucracy in the provincial 
center and Kabul rather than at the district level. Also, the position of the 
khan has been officially sanctioned under the new title of qaryadar 
(village headman), which has been integrated into the local Kirghiz 
political organization (2002: 228). 
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Though there were interconnections between the state and the Kyrgyz, actual interference 
or extraction was minimal. For example, a typical qaryadar in Afghanistan was 
responsible for collecting taxes (Nixon, 2008: 30), but the Kyrgyz didn't pay any taxes on 
their livestock. Instead, Rahman Kul was primarily tasked with monitoring the various 
international borders in the Pamirs, to ensure that there were no unauthorized movements 
into or out of Mghanistan, for which he was given the title Pasbaan-e Pamir ("Guardian 
of the Parnir") (Shahrani, 1986: 258). 
It was only during the Soviet occupation of the Little Pamir that enclosure came 
to resemble Hiatt's administrative encapsulation, since Kyrgyz politics, though 
transformed by endogenous processes, also developed in response to the needs of the 
encapsulating powers. During this period, the influence of those Kyrgyz who proved 
adept at working with and even manipulating the external powers (both the Afghan 
government and the Soviet forces) was acknowledged and rewarded with increased 
status. They were also rewarded materially, although the legitimacy of anyone purporting 
to represent and have the support of the Kyrgyz community depended upon bringing 
benefits to all or some portion of the community, besides just personal enrichment. 
Increased influence and status, and the provision of collective benefits; all allowed 
Kyrgyz leaders to parlay their success into greater political capital, with both their 
Kyrgyz constituency and their non-Kyrgyz interlocutors, whether Soviet or Mghan. As 
Salzman (1971 :333) further notes: 
... an encapsulated society (such as a tribe) will not be unaffected 
internally by its contacts with the encapsulating society ... These contacts 
will provide access to various kinds of new resources which can and will 
be drawn on by tribesman in their various intra-community and intra-tribal 
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social, economic and political struggles. As these new resources become 
institutionalized either on a pragmatic or normative level the other tribal 
institutions will adjust to accommodate them and thus the encapsulated 
tribe will become more dependent upon and consequently integrated with 
the larger encapsulating society. 
The influence and respect that accrued to capable middlemen effectively replaced 
the amanat system as the source of political capital for Kyrgyz leaders. Lacking 
indigenous means to cultivate clients, the successors of Rahman Kul instead pursued an 
external strategy of clientelism, by acting as brokers between their community and 
whoever controlled exogenous resources desired by the Kyrgyz, as in the example of 
medical care described below. Such resources, which were usually the controlled by 
some outside power such as the Afghan state or the Soviets, would be difficult to extract 
individually but might be wrested collectively. The relationship was fundamentally 
transactional and hinged on reciprocity: the external power, in addition to any ancillary 
benefits, extended its writ through the cooptation of the informal political system; the 
leader saw his status and influence increase, often confirmed through preferential and 
deferential treatment, not to mention whatever ways he could find to profit personally; 
and the Kyrgyz leader' s constituency, in return for their support, received key resources 
dispensed by the external power through the leader, ranging from services (medical care) 
to goods (food aid, livestock, warm clothes) to privileges (continuing exemption from 
taxes and conscription). 
As with the process of encapsulation, this patronage model was not entirely new, 
since Hajji Rahman Kul had also derived some measure of political capital by acting as 
middleman between the Kyrgyz and the Afghan state: 
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The cordial nature of the Kirghiz relationship with the central authorities 
in Kabul, as a result of. .. the maintenance of regular contact with the 
authorities, especially by the Kirghiz khan, has further enhanced Kirghiz 
local interests. In other words, the khan's personal acquaintance with some 
of the high officals in Kabul has at times enabled him to exercise some 
influence over provincial and local authorities ... Locally, a major 
consequence of this has been not only the economic but also the political 
superiority of the Kirghiz over their neighboring Wakhi (Shahrani, 
2002:210). 
But Rahman Kul's main source of political capital was the power he derived from his 
position as amanat patron par excellence, rather than his ability to "use his ties with the 
state to the benefit of the community" (Shahrani, 1986: 268). Although Kul did procure 
some material assistance from the state (Shahrani, 1986: 267-268; Shahrani, 2002: 209), 
neither of the two main concessions that the Kyrgyz enjoyed--exemption from taxes and 
. . b d' d h' 116 conscnptwn-can e ere 1te to 1m. 
The patronage-based political system that subsequently developed during the 
Soviet occupation differed from Kul's in that any Kyrgyz leader was very unlikely to 
wield power, the ability to compel, but instead was left to compete for status and 
influence. Unlike power, which in Ibn Khaldun's formulation is absolute (one either has 
the ability to compel or does not), status and influence are much more graduated. The 
degree to which they are possessed by a Kyrgyz leader largely determined the nature of 
his leadership: what (if any) authority he wields, whether he is seen as legitimate, and 
how effectively he can fend off challengers. And his status and influence in the post-
Rahman Kul era were increasingly determined by both the quality and quantity of the 
patronage the Kyrgyz leader could provide. 
116 As described in Chapter One, the livestock tax was abolished nationwide by the Afghan parliament in 
1966 and the Kyrgyz had been exempt from military duty since 1921 (Shahrani, 2002:208-209). 
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As I previously noted, Kyrgyz leaders no longer directly controlled the resources 
they needed to accumulate political capital since these resources were most often 
controlled by an external power. As a result, they employed a more complex and less 
dependable patronage model than the amanat system had provided. The leader, acting as 
middleman, in some ways became a client of the external power, which provided him 
with the resources to maintain his position and legitimacy. Having mobilized these 
resources through his own initiative, but also with the implicit backing of the community, 
which the leader purports to represent, he then, in the guise of patron, doles out these 
resources to his constituents or, at the very least, is credited for having acquired them for 
collective benefit. Unlike the amanat system, this new basis for patronage, and the 
political capital derived from it, was transactional, not structural: 
Leadership is an enterprise. To be successful as a leader is to gain access 
to more resources than one's opponents and to use them with greater 
skill ... Although it sounds a paradox, the opposition which exists between 
two political rivals also exists in some degree between a leader and his 
followers. This relationship, too, can be visualized as one of relative 
access to resources. What passes between them is not so much an 
interaction as a transaction ... (Bailey, 2001: 36). 
Sources of Political Capital 
The idea of the convertibility of various forms of capital has been theorized at 
length by Bourdieu (1986; 1991a), who identified three types (as well as numerous 
subtypes): economic, social, and cultural capital. While each one is convertible, they do 
not all possess the same liquidity-economic capital, which tends to be material ("private 
possession of the means of production"), is more readily "transubstantiated" into 
immaterial forms of cultural or social capital than vice versa (Bourdieu, 1986: 46). Social 
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capital-"made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is convertible, in certain 
conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of 
nobility" (1986: 47)-is essentially what post-1978 Kyrgyz leaders were converting into 
political capital, at least in two respects: "The volume of the social capital possessed by a 
given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively 
mobilize and on the volume of capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his 
own right by each of those to whom he is connected" (1986: 51). 
In later works, Bourdieu expanded on his concept of social capital to include 
political capital as a "subspecies" of social capital, one which "guarantees to its holders a 
form of private appropriation of goods and public services" ( 1991 b: 640). Here Bourdieu 
was specifically referring to "old social democratic nations such as Sweden or in Soviet-
type societies" where "this peculiar form of social capital constituted by political capital 
which has the capacity to yield considerable profits and privileges, in a manner similar to 
economic capital in other social fields, by operating a 'patrimonialization' of collective 
resources" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119). 
Combining these aspects of social capital-the ability to mobilize networks of 
connections and a means of tapping into goods and services, often controlled by the 
state-offers a good working definition of political capital: "the sum of the resources, 
actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition" (ibid). Bourdieu's conception of capital also suffices to illustrate two recent 
periods in Kyrgyz history: the pre-1978 Rahman Kul era, when economic capital 
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provided both the resources and the (patronage) networks that allowed the khan to amass 
political capital; and the post -1978 period, when new resources, including networks that 
allowed Kyrgyz middlemen to tap into patrimonial resources, had to be found as the basis 
for a different sort of patron-client relations. 
Abdul Rashid Khan 
In Turko-Mongol polities, khans were usually formally elected by consensus 117 
but among the Afghan Kyrgyz it was more common that leaders, whether manaps (clan 
chiefs) 118 or khans, were recognized: "Le manap n'etait pas elu a proprement parler, il 
n'etait pas non plus nomme ou design, il etait reconnu" (Dor, 1975: 85). A man became 
the khan by acting as a khan and having his actions recognized by the community as 
worthy of a khan. Accordingly, the khanship was more of a status than an office (at least 
until, under Rahman Kul, the Afghan state formalized the position under the title of 
qaryadar) and was in large part based on the qualities a khan was expected to possess and 
revealed in practice, including good judgment, generosity, piety, and wealth. But the 
critical attribute was leadership, in the transactional sense of "what actions of leaders 
evoke consent and what aspects of their behavior evoke resentment on the part of their 
followers and, ultimately, what the balance of these responses is over time" (Shahrani, 
1986: 263). 
117 An excellent example ofthis, in the sixteenth centmy Perso-Islamicate Central Asian context, is 
provided by McChesney (2000:66-67). 
1111 The title of manap was generally equivalent to that of ming bashy, "c01mnander of one thousand" (Dor 
and Naumann, 1978: 51), a linguistic remnant ofthe Mongol decimal system of military organization. 
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In 1978, the forty-three year old Abdul Rashid ll9 and his family followed Hajji 
Rahman Kul and the others into exile in Pakistan. Once there, Abdul Rashid and a few 
other relatively junior Kyrgyz men, who had been chafing under Rahman Kul's 
authoritarian style of leadership and who resented the economic disparities in Kyrgyz 
society, decided that conditions in Pakistan were sufficiently dire to risk returning to 
Afghanistan. Upon their arrival back in the Little Pamir in 1979, most of these men were 
too busy rebuilding their herds to apply much energy towards politics. Besides, until the 
Soviets overthrew the Amin government in December, 1979, and occupied the Little 
Pamir and closed the border with Pakistan in 1980, the returnees were expecting other 
Kyrgyz to come back from Pakistan, which left the long-term political field unsettled. 
The main exception was Abdul Rashid who, having been instrumental in breaking 
with Hajji Rahman Kul in Pakistan and convincing a number of Kyrgyz to return to the 
Little Pamir, already enjoyed a reputation as a leader. After Soviet forces arrived in the 
Little Pamir in 1980, it was Abdul Rashid who most enthusiastically took on the role of 
middleman. His father, Hajji Afghan Beg, had been a respected elder but neither a khan 
nor a bar, so it was primarily on his own initiative that Abdul Rashid steadily accrued 
status and influence by acting as liaison between two groups: one, the encapsulating 
power, in the form of the Soviet soldiers garrisoned in Bozo! Gtimboz (as well as the 
Afghan state)120, and the other, his own people. Over time, he was able to consolidate his 
119 Some Western scholars have also rendered his name as Abdurrashid. However, according to his own 
letterhead, it is written as Abdul Rashid (~)1~). Also, in 2009, Abdul Rashid Khan went on the Hajj to 
Mecca, but because most of the events discussed in this work occurred prior to that time, I do not refer to 
him as "Hajji" except when discussing him post-Hajj. 
120 A number of journalists, writing at the time of the Soviet occupation, stated that the Soviet Union had 
simply annexed the Wakhan-Pamir region, which would suggest that the Afghan state had a limited 
presence, if at all, in the Pamirs during this period (Denman, 1980; The Economist, 1980; Sabatier, 1984). 
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position and act as "the primary if not the exclusive channel of information and resources 
as they flow[ ed] between the tribe and the agencies of the encapsulating power" 
(Salzman, 1974:206). 
Abdul Rashid's main political responsibilities as middleman included overseeing 
compliance with Soviet edicts (which mostly concerned not crossing the international 
borders), lobbying for material assistance, ensuring that trading relations between the 
Kyrgyz and the Soviets remained opened and fair, and requesting medical care for sick 
Kyrgyz, 121 which occasionally involved transporting patients for more advanced 
treatment outside of the Little Pamir. For example, two informants recalled being taken 
as children to Tajikistan for medical care, where one of them received a potentially life-
saving operation. 122 While ad hoc health care was extended to the entire Kyrgyz 
community, preferential treatment, such as traveling abroad to more advanced medical 
facilities, was more readily offered to leaders such as Abdul Rashid, who himself had 
been "treated in Murghab [Tajikistan] hospital several times" (Felmy and Kreutzmann, 
2004: 100). Recognition and legitimation of the khan's status vis-a-vis the external 
powers helped boost his influence domestically among the Kyrgyz. 
However, the khan had to be careful not to over-reach or appear to be using his 
position for self-serving or nepotistic ends. Shahrani observed that a 
major function of the Khan in Kirghiz society [is] that of representing the 
community to the outside forces ... This aspect of traditional local 
leadership appears to be the most important to the Kirghiz in their 
121 Medical assistance and the distribution of humanitarian assistance were two important material aspects 
of Soviet "hearts and minds" activities in Afghanistan. Both were fairly extensive-as documented by 
Giustozzi, "Soviet forces gave medical assistance to 400,000 Afghans and material aid to over I ,000,000" 
between 1981 and 1989 (2000: 44). See also Robinson, 2010. 
122 This man did not know what the operation was for but his scar suggests that he had an appendectomy. 
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conception of good Khans and bad Khans, and distinguishes the real 
Khans from the mere pretenders ... The most important relationship which 
the Khan maintains is the one between the local community and the 
government authorities ... [there seems to be] a strong correlation between 
the state of the collective welfare of the community and the particular 
approach the Khan's [sic] have taken in conducting relations betWeen their 
community and the state. There seems to be a strong correlation also 
between the Khan's conduct with outsiders and his interactions and the 
nature of his relations with members of his own community (1986: 265-
266). 
By this standard, Abdul Rashid was acting as a "good khan" since, whatever his personal 
agenda, he was bringing benefit to the broader Kyrgyz community. However, the relative 
weakness of his patronage system limited the scope and depth of Abdul Rashid's 
domestic leadership to something short of actual authority, with the result that he 
practiced a much more consultative, consensual sort of politics domestically, ruling by 
persuasion rather than intimidation. 
The stark contrast between Hajji Rahman Kul's power and the (comparatively) 
mere leadership exhibited by Abdul Rashid Khan has given rise to a typology of khans 
among the Kyrgyz, who distinguish "good" from "bad" leaders based not only on their 
personal qualities and their representation of community externally, but also on the 
circumstances surrounding their tenure. A "zor [great] khan" rules during a period of 
almost existential threat to the community and is able to rally the fractious Kyrgyz while 
an ordinary (" kichi!C' ) khan faces no such challenge. Lacking exceptional circumstances, 
a kichik khan will just as often divide as unify the community, as various competitors 
jockey for influence. This dynamic in part reflects Kyrgyz notions of egalitarianism; as 
one informant told me, "If you put three Kyrgyz men in a room and come back an hour 
later, you will fmd five khans." Obviously, it takes not just exceptional leadership skills 
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but also the opportunity, most often driven by external factors, to employ them in order to 
overcome such bloody-mindedness and establish some sort of centralized authority 
beyond the simple dictates of maintaining internal order. 
Additionally, by virtue of being an achieved rather than an ascribed status, the 
khanship requires popular recognition to have any validity and legitimacy, which 
potentially leaves room for dissent. Thus, a kichik khan may be considered by some 
members of the society to be just a qaryadar or an ex officio khan. The result is an 
occasional lack of consensus on who was, in fact, the khan at a given time. 123 
1. Toktosun: khan in mid-1930s (5-7 years); Teiit clan/Alapa sub-clan; Little 
Pamir; father of Mamat Kerim. 
2. Sartbai: khan from 1937-1943 (7 years); Teiit clan/Alapa sub-clan; Little 
Pamir; elder brother ofToktosun and uncle ofMamat Kerim. 
3. Mamat Kerim: khan from 1943 to 1945 (2 years) 124; Teiit clan/Alapa sub-
clan; Little Pamir; son of previous khan, Toktosun; forced to abdicate due to 
opium addiction. 
4. Hajji Rahman Kul: khan from 1945 to 1947 (2 years): Teiit clan/Kochkor 
sub-clan; Little Pamir. Fled to China in 194 7. 
5. Astanabek: khan from 1947-49 (2 years); Teiit clan/Kyzyl Bash sub-clan; 
Little Pamir; father of ApendibaL 
123 This was especially true if the person's period of leadership had only been for a short time. 
124 Shahrani was told that following the abdication of Sartbai as khan, "two people were introduced to the 
government as leaders of the community .. . but neither ofthem proved effective leaders and withdrew from 
the task . . . Finally, in 1945 he [Rahman Kul] was formally introduced to the government as the Kirghiz 
Khan" (1986: 267). According to this chronology, Mamat Kerim, one of the two ineffective leaders 
mentioned by Shahrani, would only have been khan for a year or two before being replaced by Rahman 
Kul. Kul then would have been khan from 1945 onwards, except during the 1947-49 interregnum, while he 
was abroad in China and Astanabek was acting as khan. 
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6. Hajji Rahman Kul: khan from 1949-1978 (29 years): Teiit clan/Kochkor 
sub-clan; Little Pamir. Fled to Pakistan in 1978. 
7. Abu Bakr: khan (or qaryadar) from 1978-1979 (1 year); Teiit clan/Shaiym 
sub-clan; Little Pamir; leader among the families who never emigrated to 
Pakistan in 1978. 
8. Abdul Rashid: khan from 1979 to 2009 (20 years); Teiit clan!Shaiym sub-
clan; Little Pamir. 
There are several points of interest in this list. The first is that in every instance 
the khan was from the Little Pamir and belonged to the Teiit clan-perhaps unsurprising, 
given that the Teiit have been the dominant clan there since the Little Parnir was 
occupied in the eighteenth century (Dor and Naumann, 1978: 45). Another notable 
phenomenon is that the agnatic descendants of former khans derive some status but do 
not necessarily inherit the title of their forebears; there are no Afghan Kyrgyz dynasties. 
These descendants tend to be more influential than a comparable aksakal or bar but make 
no claims to any position or formal status just by virtue of their kinship with a khan. 
Despite the lack of formal hierarchy, there has been a historical tendency among 
the Kyrgyz toward hereditary status. Veniukov, in the nineteenth century, observed that 
in Kyrgyz society, "there are no aristocratic races like the Sultan families in the Kaisak 
[Kazakh] hordes. The people consequently form an equal mass, differing only according 
to their sub-division in branches. The Kara-Kirghizes [Kyrgyz] are governed by Manaps, 
or elders, who at one time received their titles by election, though these have now 
become hereditary" (1865: 278). The lack of ranked lineages or a hereditary nobility 
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comparable to the "White Bone" (ak suzek) Kazakh aristocracy, who claimed descent 
from Chinggis Khan (Hudson, 1938: 55), meant that Kyrgyz attempts at familial 
succession were more overtly political and had little to do with genealogy. 
More recently, Dor (1975: 85) noted that the tendency towards the hereditary 
transfer of office remained very much extant among the Afghan Kyrgyz: "the inherent 
tendency of power is that he who exercises it tries to keep it and use it to profit his own 
family ... Having been granted the prestige and the advantages of their station .. .it is not 
surprising that some would then have arranged to transmit the station to their children." 
In this instance, Dor was referring to speculation among the Kyrgyz as to who might 
eventually follow Hajji Rahman Kul as khan, which illustrates the tension between the 
ideal of achieved status and the reality of entrenched interests: 
As far as we have been able to gather regarding the succession, the matter 
rests in much indecision; no one knows which of his seven sons will 
succeed the Khan ... Most people do not care to guess, but avow that the 
Khan can appoint whomever [among his sons] he judges the most apt at 
exercising power. But a traditionalist of the Great Pamir (perhaps an 
ambitious one) affirmed to us that anyone could succeed the Khan and that 
the assembly of notables gets to designate who that will be (1975: 87). 
Finally, it is interesting that most of the khans on the above list were not 
exceptionally wealthy. Besides Astanabek, described as a placeholder khan while 
Rahman Kul was abroad in China, the only other exception is Hajji Rahman Kul; the rest 
of the khans were not among the wealthiest Kyrgyz. Yet both Dor and Shahrani 
emphasize wealth as a prerequisite for leadership in Afghan Kyrgyz society. For 
example, Dor mentions that while the absence of an aristocracy in Kyrgyz society 
ostensibly kept the khanship on a level playing field, in reality, "It is not birth which 
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determines the rights of an individual, but rather wealth. This is why, in theory, everyone 
is free to rise to different levels except for the fact that his social origins form an 
inviolable barrier" (1975: 91). And Shahrani notes that "Wealth in livestock ... has been 
one of the most crucial factors in the effectiveness of a leader's performance and 
maintenance of influence" (1986: 264). But, as Bailey observed, "Merely to be rich will 
not in itself produce political power. Some positive act of symbolic conversion of wealth 
into honour must be made, and it must be generally acknowledged, not least by those 
who already possess honour, that the act of conversion of legitimate" (200 1: 156). So, 
while wealth, and sometimes status and even office, is heritable, and it is true that those 
men coming from a wealthy background will possess certain advantages over others who 
do not, most of the khans during the past 75 years were not very rich, which suggests that 
their political capital came from sources besides, or at least in addition to, their economic 
capital. 
The example of Apendibai illustrates this dynamic. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Apendibai's father, Astanabek, was the only Kyrgyz to return from Pakistan with 
any significant number of animals. His livestock holdings-initially the only source of 
amanat animals for the returnees to the Little Pamir-increased during the Soviet period 
and were eventually inherited by his son. Prior to his death in 2008, Apendibai was not 
only the wealthiest Kyrgyz but also by far the largest provider of amanat animals, giving 
out 780 sheep and goats and 329 yak (22.2% and 40%, respectively, of all amanat 
animals in the Little Pamir). 125 Yet for the most part he (as well as his son and heir, 
125 When calculated as the proportion ofKyrgyz-owned amanat animals in the Little Pamir, Apendibal 
loans out 30.1% of all sheep/goats and 53.3% of all yak. 
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Islamuddin)126 was apolitical. Granted, Apendibai might have been an exceptional case, 
due to the magnitude of his opium addiction, but the fact that he did not try to convert his 
pastoral capital into political capital despite loaning out more than one-quarter of all 
amanat animals in the Little Pamir127 indicates either a serious lack of political ambition 
or, as I've argued, that new and different sources of political capital have supplanted 
pastoral capital as the key to political influence. 
Khan-Qaryadar Dynamics 
The two dominant uruus-the Teiit in the Little Parnir and the Kesek in the Great 
Pamir--established a system in which a single khan, from the Teiit chong uruu, would 
formally rule over both areas. While the khan would represent the Kyrgyz of both Pamirs 
externally as a single group, in practice each· area would have its own leader to deal with 
domestic issues: a Teiit khan in the Little Pamir and a Kesek qaryadar in the Great 
Pamir. Even after the Afghan government invested Hajji Rahman Kul with the formal 
title of qaryadar, the semantics of each position remained clear to the Kyrgyz: the Kesek 
qaryadar was subordinate to the Teiit khan in matters both domestic and external. The 
merging of the two positions by the Mghan state was simply an expedient. A similar 
dynamic was observed by Hiatt, regarding the Bedouin in Jordan: 
... two positions known as mukhtars were instituted with government 
encouragement within the Khreisha settlement and were filled by 
members of the lineage. In all likelihood these offices were created not to 
supplant the tribal sheikhs or to modernize the traditional authority 
structure by grafting on an alien political construct, but simply to facilitate 
126 Apendibai died in August 2008 but even before his death Islamuddin had taken over his father's affairs 
since, as one informant memorably phrased it, "Apendinin meesi ketken"-Apendi's brain has gone. 
127In 2007-08, there were 4,344 amanat animals in the Little Pamir, of which Apendibai owned I, 109 
(25 .5%). 
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government communication with the population and administration of 
them (1984: 7). 
Because of Rahman Kul' s personal connections to the Afghan government, it was 
beneficial for both parties to have him assume the role of intermediary, rather than having 
two (or more) points of contact between the Kyrgyz and the state. While we might 
assume that the Kesek qaryadars resented this arrangement, it appears to have worked to 
mutual advantage: "Haji Rahman Qui's ability to use his ties with the state for the benefit 
ofthe community is unprecedented" (Shahrani, 1986: 268). 
The khan-qaryadar condominium did have one peculiarity that probably resulted 
from Rahman Kul's power and the vast amanat-based patronage network that he 
controlled: the Little Pamir khan was responsible for selecting the Great Pamir qaryadar. 
As related by Dor and Naumann (1978: 52-53), the qaryadar was akin to the khan's 
regent: "In the Great Pamir ·he [the khan] is forced to transfer his power to a Kesek, who 
is called kariyadar. .. The great distance and the difficulties of communication during the 
winter make such a transfer of power necessary. Nevertheless, Rahman Kul interferes any 
time he considers it useful or if he is asked to." For example, in the summer of 1973, Kul 
traveled to the Great Pamir because the Kesek qaryadar "Abdul Samad had died a few 
months before and Rahman Kul had to introduce a successor" (Dor and Naumann, 1978: 
53), choosing between two candidates. 
After the 1978 exodus, the two Pamirs became more independent politically and 
while, as described in the next chapter, the khan is still often portrayed externally as 
representing both Pamirs, the reality is that each Pamir is politically autonomous from the 
other in domestic matters and it would be impossible to conceive of the present khan 
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choosing a qaryadar for the Great Pamir. The last qaryadar in the Great Pamir was 
Mamat Aslam, who replaced Jalil, the qaryadar selected in 1973 by Rahman Kul, after 
Jalil ' s death in 1992. Since 2001 , the position seems to have waned in importance, 
especially after 2005, when a Kyrgyz from the Great Pamir was appointed to parliament. 
Various Wakhi informants still referred to Aslam as qaryadar (or arbab ), but no Kyrgyz 
outside of Aslam's camp ever referred to him (or anyone else) as such. 
The Price of Acquiescence: Waqt-e Mujahideen 
In his memoir of trying to build a school for the Kyrgyz, Greg Mortenson claimed 
that "Abdul Rashid Khan had played a delicate game that involved cooperating with the 
Soviet army ... while secretly channeling provisions and logistical support to the Afghan 
mujahadeen. By blending diplomacy with deception, he was able to avoid provoking the 
vicious reprisals for which the Soviets were so hated, while simultaneously benefitting 
from Russian trade and development assistance" (2009: 359). This is nonsense, and likely 
a wishful recounting of the Soviet occupation on the part of Abdul Rashid. In reality, the 
Kyrgyz-and few more so than Abdul Rashid Khan-greatly benefitted from the 
presence of the Soviet troops. As they were generally left alone, the Kyrgyz and in 
particular Abdul Rashid had no reason even to risk incurring the wrath of the Soviet 
forces. 
However, after the Soviets withdrew in 1989, it probably seemed in retrospect as 
though providing covert support to the mujahideen might not have been a bad idea. Even 
during the Soviet occupation, the Afghan government was only ever able to maintain "an 
insecure hold over the main districts of Jurm and lshkashim and the surrounding valley 
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floors while the mujahidin largely controlled the surrounding mountains and lateral 
valleys" (Pain, 2010: 9). Giustozzi writes that "In Badakhshan, for example, Kabul had 
by 1984 greatly expanded its control over hundreds of villages in low-lying areas, but, as 
only 10% of them were solidly under the government's influence (i.e. covered by party 
organizations), in 1988 Kabul rapidly lost 240 villages, about 40% of those it controlled" 
(2000: 176). An NGO report from 1989 noted that "Almost all ofBadakhshan lies out of 
the reach of central government authority .. .In the rural areas of Badakhshan de facto 
authority lies in the hands of district and local guerrilla commanders, and traditional local 
shuras" (Brailsford, 1989: 11). Following the Soviet withdraw, the few districts and cities 
that remained under the control of the Najibullah regime began to fall and by August, 
1991, Ahmed Shah Massoud, head of Shura-ye Nazar, the military wing of Jamiat-e 
Islami, had taken most of the northeastern regions along the border with Tajikistan, 
including Ishkashim and Wakhan (Dorronsoro, 2005: 229). 
Fortunately for them, the Kyrgyz had been passive supporters of the Soviet-
backed Afghan government and could credibly claim that they had been powerless to 
resist the Soviet forces garrisoned in the Little Pamir. As a result, they faced much less of 
a backlash from the mujahideen than did the various Ismaili groups, including the Wakhi, 
who had readily embraced the leftist policies ofthe PDPA: 
The majority of Ismaili elites maintained that only socialism could remedy 
their social and economic problems and they could see that their fellow 
Ismailis across the Oxus river in Gomo-Badakhshan and those in Sinkiang 
in China apparently enjoyed a more comfortable life under 
socialism ... Ismailis supported the [PDP A] government and the Soviet 
occupation of the country ... They did not heed the call of the Mujahidin 
for a holy war against the Kabul regime and the Soviet occupation forces 
for a number of compelling reasons: (a) the Sunni majority had oppressed 
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Ismailis in the past, (b) Ismailis with pro-Soviet political orientations were 
impressed with the visible material improvement in the standard of living 
of their co-religionists in Gorno-Badakhshan ... and were convinced that 
the Soviet-backed government would sponsor similar development 
programmes in the Ismaili-settled regions in Badakhshan, and (c) they 
could not withstand Soviet troop concentration [sic] a mere few hundred 
yards away from their villages (Emadi, 1998: 114). 
As the above quote makes clear, the decision of most Ismailis to support the 
government was guided by both political and sectarian considerations, and so was the 
payback they received at the hands of the Sunni mujahideen. The Shura-ye Nazar 
commander (qomandan) who controlled most of eastern Badakhshan after 1992, 
Najmuddin Wasiq (also called Najmuddin Khan), together with his sub-commanders, was 
blamed by many Ismailis for numerous punitive actions: 
It is claimed [by Ismaili intellectuals from Shugnan] that Wasiq regarded 
Isma'ilis as enemies of the faith. He [Wasiq] maintained that if his men 
did not kill Isma'ili prisoners when they capture [sic] them and brought 
them to him to decide their fate he would not kill the Isma'ili but would 
shoot the mujahid militia instead. According to Wasiq any encounter with 
an Isma'ili would contaminate his faith and ruin his reputation as a 
Muslim warrior (Emadi, 2005: 183). 
While coercive force was the basis of their power, the various commanders also 
appeared to desire a measure of popular legitimacy, which served as a check on their 
more vengeful instincts. For example, the region Najmuddin controlled consisted of his 
home district of Baharak as well as a number of predominately Ismaili districts, including 
Ishkashim--of strategic importance with the border crossing to Tajikistan. His initial 
attempts at establishing greater authority were rebuffed and, lacking any popular support 
among the rank-and-file Ishkashimis, he: 
co-opted a number of [prominent] Isma'ilis and used their influence to 
rally Isma'ilis in support of his future agenda. Wasiq needed Isma'ili 
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support to offset his archrivals Pazir, commander of Arghanjwa [district in 
central Badakhshan] and Zalmay [Mujaddadi], a commander in 
Jurm ... Wasiq depicted himself as a champion of development ... Wasiq 
resorted to diplomacy in implementing his agenda by declaring his support 
for the operation of FOCUS Humanitarian Assistance, an affiliate of 
AKDN in the region (Emadi, 2005: 183-184). 
The local "commander economy" that developed under men like Najmuddin and 
his subordinates ranged from predatory to beneficial, and sometimes both simultaneously. 
Whereas Najmuddin is credited with having had "a developmental perspective, with 
schools being supported and teachers being paid" in areas under his control (Pain, 2010: 
1 0), many of these same areas suffered from "looting or seizing of control of resources by 
locally powerful commanders ... Others found their livestock herds subject to predation by 
commanders and so rapidly reduced their herds" (Pain, 2010: 10-11). When describing 
the mujahideen period (waqt-e mujahideen), my Kyrgyz informants recalled the taking of 
Kyrgyz livestock by the various Badakhshi soldiers (who called it a tax) and the influx of 
opium, often peddled by the same soldiers, as the most harmful practices. 
Lacking much of a government with which he could liaise and request assistance, 
Abdul Rashid Khan was primarily concerned with minimizing any harm the Kyrgyz 
might suffer at the hands of the junior (and often poorly disciplined) soldiers, which he 
did by establishing and maintaining contact with the more senior commanders, including 
Najmuddin. If any of the soldiers were causing undue distress for the Kyrgyz, Abdul 
Rashid Khan would threaten to take the matter to Najmuddin Khan down in Ishkashim. 
But because opium dealing in the Pamirs was simply one small part of a much larger 
industry in which nearly all the commanders were involved, and because the dealers 
themselves were often soldiers and sub-commanders "supplying" the local market with 
220 
the full knowledge of their superiors, there was little that Abdul Rashid or any other 
Kyrgyz could do about the influx of opium. 
During this period, Abdul Rashid as well as local leaders among the W akhi, 
including the Ismaili pir, 128 Shah Ismail, occasionally became involved in preventing 
retribution against former members of the PDPA government and military. 129 Between 
1989 and 1992, many prominent PDP A figures fled to Tajikistan or, in the case of some 
Wakhi, to Pakistan, where they could count on the support of their co-ethnics. A few of 
these individuals sought refuge in the Pamirs, including Niaz Ali Patuwani, a Wakhi from 
upper Wakhan. Niaz Ali had worked with Afghan counterinsurgent forces in Northern 
Afghanistan-some say as the bodyguard of a prominent general, others say as an 
interrogator. He fled to the Pamir in 1992 and sought refuge with Abdul Rashid Khan, 
who found Niaz Ali's literacy and worldliness to be useful attributes and so kept him on 
as his secretary (munshi), in a modem version of the rustic Turko-Mongol tribal leader 
and "his wily Persian vizier" (Barfield, 2002: 68). Many Kyrgyz informants, including 
Abdul Rashid himself, told me that had it not been for the khan's multiple interventions 
with Badakhshi soldiers on behalf of Niaz Ali, he would have been removed from the 
Pamir and severely punished. 
Besides preventing or minimizing harm to the Kyrgyz community, the khan's 
political role increasingly involved reaching out beyond the commanders and the Afghan 
128 The pirs are members of dynastic groups established in the thirteenth century by high ranking Nizari 
lsmaili missionaries (Daftary, 1998: 165). 
129 The former mujahideen' s antipathy towards collaborators remains undiminished to the present and 
tensions were especially high in Badakhshan after a mass grave containing the remains of some 400 bodies 
was discovered outside of Faizabad in April 2007. Some of the victims, mostly civilians targeted by the 
pro-communist PDP A government, "were handcuffed and shackled. Several dozen were tied up in a chain, 
some had bullet holes in their skull" (Hamzi, 2007). 
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government to various aid agencies. This aspect of Abdul Rashid' s leadership became 
crucial from 1996 onwards, after the Taliban captured Kabul and the beleaguered Afghan 
government, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, from Badakhshan, steadily lost ground. The 
regional economy had collapsed and the Kyrgyz were struggling just to subsist, 
especially since wheat had become scarce and expensive due to supply disruptions caused 
by the conflict (Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, 1995: 9). With Badakhshan 
increasingly besieged, the Kyrgyz found an unlikely source of assistance: the NGOs that 
were present across the border in GBAO, Tajikistan, particularly the Aka Khan 
Development Network (AKDN). 
AKDN had been present m Tajikistan since 1992 and was instrumental in 
providing aid to famine-stricken parts of GBAO during the Tajik civil war (Herbers, 
2001: 373). In 1997, Focus Humanitarian Assistance (FOCUS), an AKDN affiliate 
specializing in emergency relief, arrived in Tajikistan. Often operating along the border, 
FOCUS' efforts drew the notice of the Kyrgyz and in 1998 Abdul Rashid appealed to 
them for assistance. FOCUS conducted a survey of both Pamirs in August-September 
1998 and began an initial food distribution of 35 kg flour per person, brought overland 
from Tajikistan, that same year. Permission to have aid delivered across the border (and 
not have it looted by Afghan soldiers), as well as an irregular bazaar along the border, 
was one benefit the Kyrgyz derived from having a positive relationship with commanders 
like Najmuddin. 
Around the same time, Abdul Rashid Khan began petitioning the government of 
the Kyrgyz Republic to "repatriate" the Afghan Kyrgyz, as described in Chapter One. 
While ultimately unsuccessful, this was the sort of initiative that required the 
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involvement of a khan, to liaise with various officials and to rally support domestically. 
In the former, Abdul Rashid was undoubtedly successful, meeting with various 
Kyrgyzstani, UN, and NGO officials, as well as hosting a UN field visit to the Pamirs in 
2000 (IRIN, 2001). However, as with all attempts at displaying leadership and thus 
staking one's reputation on a particular outcome, Abdul Rashid ran the risk that the 
Kyrgyz community would not support him, especially on such a crucial and difficult-
not to mention contentious-matter as emigrating to Kyrgyzstan. 
After a couple years of indecision and wavering enthusiasm for the idea of 
leaving the Pamirs, in 2001 Abdul Rashid informed the various officials that, at least for 
the time being, the Afghan Kyrgyz would be staying put. While in some respects his 
failure to convince the majority of the community to agree to move to Kyrgyzstan 
insulated the khan from future criticism-! would often hear him say, in response to 
some complaint, something along the lines of "If everyone had only listened to me, we 
would be in Kyrgyzstan right now"-it was also a very public humiliation for him and 
his bitterness was still palpable in 2006, when I first broached the subject. The resource 
that his failed gambit had cost him was not material; Abdul Rashid could plausibly claim 
that drawing attention to the difficulties the Kyrgyz faced had resulted in additional aid 
from various NGOs and the Kyrgyzstani government. But, as Azoy noted in a somewhat 
analogous context, "In a continuous flux of events where group institutions are weakly 
defined, the greatest resource is individual reputation ... The khan with e'tibar [personal 
credit, dependability] can never control the future completely. His reputation for political 
competence, however, suffices to make tomorrow appear somewhat more predictable" 
(2012: 32-33). A number of Kyrgyz informants cited the aborted move to Kyrgyzstan as 
the moment when the cracks in Abdul Rashid's leadership became obvious. 
CHAPTER 7- KHAN, W AKIL, AND RAIS-E SHURA: 
POST -2001 POLITICS 
Following the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban by American military forces as part 
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the international community began what was 
supposed to have been a massive effort to rebuild the Afghan state. In a 2002 speech, 
President George W. Bush described a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan, stating that 
"We're working hard in Afghanistan. We're clearing mine fields. We're rebuilding roads. 
We're improving medical care ... We'll help the Afghan people recover from the Taliban 
rule ... By helping to build an Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in 
which to live, we are working in the best traditions of George Marshall." In practice, 
however, very little in terms of resources, whether financial or military, was allocated for 
Afghanistan. Besides the military focus on targeting remnants of al Qaeda and the 
Taliban, social and political initiatives largely concentrated upon creating a "democratic" 
Afghan state. Much ofthe subsequent institution building revolved around the creation of 
a unitary, highly centralized government, formalized in the 2004 Constitution, which 
devolved little power to the provincial or district level and provided no official 
recognition of local, informal legal and political institutions. 130 
As the post-Taliban Afghan state took shape, the leaders of various Afghan 
solidarity groups, who had previously made expedient accommodations with the 
prevailing power-the PDPA or the mujahideen in the 1980s and, later, during the 1990s, 
130 A few sporadic references to "tribes" appear in Chapter One of the Constitution, but always to indicate 
the inclusivity ofthe Afghan nation-state. Article 137 of Chapter Eight ("Administration") mentions "local 
administrations" but subsequent articles make it explicit that such bodies (provincial and district councils) 
are to be elected, rather than drawn from existing local institutions. 
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with the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, or whichever local qomandan held sway-began 
reaching out to the nascent government in Kabul. Since the international community 
would be basing their development and state-building131 efforts in the capital and from 
there expand them into other regions, savvy local leaders realized that it was likely in 
their best interest, and the best interest of their constituency, to establish relations with 
the Karzai administration and various international bodies. 
Among these leaders heading to Kabul to establish themselves and to solicit aid 
were Abdul Rashid Khan and his retinue. The Kyrgyz were resourceful enough to find a 
powerful patron in Karzai's administration, Zalmai Mujaddadi, a former mujahideen 
commander from Badakhshan. Because no Kyrgyz held any formal office in the Afghan 
Interim or Transitional Authority, they were represented on these missions by the 
foremost local leader, the khan. Later, in 2005, a Kyrgyz from the Great Pamir was 
appointed to the Meshrano Jirga, the upper house of Parliament, opening up a second 
avenue to the power-brokers in Kabul and the resources they controlled. But, with an 
informal leader from the Little Pamir and a formal leader from the Great Pamir both 
vying for influence and resources, the two approaches tended to undermine rather than 
complement each other. Eventually, a third form of leadership, under the auspices of the 
National Solidarity Program, upended the situation even further by creating an additional 
means of mobilizing resources and accumulating political capital. 
131 I purposefully refrain from using the flawed tenn "nation-building," which implies the construction of 
something besides the bureaucratic apparati and institutions of a functioning state. While this is not to deny 
that such attempts were made, the more tangible contribution was the (re)creation of an Afghan state 
apparatus. 
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The Scramble for Kabul 
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Najibullah government managed to stay 
in power until April 1992, when it fell to the mujahideen. The seven major Afghan 
political parties (tanzims) failed to achieve a durable political settlement and Afghanistan 
dissolved into civil war, largely centered on the capital, Kabul. Much of the countryside 
was controlled by armed militias, many of which preyed upon the local population. The 
security vacuum in southern Afghanistan combined with the Pakistanis' desire to install a 
stable, sympathetic government, led to the rise of the Taliban in 1994 (Barfield, 2010: 
257). Comprised largely of religious students (tali ban), the movement gained ground 
quickly, taking Kandahar that same year and then Kabul in 1996, after driving out the 
tanzim leaders who had destroyed the city. The Taliban then set their sights on northern 
Afghanistan, capturing Mazar-e Sharif in 1998. Only northeastern Afghanistan remained 
out of Taliban control, defended by the Northern Alliance, a loose coalition of mostly 
non-Pashtun, anti-Taliban commanders and their soldiers. 
After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the Taliban leader, 
Mullah Mohammad Omar, was given an ultimatum: expel Osama bin Laden and al 
Qaeda or face attack. Omar chose the latter and, in less than a month after U.S. airstrikes 
began on October 7, 2001 , the Taliban abandoned Kabul. The political imperative then 
became to establish a post-Taliban government. This process was formally inaugurated in 
December 2001 at a conference in Bonn, Germany, where the framework for an Interim 
Administration was created. An Emergency Loya Jirga would follow within six months, 
establishing a Transitional Authority and, later, a Constitutional Loya Jirga, to adopt a 
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new constitution. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader, was appointed Chairman of the 
Interim Authority and was then elected president of the Transitional Authority during the 
June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga. 
Following the direct election of Karzai as president in October 2004, the Kyrgyz, 
like many other ethnic and solidarity groups 132 in Afghanistan, sought to establish direct 
relations with the government, partially in an attempt to bypass ineffective district and 
provincial officials as well as the many, sometimes predatory, commanders in 
Badakhshan, who often remained the de facto power. Provincial and district authorities 
do not control substantial resources, in part because they lack the ability to raise revenue 
locally and so are dependent upon the national government for their budgets. 
Accordingly, local leaders realized that their parochial interests would be best served by 
direct appeal to the powers in Kabul. For the Kyrgyz, they had the example of Hajji 
Rahman Kul prior to 1978 to guide them: 
... for the most part the Kirghiz have dealt directly with Kabul rather than 
going through the administrative channels ... The cordial nature of the 
Kirghiz relationship with the central authorities in Kabul.. .has further 
enhanced Kirghiz local interests. In other words, the khan's personal 
acquaintance with some of the high officials in Kabul has at times enabled 
him to exercise some influence over the provincial and local authorities 
(Shahrani, 2002: 208-21 0). 
The first Kyrgyz mission visited Kabul in 2003 and they returned again in the fall 
of 2004, but both trips were only marginally successfully and neither one succeeded in 
securing a meeting with Karzai. In February 2005, after waiting at a government 
guesthouse for several months, they were finally able to get an audience with the 
132 These groups, constituted by some form of shared identity (descent, ethnicity, residence, occupation), 
are called qaum in Dari. For more on this concept in post-Taliban Afghanistan, see Coburn (2011 : 25-31). 
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president. This fust meeting, occurring on the grounds of Karzai's palace, the Arg-e 
Shahi, where various local leaders and supplicants were offered an irregular, informal 
audience with the president, was witnessed by Jon Lee Anderson, a journalist writing for 
The New Yorker: 
Karzai noticed a Mongol-looking elderly man who had stood up, 
and urged him forward. The man had been sitting quietly with several 
companions, all of them wearing high tasseled fur hats and long black 
leather boots with their trousers tucked in, Cossack style. 
The old man introduced himself as Abdul Rashid, the khan of the 
Small Pamir ... He said that he and his companions had waited three 
months to see Karzai, and it had taken them four weeks to reach the 
capital from their village; they had made much of the journey on foot. 
"There are no roads where I live," the khan explained. "I am 
thinking that the Mghan government has forgotten us." There were no 
schools or hospitals, or policeman to guard the frontier against smugglers 
or terrorists. After several years of drought, his people had little food. He 
was ashamed to say it, but they were also afflicted by opium addiction, 
and needed clinics. 
Karzai interrupted him. "Don't worry. I am going to arrange 
food-I will send you back with food on helicopters," he said. "You will 
not go home without a solution to your problems. We will arrange what 
documentation is needed for the clinics, and we will get you your food" 
(2005: 66). 
The presence of the Kyrgyz at the Arg that day was possible mainly thanks to the 
assistance of Alhaj Fazal Azim Zalmai Mujaddadi133 (aka Zalmai Khan), an influential 
figure from Jurm, Badakhshan, a district capital 60 km southeast of Faizabad and lying 
along the route leading south from Badakhshan toward Kabul. His father had been a 
member of parliament in the 1970s and had known Hajji Rahman Kul, who visited en 
route to and from his annual trip to the capital. Born in 1958, Zalmai Khan spent his 
childhood in Jurm and then attended Kabul University, graduating in 1980. Soon 
133 The Mujaddadis are members of the Naqshbandiyya, a prominent Sufi lineage in Afghanistan. Another 
important Afghan Sufi order (tariqat) is the Qaddiriyya, whose hereditary leaders come from the Gailani 
lineage. 
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afterwards, he was arrested by the Karmal regime for political activity and upon release 
he fled to Peshawar, Pakistan to join Jamiat-e Is/ami, led by his fellow Badakhshi, 
Burhanuddin Rabbani. Mujaddadi fought against the Soviets in Badakhshan as a minor 
commander in Ahmad Shah Massoud' s Shura-ye Nazar (Jamiat's military wing), and 
then worked in the security sector for Rabbani's government in Kabul during the early 
1990s. He spent three weeks living with the Kyrgyz during this period, which allowed 
him to better understand the challenges facing them: 
It was August and even then it was really cold ... The Pamiris [Kyrgyz] live 
really remote from one another-families are two and three kilometers 
apart. I asked why the population was so small and not increasing, and 
they told me it was because eighty percent of their babies died before 
tasting their mother's milk. They have no doctors to guide them, no health 
care (quoted in Anderson, 2005: 70). 
After the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, Zalmai Khan joined the Northern 
Alliance, an umbrella group of a number of factions opposed to the Taliban, and was 
based in Badakhshan. As part of what has been called his "mobile political history" (Pain, 
2010: 11 ), during this period Zalmai Khan initially supported Massoud and his Shura-ye 
Nazar but then switched his allegiance to Rabbani. Although still part of the same 
political party, Jamiat-e Is/ami, this move put him at odds with a number of his former 
Shura-ye Nazar colleagues, including Najmuddin Wasiq. During the internecine 
"commanders ' wars" there in the mid-to-late-1990s (Foschini, 2010), the two vied for 
control of eastern Badakhshan, including Mujaddadi's home district of Jurm, which 
Wasiq controlled. Their forces fought a number of battles between 1997 and 1998 which 
resulted in Zalmai Khan being forced to flee to Tajikistan. After Najmuddin was killed in 
November 1999, Mujaddadi returned from exile and many locals suspect that he was 
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involved in Najmuddin's murder, but Zalmai Khan was never formally accused of any 
wrongdoing. 
After the overthrow of the Tali ban, Zalmai Khan threw his support behind Hamid 
Karzai and was appointed the National Directorate for Security (NDS) chief for the 1Oth 
district of Kabul, a high-profile posting that included the diplomatic quarter of Wazir 
Akbar Khan and the wealthiest parts of Kabul. He was also responsible for presidential 
security during the Interim and Transitional Administrations, and became a close 
confidant and trusted lieutenant of Karzai. 
The Kyrgyz remembered Zalmai Khan and sought him out upon hearing that he 
had joined Karzai's government, in the hope that he would broker an introduction to the 
president and assist them in lobbying for Kyrgyz interests in Kabul. In the transactional 
world of Mghan politics, it was an obvious move, since Mujaddadi's position in Kabul 
and his closeness to the president, in addition to his familiarity with the Kyrgyz, made 
him an ideal patron; as Anderson (2005: 70) noted, "The Pamiris [Kyrgyz] seemed to 
have tapped some dormant sense of feudal responsibility in him. ('They look to me,' he 
[Zalmai Khan] said.)" 
Even before the February 2005 meeting with Karzai, the Kyrgyz had been 
soliciting aid through Zalmai Khan: "During the interim administration [December 22, 
2001 to July 13, 2003], President Karzai had given orders regarding the Pamiris [Kyrgyz] 
to several of his ministers, 'but they didn't take him seriously,' Zalmay Khan said" (ibid). 
A few weeks after the 2005 meeting witnessed by Anderson, the Kyrgyz decamped from 
Kabul, apparently with little to show for it: 
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Because Karzai is distracted by a host of issues, it is hard for him to keep 
smaller promises, too. They day before I left Mghanistan [spring 2005], I 
went to see the Pamiris [Kyrgyz] again. Their mood was ebullient. On 
their first visit to the Health Ministry, they had practically been laughed 
out of the building, but now they had once more been promised their 
clinics. And the rural development minister [Mohammad Hanif Atmar] 
had told them that, while there wasn't much chance of a helicopter, he was 
organizing trucks with food and blankets for three hundred families, and 
some shoes. When I called for an update last week [May 2005], however, 
not much more had happened. Zalmay Khan was out of the country, and 
his assistant reported that, as far as he knew, the Pamiris had returned to 
the Wakhan Corridor empty-handed (Anderson, 2005: 73). 
When I first met him a year later, in June 2006, Abdul Rashid informed me that 
aid had actually been provided in the end, but the trucks carrying it had broken down in 
Khandud and the Kyrgyz were having difficulty getting the "supplies to the trailheads at 
Gaz Khan and Sarhad. Other informants claimed that anywhere between three and eleven 
truckloads of supplies, consisting of clothes, food, medicine and other items, had in fact 
arrived-either driven directly into the Pamirs via Tajikistan or brought up using pack 
animals from Sarhad and Gaz Khan, depending on the version of the story. The profusion 
of medical supplies and UNHCR tarps that I saw in 2006 suggested that some sort of aid 
had indeed been received. 
Regardless of the particulars of the story, it is clear that the relative success of this 
mission-the Kyrgyz met Karzai, were granted audiences with and received promises of 
assistance from various ministers, and eventually were given an indeterminate but 
considerable amount of aid-set the stage for future endeavors. It also made clear that 
since the locus of power was in Kabul, the road to success for any politically ambitious 
Kyrgyz lay outside of the Pamirs and was largely dependent upon access to the central 
government. The major gate-keeper in this regard was Zalmai Khan and a relationship 
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with him became de rigueur for anyone looking to accrue political capital by acting as 
middleman between Kabul and the Pamirs. 
During the missions to Kabul, the Kyrgyz were represented by Abdul Rashid 
Khan and despite the political separateness of the Great and Little Pamirs, they presented 
a unified front. The Kyrgyz understood that a cacophony of voices was unlikely to be 
effective in extracting aid; better to work collectively and then argue amongst themselves 
over the division of the spoils. Abdul Rashid, by virtue of being khan and possessing the 
requisite gravitas, as well as the personal connections with Afghan Border Police (ABP) 
commander for Badakhshan, Mir Abdul Wahid (aka Wahid Khan), Zalmai Mujaddadi, 
and, now, President Karzai, continued to act as the Kyrgyz's external representative. This 
approach did not address the fundamental contradiction of his position, that his 
representation of the entire Kyrgyz community as its political leader was mainly an 
expedient, one with little basis in fact, and that, to paraphrase an old Afghan proverb, 
while Abdul Rashid could rent the support of all the Kyrgyz, he could never own it. The 
tacit agreement between the various Kyrgyz factions did at least initially temper any 
competition between the two Pamirs and ensured that they were not working at cross 
purposes. 
The "Style and Substance" of the Khan 
A key aspect of a Kyrgyz khan's leadership consists in looking and acting the 
part, whether in the Pamirs or at the Arg in Kabul. In the case of Abdul Rashid, a 
significant portion of his gravitas, of being sangeen-somber and dignified--came from 
careful image management. The considerable attention paid to Abdul Rashid's public 
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appearances in the Pamirs, whether receiving guests in the mezmankana or while visiting 
other Kyrgyz encampments, stemmed from the understanding that to be recognized as 
khan, one also had to embody the qualities of a khan. Most of these involve personal 
attributes: " ... bravery (military prowess), honesty, abilities in public persuasion and 
oratory, sound and impartial judgment, religious observance ... hospitality, generosity, and 
the offer to help one's relatives and to the needy and the poor, stand out as proof of 
religiosity" (Shahrani, 1986: 264). They also include more structural factors, such as 
"membership in a large oruq [uruu], and success as a herder, with a large flock and 
wealth in other tangible goods" (Shahrani, 2002: 164). 
Crucial for Abdul Rashid's image management was Niaz Ali, his Wakhi 
secretary, who was often the first person to greet any guests, traders, or supplicants 
visiting the khan. After the ritual obligations of hospitality were satisfied, he would 
inquire about the visitors' purpose and then discreetly slip away to brief the khan, who 
would decide whether to grant his guests an audience or not. In most cases, Niaz Ali 
would return and, holding up the reed-and-felt mat that served as a door to the guest yurt, 
announce, "Khan aamad!" Everyone would stand as Abdul Rashid shuffled to the tor, the 
place of honor directly across from the door, where Niaz Ali would help him sit. After 
several minutes of greetings and salutations, the khan, with Niaz Ali at his side, would 
begin to make more pointed inquiries. If his interlocutors were other Kyrgyz, the 
conversation, in Kyrgyz, usually had a more relaxed feel but if they were Badakhshi 
traders, Afghan Border Police, government officials, or unfamiliar guests, there was often 
a subtle tension. As anthropologist David Edwards notes: 
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... the provision of hospitality is a way of managing social relations in an 
uncertain environment that is largely devoid of local government 
institutions (most importantly, police) and- at the village level at least-
institutions such as restaurants and hotels which can accommodate the 
potentially disruptive presence of outsiders in a small, face-to-face 
community setting. The place where hospitality is traditionally offered is 
the guesthouse (hujra or memankhana), which is the place where 'the 
stranger' becomes 'the guest,' and this transition brings with it 
opportunities and obligations on the part of both host and guest. 
Significantly, in becoming a guest, actual differences of wealth and power 
are re-imagined in relation to the immediate context of the guesthouse in 
which the host nominally controls the relationship (even if that control is 
offset by the social obligations he must fulfill as host) (2010: 7). 
In the case of Badakhshi or Pashtun guests, the lingua franca was typically Dari and Niaz 
Ali would explicate anything that the khan didn't seem to grasp. 134 In these 
conversations, Niaz Ali was much more likely to speak, either for the khan or with him in 
support of some point. 
If any documents had to be drawn up, letters written, or records made, Niaz Ali 
would produce a binder containing loose sheets of paper, pens, various administrative 
correspondence, and the khan's stamp. He'd take dictation from Abdul Rashid (in Dari), 
make minor suggestions, and, when done, reread the document. Once satisfied, the khan 
would nod and Niaz Ali, with a fair amount of ceremony, would prepare the block stamp 
and ink pad. The stamp, procured in Kabul, had the symbol of a Marco Polo sheep's 
head, the Persian year, and Abdul Rashid's title: "Khan Abdul Rashid, riyaasati-e 
qabayil-e pamiraat-e Afghanistan" ("Khan Abdul Rashid, Directorate of the Tribes of the 
Pamirs of Mghanistan"). For official correspondence going to a government official, 
Abdul Rashid and Niaz Ali would also use the khan's letterhead, which, similar to his 
134 Abdul Rashid, like all Kyrgyz men in the Little Pamir, was equally conversant in Dari and Wakhi but 
was most comfortable speaking Kyrgyz. 
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seal, read "Khan Abdul Rashid, khan-e qabayil riyaasat-e pamiraat-e Afghanistan" 
("Khan Abdul Rashid, Khan of the Tribes, Directorate of the Pamirs of Mghanistan") 
(Figure 27). 
Figure 27. Abdul Rashid Khan's letterhead (top) and seal (bottom). 
The Persian year listed on the seal is 1386, corresponding to 2007-08. 
Niaz Ali would then stamp the letter, place it in an envelope, and put another 
stamp over the seal. Because hand-delivery was the only means of getting various 
missives to their recipients, the envelope was entrusted to whoever was headed out of the 
Pamir, with instructions where and to whom it should be delivered. I would commonly 
leave the Pamir carrying a number ofletters addressed to Wahid Khan, Zalmai Khan, Aly 
Mawji (the Aga Khan's ambassador to Mghanistan), and the U.S. ambassador (asking 
him to build a road for the Kyrgyz). 
One of the most notable things about Abdul Rashid's seal and letterhead was its 
conspicuous use of the plural form of Pamir-pamiraat-implying that he was khan of 
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both the Little and Great Pamirs. While in a sense true, since there was no one else 
claiming to be khan in the Great Pamir, it ignored the fact that practically speaking he 
had no authority over any of the Great Pamir Kyrgyz. The khan's seal was a succinct 
example of the useful fiction maintained by the Kyrgyz, or at least the khan, to give the 
impression that their external representative spoke for the entire community, rather than 
just a portion of it. Coburn observed a similar dynamic at work among a community of 
potters, living north of Kabul, and their representative, Malik Abdul Hamid: "As the 
potters' main voice with the district governor and other outsiders, the Malik had a serious 
incentive to preserve group unity. Since his power came from the group, he was only as 
powerful as he could make the group appear" (20 11: 77). 
Maintaining Abdul Rashid's image as a steadfast and effective leader grew more 
difficult over time, as his health continued to deteriorate due to a combination of diabetes, 
coronary heart disease, and other ailments. For much of the winter (2007-08) I spent in 
his camp, Abdul Rashid was frequently indisposed and unable to meet with visitors, 
which left his sons and Niaz Ali responsible for most routine administrative matters. 
Fortunately, there are few non-Kyrgyz guests during the winter and by the summer of 
2008 Abdul Rashid had recovered enough to meet the social obligations of his position, 
though ever-more reliant upon Niaz Ali. 
The Ascension of Hajji Turdi Akhun 
Afghanistan's bicameral National Assembly consists of a lower (the Wolesi Jirga 
or "Council of the People") and an upper (the Meshrano Jirga or "Council of Elders") 
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house. 135 The Afghan Senate has 102 seats and there are no direct popular elections for 
these positions; 34 seats are filled by one member elected from each Provincial 
Council136 for a term of four years; 34 seats are (in theory) filled by one member elected 
from each district council, 137 for a term of three years; and 34 senators are appointed 
directly by the president, for a term of five years. Article 84 of the Constitution grants the 
president considerable latitude in these appointments, stating only that the presidential 
appointees must be chosen "from among experts and experienced persons."138 
Additionally, the appointed seats must be equally apportioned to men and women (17 of 
each), two appointees must be handicapped (literally, have a "physical defect") and two 
must be representatives of the kuchis, Afghan nomads, most of whom are Pashtun. The 
end result is that each province will have a minimum of two representatives in the Senate, 
and possibly more. 139 
Concurrent with the September 18, 2005 parliamentary elections, Karzai had to 
fill his appointments to the Meshrano Jirga. Zalmai Khan, who himself had just been 
elected to the Wolesi Jirga, claims credit for coming up with the idea of having Karzai 
135 The upper house is the Senate and the lower house is the House of Representatives, and members of 
each are considered senators and representatives, respectively. Generically, they are also called members of 
Parliament-MPs-or members of the National Assembly-MNA. The local referent, wakil, simply means 
"representative." 
136 Each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces elects a Provincial Council with between 9 and 29 members, 
depending on the population size of the province. 
137 Because District Council elections still have not occurred, owing to ongoing disputes over district 
boundaries, these 34 seats are allocated to another member elected from each Provincial Council. So, in 
total, two members from each Provincial Council serve in the Meshrano Jirga. 
138 Article 85 of the Constitution sets additional conditions for candidates to the Meshrano Jirga concerning 
citizenship (must have been an Afghan citizen for at least 10 years), legal record (cannot have been 
convicted for crimes against humanity), and minimwn age (35). 
139 Even though there are 34 appointed seats, it is not stipulated in the Constitution that each ofthese should 
go to one representative from each province; often, politically important provinces will have multiple 
appointed senators, leaving other provinces with no representatives to the Meshrano Jirga besides the two 
elected representatives. This dynamic became more pronounced after the 2010 elections, which I discuss in 
the Epilogue. 
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appoint a Kyrgyz to the Senate. He suggested it to Karzai, saying that it would be good 
for the Kyrgyz to have a representative in national government, especially in light of the 
many difficulties they face living in the Pamirs. Karzai agreed and asked Zalmai to fmd a 
suitable candidate. The Kyrgyz appointee would be one of Karzai's general 
appointments, not one of the two nomad (kuchi) 140 or handicapped appointees. 
Even though it was ultimately Karzai's appointment to make, he was willing to 
delegate deciding who among the Kyrgyz would be nominated to the Meshrano Jirga to 
Zalmai Khan. Karzai' s practice of appeasing loyalists like Zalmai Khan by nominating 
their candidates, though legal, has not been without its critics, including the former head 
of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Nader Nadery: 
Through their influence at the Palace, a small group of wartime leaders are 
utilizing government appointments to expand their own network rather 
than serve the public interest. There is little risk of exposure or 
accountability and a high return. Those who are being formally appointed 
by the President (but actually at the behest of unaccountable and 
influential patrons) feel less loyalty to their official boss than to those who 
nominated them. The public understands that public office is being used to 
dole out favors to the informal leaders. Ultimately, public trust in the 
government is severely undermined (2012). 
Zalmai Khan initially offered the position to Abdul Rashid, who declined it, citing 
poor health and little desire to be away from the Pamirs as often as he would have been 
required to be, had he accepted the position. It is also quite likely that his failing health 
was also a concern, especially given the frequent, arduous journeys in and out of the 
Little Pamir that he would have faced as a senator. Zalmai Khan then thought of Hajji 
140 "Kuchi," from the Persian verb kuch (to move, migrate), has an ethnic referent (Pashtun) and so is 
generally not used for non-Pashtun pastoral nomads. However, I did hear other Afghans refer to the Kyrgyz 
as kuchis on occasion and once, on the road to Faizabad when we were passing a number ofPashtun kuchis 
headed to highland pastures, one of my Kyrgyz companions leaned out the car and began asking questions 
of the herders, explaining, "I am a nomad, too" ("Ma haam kuchi astam" ). 
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Turdi Akhun, one of the wealthiest men in the Great Pamir, who had been part of 
previous Kyrgyz delegations to Kabul and whom Mujaddadi had known for several 
years. Mujaddadi claims that he put the idea of Akhun as appointee to the Kyrgyz, who 
concurred that he was of "good character" and suited for the job.141 Also influencing 
Mujaddadi's choice was Akhun's relative youth (he was 41 years old in 2005) and his 
residence in the more proximate Great Pamir, both of which meant that he would be more 
willing and able to make the frequent trips to Kabul that the position would require. 
Mujaddadi sent word up to the Pamir for Hajji Turdi Akhun to come down to Kabul. 
Once there, he was offered the position, which he accepted, and in 2005 he was appointed 
to the Meshrano Jirga, giving him a term that would last until Jadi 1389 (December 
2010), when he would be up for re-appointment. 
There seems to have been a surprising amount of intrigue surrounding this Senate 
appointment, especially given the apparently straightforward explanation of why Abdul 
Rashid was not the appointee. True, Akhun was not a necessarily obvious choice-he 
was fairly young and had not demonstrated much political ambition previously. Prior to 
his appointment, Akhun had not even been aware that such a position even existed. As he 
told me, "I did not know about the Senate but I knew Mr. Zalmai Khan. He introduced 
me to Karzai Sahib as a delegate of the Kyrgyz people." 
The alternative explanation for why Akhun was appointed and not Abdul Rashid 
is that Akhun bribed Zalmai Khan to recommend him to Karzai. The payoff is rumored to 
have been 100 sheep and 35 yak. No one could explain why Mujaddadi, with apparently 
14 1 In an earlier interview, Mujaddadi offered a somewhat different narrative, in which a visiting Kyrgyz 
delegation in Kabul put Hajji Turdi Akhun forward as a candidate after Abdul Rashid declined the position. 
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ample wealth, 142 would be willing to trade his influence for such a paltry sum, paid in 
illiquid assets. Akhun readily acknowledged having amanat animals from Zalmai Khan 
but denied that these livestock were paid to Mujaddadi as a bribe for his Senate seat. 
Here again, Karzai's reasons for supporting the Kyrgyz are oblique but according 
to Zalmai Khan, Karzai is genuinely concerned about their welfare. It is also probable 
that, as mentioned previously, a Kyrgyz appointee offered a non-objectionable, ethnically 
neutral way of showcasing the initial "big tent" approach to governing that Karzai wants 
to project to both domestic and international audiences. Besides, in theory a Kyrgyz wakil 
would not be tied to any ethnic faction and so would presumably remain fairly loyal to 
Karzai, especially if he had any hope of being re-appointed in 2010. Indeed, Akhun 
proved a steadfast supporter of Karzai in the 2009 election, although whatever electoral 
support he was able to muster among the Kyrgyz was basically moot, as few (if any) 
Kyrgyz went down to vote in Wakhan. 143 
Born in 1964, Hajji Turdi Akhun comes from a modest background: his father, 
Atabek, was prosperous but not rich, although he did own good grazing lands (Akhun's 
142 Like many Afghan politicians, the actual sources of Zalmai Khan's wealth are unclear. He is said to 
have appropriated a lapis lazuli mine in Badakhshan (Giustozzi and Orsini, 2009: 12) but the majority of 
his wealth is rumored to come from drug trafficking. Mujaddadi himself has never been formally accused 
but his nephew was arrested with 26 kg of heroin in his car (Clark, 201 0). Suspicions of drug trafficking 
based on the arrest of close relatives seem normal for politicians from Badakhshan; even Fawzia Koofi, a 
popular female politician who intends to run for president in 2014, has been implicated by association after 
her brother, HedayatuUah, was caught with 52.7 kg of opium in 2011 (Tanha, 2011 ). 
143 One reason why both Mujaddadi and Karzai might have courted the Kyrgyz for electoral reasons has to 
do with Afghanistan's single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system which, when combined with with a 
weak and diffuse political party structure, tends to result in numerous candidates running in a given 
election, many of whom will win by relatively small margins. As noted by the International Crisis Group, 
using the SNTV system for Afghanistan's Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council elections, in which many 
candidates run for a number of seats, will produce "real distortions .. .in multi-seat constituencies. If a large 
proportion of the citizenry votes for one candidate, many ballots will in effect be wasted. This large group 
will elect a single representative, while much smaller numbers of voters will also manage to 
disproportionately elect favoured candidates. SNTV is particularly unsuited to a country in which political 
parties lack capacity and discipline" (2005: 10). 
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grandfather, Kurbanbek, had been an influential akym or regional representative}. He is 
Naiman, one of the smaller clans in the Afghan Pamirs, and his ancestors originally came 
to Afghanistan from the Alai region of southern Kyrgyzstan, by way of the Alichur Pamir 
in Tajikistan. He is married but, like many wealthy Kyrgyz men, is also a widower and 
serial monogamist, his two previous wives having died. Akhun has eight sons and one 
daughter; five of his children are married. 
As wakil, he would go to Kabul in the fall and again in the late spring or early 
summer, for the bi-annual four-and-a-half month National Assembly sessions. Akhun 
was somewhat notorious for his frequent absences from the Senate when it was in 
session. He preferred to remain in the Great Pamir, where he spent the winter and the 
latter part of the summer. His second-eldest son, Ziauddin, who is well educated and very 
intelligent, accompanied his father to Kabul and acted as his munshi (secretary). 
Ziauddin, like a number of younger, ambitious, wealthy Kyrgyz, differs from his father in 
that he finds life in the Pamir "boring," especially during winter, and prefers the greater 
stimulation offered by Ishkashim, Faizabad, and Kabul. 
Hajji Turdi Akhun's position as wakil was a point of considerable pride for most 
Great Pamir Kyrgyz, especially since it went to one of their own and not someone from 
the Little Pamir. It marked the greatest extent ever of Kyrgyz participation in formal 
Afghan politics, at any level-national, provincial or district. Akhun's position also 
bestowed considerable status upon him as the sole Kyrgyz representative in government 
and one of only three senators from Badakhshan. Some Little Pamir Kyrgyz were 
occasionally derisive concerning the wakil, though, noting that Akhun was appointed 
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(entesabhi), not elected (properly muntakhab, though often called entekhabi by the 
Kyrgyz), to office. 
According to many Kyrgyz in the Great Pamir, Akhun's position as wakil was the 
functional equivalent of being khan, but Akhun himself appeared to have done very little 
to leverage his influence in Kabul in an effort to increase his domestic authority within 
the Great Pamir. While greatly respected, in large measure for being the wealthiest man 
in the Great Pamir and possessing many of the other customary requisites of a khan, he 
showed little interest in the domestic responsibilities that would come with being a khan, 
·· including mediating disputes, hosting distinguished visitors (of which there are few in the 
Great Pamir), and providing assistance to various petitioners. Overall, Hajji Turdi Akhun 
seemed much more interested in deriving wealth than influence from his position and 
claimed that if he were not reappointed to the Meshrano Jirga in 2010, he would happily 
retire from politics and return full-time to livestock husbandry: "If I am not reappointed, I 
will return to the Pamir and continue life as a malchy [herdsman]. I don't have any other 
political aspirations." 
The Competition between Khan and Wakil 
Much of rivalry between Abdul Rashid and Hajji Turdi Akhun centered on access 
to government officials, as these figures control resources important in the context of 
Kyrgyz patronage politics, including their ability to act as intermediaries between the 
Kyrgyz and other, even more influential power brokers to whom the Kyrgyz would not 
otherwise have direct access. An open line to influential government officials also offers 
Kyrgyz leaders a key source of symbolic capital. Because the trappings of informal 
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positions such as the khanship are really status markers, access to government resources, 
such as vehicles and official permission to transit Tajikistan, are important source of 
political capital beyond just the convenience they offer. For example, Abdul Rashid only 
ever rode down to Sarhad on horseback after exhausting every opportunity to have the 
Mghan government transport him by car through Tajikistan. 
In Wakhan district, the main figure whose attention was sought in this contest was 
Mir Abdul Wahid Khan, the ABP commander for eastern Badakhshan. Wahid Khan's 
trajectory was similar to that of Zalmai Khan: he began as a minor Tajik sub-commander 
in Badakhshan with Shura-ye Nazar during the late 1980s. After Najmuddin Wasiq, 
Wahid Khan's superior, was killed in 1999, he remained loyal to Najmuddin's successor, 
Sardar Khan (another Tajik Shura-ye Nazar commander who was also close to Ahmad 
Shah Massoud). However, after Zalmai Khan started to amass influence in Kabul 
working for Karzai, Wahid Khan switched his allegiance to Zalmai Khan (who was a 
bitter rival of Sardar Khan) and quickly achieved considerable influence throughout 
Badakhshan, reportedly by gaining control over many of the lucrative heroin processing 
labs and smuggling routes into Tajikistan, including the border crossing at Ishkashim. 144 
Wahid Khan is important to the Kyrgyz locally, in no small part because as ABP 
commander he has excellent cross-border relationships with his Tajikistani counterparts 
and can easily get permission to move people and supplies across the border and into 
either Pamir. But in terms of access to patrimonial resources, Zalmai Khan is of much 
greater importance to the Kyrgyz since besides acting as gatekeeper to Karzai, he wields 
144 For a detailed description of the drug trade at the Ishkashim border, see the articles by Ibrahimi, 
"Northern Afghanistan: The Enemy Within" (2007) and "Turning Afghan Heroin into Kalashnikovs" 
(2008). 
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considerable influence over the distribution of state resources within Badakhshan. This 
became especially true after he was elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2005, with 14,145 votes 
( 6.1% of the total), coming in second after his rival, Burhanuddin Rabbani (who received 
26,422 votes or 11.4% of the total). 145 Once seated in Parliament; Zalmai Khan became a 
member of a number of important commissions, including "Chief of Internal Security 
Commission" and "Chairman of Commission for Internal Affairs, National Security, 
Strengthening of Borders and Local Administration." 
Abdul Rashid was haunted by the presumably greater influence Akhun exerted 
over Zalmai Khan by virtue of being in Kabul more frequently. His concern, shared by 
other Little Pamir Kyrgyz, was that Akhun would try to steer government assistance 
towards the Great Pamir at the expense of the Little Pamir. This sort of zero-sum thinking 
is fairly typical of the Kyrgyz, who tend not to understand the mechanisms by which aid 
is allocated and distributed but assume that quantities are finite and thus one Pamir' s gain 
is the other Pamir' s loss. Often the resulting competition turns petty and devolves into ad 
ho_minem accusations of favoritism and deceit. For example, one contretemps that played 
out over 2007-08 involved the question of which Kyrgyz were going to be assigned paid 
administrative positions associated with the schools (canvas tents, really) and teachers 
that the Afghan government was planning to establish in the Little Parnir. In a 2007 letter 
written to Zalmai Khan, Abdul Rashid bemoaned the decision not to appoint Niaz Ali 
supervisor of the project, in which he believed Akhun had a hand: 
145 The seats in the Wolesi Jirga are apportioned by population; Badakhshan has nine seats. See Fn. 143 
about how Afghanistan's SNTV system tends to result in candidates for multi-seat constituencies winning 
by narrow margins, as iiiustrated by both Mujaddadi and Rabbani's electoral figures. 
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... And regarding Mirza Ali, whose name is Niaz Ali, you had promised to 
appoint him as a supervisor but you accepted as trustworthy the word of 
Hajji Turdi Akhun and those Kyrgyz who pretend to be the elders of the 
Parnir. We and the people do not have security and are very unhappy. If 
some people allege that Niaz Ali has harmed others, they must say it in 
front of you. Otherwise, they will be playing political games with us. 
The importance of maintaining the fa<;ade of unity in their attempts to attract 
development resources had been one of the main forces checking intra-Pamir political 
tensions and rivalries. But increasingly, as the above letter demonstrates, the competition 
between the two Pamirs made the Kyrgyz more willing to publicly air their internal 
disputes over leadership, most often concerning the khan' s actual authority. These 
disputes occured on two levels: within the Little Pamir, and between the Great and Little 
Pamir. The disputes within the Little Pamir tended to reflect the political balkanization of 
this small community, often along clan and sub-clan lines but based primarily upon 
certain objectionable actions on the part of Abdul Rashid Khan (and, by association, Niaz 
Ali, who was believed to have a Rasputin-like influence over the khan) rather than any 
sort of inherent inter-clan (or sub-clan) antipathies. The origins of much of this dissent 
can be traced back to the late 1990s, when the Little Pamir community fractured into two 
blocs concerning the decision whether to emigrate to Kyrgyzstan. The bloc that favored 
emigration, led by Abdul Rashid, was concentrated along the northeastern part of 
Chakmaktyn Kol, an area called Minara, and many belong to the Teiit sub-clans (Shaiym, 
Buka, Diirbowel, Tekreng, Barky, and Seiit Mat) that constituted the khan's main base of 
domestic support. 
The opposing bloc, the ones who ultimately scuttled the idea of emigrating, was 
led by Hajji Osman, the son of a former khan (Mamat Kerim) and agnate of two others 
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(Sartbai, his great-uncle, or father's father's elder brother, and Toktosun, his paternal 
grand-father). Hajji Osman had been allied with Abdul Rashid during their time in 
Pakistan and he was influential in convincing the first group of Kyrgyz to return to the 
Little Pamir in 1978. While there was friction between the two of them during the Soviet 
occupation, it was only in the late 1990s that genuine enmity broke out, resulting from 
Hajji Osman's willingness to openly challenge Abdul Rashid's leadership on a host of 
issues, including leaving for Kyrgyzstan. Osman's main supporters are the Kyrgyz living 
southwest of the lake, most ofwhom spend the winter in the Wakhjir valley. Members of 
this faction predominately belong to a few Teiit sub-clans (Alapa, Wotiinchii, and Kara 
Teiit) as well as the Kypchak and some members ofthe Kesek clans. 146 
There is also a third Kyrgyz faction, living in the most northeastern inhabited part 
of the Little Pamir, who had become mqre stridently opposed to Abdul Rashid's 
leadership only since 2001. This group, consisting of one Teiit sub-clan (Nooruz) and the 
Naiman clan, was opportunistically aligned with Hajji Osman's Wakhjir faction on 
occasion but most of their disagreements with Abdul Rashid did not stem from the 
acrimonious debate over whether to move to Kyrgyzstan but rather concerned more local, 
parochial matters. Unlike Hajji Osman, none of the influential aksakals and bars of this 
group seemed interested in usurping the khan's authority (or the khanship itself). While 
they would have preferred to see someone else become khan, they were less ardent 
supports of Hajji Osman than was his own Wakhjir faction and were generally non-
146 The Kesek, as a chong uruu, did not wholly support any one group and the various Kesek sub-clans 
were either split amongst the different factions or remained neutral. The same was true for a few Teiit sub-
clans but most notably the Kyzyl Bash, to which Apendibai and Islamuddin belong. While they have 
exchanged a number of women with the Shaiym, especially Abdul Rashid's alyl, they live in proximity to 
Hajji Osman and thus had practical reasons to remain unaligned. 
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partisan. Instead, they grew disgruntled with Abdul Rashid's leadership, believing that it 
had become largely self-serving and ineffective. They particularly loathed Niaz Ali, in 
part for ethno-sectarian reasons but mostly owing to his supposedly malign influence 
upon Abdul Rashid. They were also opposed to any of Abdul Rashid's five adult sons 
having any political influence and were not alone in viewing them as lazy, debauched, 
manipulative, and generally unfit for leadership; this view is certainly shared by Hajji 
Osman and his faction as well as by a number of Abdul Rashid's staunchest allies. 
The Great Pamir Kyrgyz were not actively involved in the domestic politics of the 
Little Pamir aside from having had, on the whole, closer and better relations with Hajji 
Osman and his group, and expressing a preference for his leadership over that of Abdul 
Rashid. It would be an overstatement to say that they supported a particular faction over 
another. Mostly, the travails of Abdul Rashid and the fractious politics of the Little Pamir 
provided ample fodder for conversation-the Kyrgyz, like other Afghans, delight in 
political gossip. Because the Kyrgyz travel infrequently between the two Pamirs, at most 
visiting annually and often much less, it is mainly the tijor who pass news and rumor 
back and forth. The Wakhi were similarly aware of the strained relations within and 
between the two Kyrgyz communities but resisted getting involved, as it was in their 
interest to maintain a good working relationship with all of the various factions. If 
anything, they preferred Abdul Rashid, who lived further from the former Kyrgyz 
pastures that the Wakhi now occupied, which they believe explains why he never 
demonstrated much interest in pressing Kyrgyz claims to these areas. 
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The contest for a road best illustrates the tensions that existed between the leaders 
of the Great and Little Pamirs for development aid. The construction of a road connecting 
to the Wakhan is, in the minds of the Kyrgyz, the sine qua non of their future in the 
Pamirs. Almost without exception, a road tops the list of their development priorities and 
the lack of one is most commonly cited to explain all of their other difficulties. Their 
second priority is the establishment of some system of health care, preferably a 
permanent clinic in the Pamirs. Finally, the third priority is remedying the absence of 
schools or teachers (aside from a few literate mullahs147 who teach the Qur'an). The 
rationale for ranking schools behind health clinics was starkly summarized for me by one 
Kyrgyz elder: "If fifty percent of children die before age five, who is there to educate?" 
No Kyrgyz will countenance the idea that a road from the Wakhan to either Pamir 
is, at best, an unlikely and distant prospect, given that it would be incredibly expensive to 
build and almost impossible to maintain, especially along the narrow gorge leading to the 
Little Pamir, where the existing track is barely passable for horses. They are realistic 
enough to realize that, if a road were constructed, it would only connect one Pamir to the 
Wakhan, at least initially. The problem with a ring road servicing both Pamirs is that the 
only suitable terrain between the two Pamirs for constructing such a road lies in 
Tajikistan, which would require any travelers to transit Tajik territory. This inconvenient 
147 "Mullah" is an honorific bestowed upon the handful of Kyrgyz men who are literate in Dari and 
classical (Quranic) Arabic, although they lack any formal religious trailling. The ritual responsibilities of 
Kyrgyz mullahs include giving the azan (the call to prayer), leading prayers, providing children (often girls 
as well as boys) with religious and secular instruction, and performing funerary rites (du 'a). Mullahs are 
also called upon to expel malicious spirits (jinn) by reading certain suras from the Qur'an, provided that the 
jinn are of Islamic origin. Non-Islamic jinn are exorcised using other means, typically performed by a 
shaman (bakshy): passing a brazier of hot coals over the afflicted patient, blowing smoke, and holding a 
round loaf of bread, with candles affixed, over the patient. The last Kyrgyz bakshy, a man named 
Koichuman living in the Great Pamir, died in 2009. 
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fact brings with it a host of bureaucratic problems, not least of which is that Tajikistan 
already has a number of border crossings with Afghan Badakhshan and it is therefore 
doubtful whether the Tajik government has any desire to have an additional cross-border 
road running through a remote part of their territory, which they would then be 
responsible for administering. As a result, there has been intense and often acrimonious 
lobbying between the Great Parnir Kyrgyz, led by Hajji Turdi Akhun, and those of the 
Little Pamir, represented by Abdul Rashid Khan, over which community should get a 
road, however notional and improbable such a road might be. 
The Little Pamir Kyrgyz argue that a road to their area, beginning in Sarhad-e 
Broghil, would naturally continue on to China, thereby establishing the first road link 
between Afghanistan and China, over the Wakhjir pass. The Great Pamir Kyrgyz counter 
that the terrain between Sarhad and the Little Parnir is too difficult for a road to be 
constructed and maintained and that the comparatively gentle Pamir River valley would 
be much better suited for it. Such a road would parallel the river from Gaz Khan to Zor 
Kol, along the riparian tableland. However, the road would eventually dead-end at the 
border unless it continued on into Tajikistan and then reconnected to Afghanistan by 
means of the Andamin pass. 
NGOs-An Alternative to the State 
The international NGOs that arrived in the Pamirs after 2001 offered Kyrgyz 
leaders an alternate source of patronage besides the nascent Afghan state. This was a 
significant change from the pre-1978 period, when the government held an effective 
monopoly on the distribution of aid, especially in the geopolitically sensitive Pamir 
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region, where foreigners were rarely allowed. Not only did the influx ofNGOs and other 
forms of foreign assistance change the dynamic of service delivery by effectively 
replacing the government, but in some cases NGO patronage was preferred, since it came 
with few, if any, expectations ofreciprocity, unlike the state's transactional quid pro quo. 
Plus, the early experience of the Kyrgyz with NGOs such as FOCUS, prior to 2001, had 
resulted in considerable amounts of crucial humanitarian assistance being delivered. By 
the time of my fieldwork, though, the Kyrgyz had begun to suffer from development 
fatigue and were noticeably less enthused about non-tangible forms of assistance, such as 
"training and capacity building," unless there was some sort of perk (travel) or 
remuneration associated with it. One Kyrgyz summed up the sentiment thus: "Some 
[foreigners] come with medicine, others with questions. We never know what they really 
want from us." But they were also pragmatic enough to realize that there were a limited 
number ofNGOs willing to work in the Pamirs and that it was in their best interest to at 
least appear receptive to the NGOs' overtures. 
For example, one NGO was hoping to enlist the Kyrgyz's support in conserving 
the biodiversity of the Pamirs. The Kyrgyz understood this to mean that they would be 
prevented from hunting wild game (especially ibex and Marco Polo sheep) and restricted 
from grazing in certain areas. Unsurprisingly, they evinced little enthusiasm for anything 
conservation-related, at least until six Kyrgyz were invited to participate in a USAID-
funded "study and exposure" trip to see protected areas in Kyrgyzstan. In Kabul, on the 
way to Kyrgyzstan, they met with the NGO's country director, who explained the goals 
of the trip. Hajji Turdi Akhun, one of the participants, launched into an unrehearsed 
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soliloquy about how preserving the natural heritage of the Pamirs, their most valuable 
patrimony, was the highest priority for every Kyrgyz. During the trip, however, Akhun 
devoted his energies to soliciting aid from the Kyrgyzstani government and NGOs and 
never mentioned conservation again. 
The Kyrgyz also understand that the Afghan state depends on the international 
community for most of its funding. In the case of the road, they realize that while the 
government will decide where the road will be built, another government or international 
institution will ultimately pay for it. So they have targeted both the relevant Afghan 
actors (Zalmai Khan, Karzai, the Ministry of Public Works), as well as the international 
community, writing letters to various ambassadors to Afghanistan, suggesting to every 
NGO that they switch their focus to road building, and touting the panacea that the road 
would offer to every journalist (and anthropologist) they encounter. At the same time, the 
Kyrgyz also believe that the state's presence, in whatever form, will be more enduring 
than that of the NGOs, which is why they continue to concentrate their efforts on Kabul. 
For them, NGOs offer less a hedging strategy than an opportunistic source of patronage: 
" ... the goods and services the international community provided, and the stability they 
created, were never reliable enough to be perceived by residents [of Istalif, a town near 
Kabul] to constitute a viable alternative to the state" (Coburn, 2011: 137). 
The main NGOs active in Wakhan-Pamir area are the Aga Khan Development 
Network (AKDN), Orphans, Refugees and Aid International (ORA), the Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS), and the Central Asia Institute (CAl). Most of these NGOs 
act as implementing partners for donor agencies such as USAID, the Norwegian Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs, and Germany's Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). 148 In Wakhan district, the main NGO projects-natural resource 
management, infrastructure rehabilitation (roads, bridges, water, sanitation, etc.), training 
and capacity building, healthcare and educational support, and, most recently, tourism 
development-have been largely limited to the Wakhi areas; by comparison, almost 
nothing has reached the Kyrgyz. The main reason for this asymmetry is the relatively 
easier access and greater population density of the W akhi communities (especially along 
the road from Ishkashim to Sarhad, where AKDN is most active), although, as I 
discussed in Chapter One, the Kyrgyz have developed a reputation, in some instances 
well-deserved, for being uncooperative and unreceptive to initiatives that impose 
reciprocal obligations upon them. 
Negative stereotypes of the Kyrgyz have a long pedigree and few travelers' 
accounts from the nineteenth century failed to mention rumors of Kyrgyz banditry and 
savageness. Even in the 1950s, an American couple, Frank and Jean Shor, were told how 
Rahman Kul had "crossed the Russian Pamirs. There they had robbed a caravan and 
murdered every man in it" before befriending a Chinese garrison commander, who they 
invited along with his detachment of eight men to "lunch on a Mohammedan festival day. 
While the Chinese were eating, Qul' s tribesmen had stolen into the tent behind them and 
murdered every man in cold blood" (1950: 706; cf. Shor, 1955). Twenty-five years later, 
Dor observed that 
148 Beginning in January 2011, GTZ changed its name to the Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir lntemationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the German Organization for International Cooperation. 
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The Kirghiz is aloof and hard to approach ... One Kirghizjokes that, forced 
to live near the yaks, the Kirghiz becomes like the yaks. Perhaps like 
them, he is distrustful, obstinate, and able to endure much. The conditions 
of his life make him this way ... As a people, the Kirghiz have never had 
the reputation of being open or welcoming; to the contrary, they have 
often been considered as dangerous robbers, and even though they may 
have renounced this way of life, they have not forgotten it (197 5: 301-
302). 
More recently, a writer for National Geographic Magazine, trying to understand 
Kyrgyz truculence and obstinacy, mused that "This is a place, as the Khan says, 'Where 
you get old fast.' Maybe, when you are continually cold, when you watch a half-dozen of 
your children die, some emotion is sandpapered away. Maybe this land is too windy, too 
remote, too hard. If it doesn't kill you, it damages you; it robs you of a certain channel of 
joy" (Finkel, 2013). 
Among the NGOs that work with the Kyrgyz, by far the largest and most well 
resourced is AKDN, an umbrella organization consisting of a number of development 
agencies with various mandates ranging from health to education to cultural preservation. 
The main AKDN agencies active in Wakhan district are Focus Humanitarian Assistance 
(FOCUS), the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), and the Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS). 
FOCUS was the first AKDN affiliate active in Afghanistan, beginning work in the 
northeast in 1995. Their initial project was distributing food aid and "at its peak in 2001, 
FOCUS delivered over 20,000 metric tons of emergency food and non-food aid to 
500,000 beneficiaries in the country."149 Since 2001, AKDN has expanded from 
humanitarian assistance into a broader program of large-scale rural support encompassing 
agricultural development, health care, education, and infrastructure building and 
149 http://www. akdn. org/pub lications/2 006 _akdn _afghanistan. pdf 
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rehabilitation (especially of roads and irrigation systems, and often involving food-for-
work activities). In addition to traditional development activities, AKDN is also the 
Facilitating Partner for the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Wakhan district. 
For the Wakhi, the importance of AKDN's substantial presence in Wakhan cannot 
be overstated, whether in terms of direct benefits (development activities) or by offering 
this historically vulnerable community a powerful patron and protector: "Through the 
leadership of the Aga Khan they [the Wakhi] have more links to the outside world and 
neighboring communities in northern Pakistan and Tajikistan than one would normally 
expect for people living in such isolated locations" (Barfield, 2005: 216). 150 The Aga 
Khan's influence over political actors in Afghanistan serves as an important buffer for the 
W akhi (and other Ismail is) in Badakhshan against discrimination, if not outright 
predatory behavior on the part of the Sunni-dominated provincial and district 
government. And despite growing pessimism151 about the prospects of the current Mghan 
government, largely due to the deteriorating security situation in neighboring districts, 
none of the Wakhi with whom I spoke was even considering emigration to Tajikistan or 
Pakistan as an option. Lacking any representatives in government152 and convinced that 
the Aga Khan's concern for them will prove enduring, the Wakhi (unlike the Kyrgyz) 
view AKDN as a viable alternative to the Afghan state. 
150 AKDN is also very active in the Ismaili parts of southern Tajikistan and northern Pakistan. However, 
they are barred by the Chinese government from providing any aid to the Ismailis in Xinjiang since, 
according to the state-appointed imam, "There is absolutely no need for such help as the central 
government provides very substantial funding to the region" (quoted in Rotar, 2003). 
151 During my last visit in 2010, a number of Wakhi informants, despite living in probably the safest and 
most stable district in Afghanistan, expressed the sentiment that "Da Afghanistan arami khalas shud'-
peace is finished in Afghanistan. 
152 One Wakhi religious leader, Pir Shah Ismail, ran unsuccessfully for the Wolesi Jirga in 2010. 
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Not only does AKDN control substantial resources and facilitate regional, cross-
border linkages, but the Wakhi, as part of the global Ismaili community, enjoy greater 
certainty that AKDN' s current level of effort will be maintained and that they will not be 
abandoned in the future. In contrast, the Kyrgyz have no such guarantees from any NGO 
and have to expend considerably greater effort to mobilize and maintain external 
resources, all of which are outside of their control and considerably more contingent. 
Simply being Kyrgyz gains them nothing; they have to continually strive to attract 
assistance, whether from the Afghan state or international NGOs. 
The shifting fortunes of these two communities have engendered an additional 
degree of loathing on the part of the Kyrgyz towards the Wakhi, or, as they are derisively 
called, sarts-an old Central Asian pejorative used by nomads to refer to sedentary 
agriculturalists or townsfolk. 153 While Shahrani's research makes clear that Kyrgyz 
ethnic and religious chauvinism towards the Wakhi is nothing new, since 2001 it has also 
been tinged with a measure of envy, since the Wakhi are now enjoying the greatest period 
of stability and advancement in their recent history, with the possible exception of the 
Soviet occupation during the 1980s. And though no Kyrgyz ever admitted as much to me, 
they do seem to realize that, compared to Hajji Rahman Kul's time, the Wakhi have 
surged ahead of them in terms of development and international political connections. 
Witnessing the many aid projects, including the Kyrgyz trifecta of roads, health care, and 
schools, delivered to the adjacent Wakhi communities over the past ten years by AKDN 
(in addition to other NGOs), many Kyrgyz believe that Ismaili sectarianism influences 
153 The exact etymology of the tenn sart is uncertain but one interpretation is that it derives from two 
Turkic words, "sa~y" and "if' meaning "yellow dog" (Bergrie, 2007: 7). 
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development decisions and that as Sunni Muslims they are discriminated against. That 
such a belief would even be possible shows how much AKDN has changed the social and 
political landscape of the Wakhan-Parnir region compared to forty years ago. 
Allegations of sectarian bias notwithstanding, both Abdul Rashid and Hajji Turdi 
Akhun enjoyed a personal relationship with the Aga Khan's diplomatic representative to 
Afghanistan, Aly Mawji. A 43 year old British Ismaili, Mawji has been described by Der 
Spiegel as possessing "manners as impeccable as his suits" (Fichtner, 2009). Previously, 
he worked for AKDN in the Pamiri and Kyrgyz regions of Tajikistan and Afghanistan 
and Mawji's relationship with the Kyrgyz goes back many years. The Kyrgyz leaders 
approached Mawji much like they did Wahid Khan and Zalmai Khan, since he offered a 
direct line to AKDN's resources as well as the status that comes from dealing directly 
with the Aga Khan's man in Kabul, instead of a mere local functionary. Having sat 
through numerous phone calls (on my satellite phone) between Abdul Rashid and both 
Zalmai Khan and Aly Mawji, it was clear that both men were roughly equivalent in the 
khan's eyes, as both control valuable resources, act as gatekeepers to even higher-level 
actors, and are seen as sympathetic to the Kyrgyz community. 
Because he had a personal relationship with Aly Mawji, Abdul Rashid often 
appealed directly to him for development assistance. Mawji's foreignness-his heavily 
accented Dari and his Western mannerisms-placed him in a different cognitive and 
social category from Mghan actors such as Zalmai Khan with the Kyrgyz. For instance, 
one letter that Niaz Ali wrote in 2007 to Aly Mawji on the khan's behalf invoked terms 
of friendship and kinship that they would never have used with Zalmai Khan: 
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To the honorable authority and my dear friend, Aly Mawji, the 
representative of the Honorable Imam, 
Greetings and respects, 
For the past several years, with the blessings of the Honorable Imam, the 
Kyrgyz people of the Pamir and the Wakhan have been the beneficiaries 
of his kind assistance. So far this year, the Islamic Government of 
Afghanistan has neglected us. They have supplied us with no provisions. 
First, I call on the Imam and Compassionate God, and second I plead with 
you, my great brother, to please help us poor people, who live a hand-to-
mouth existence on the Roof of the World. This year, the people of the 
Little Pamir face many difficulties and hardships. We place our trust first 
in Honorable God and secondly look to you for help. Niaz Ali also extends 
his greetings to the representative of the Imam. You must come [to visit 
us]. 
Regards, 
Khan Abdul Rashid Khan 
Head of Pamir and W akhan 
Other International Actors 
The ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Badakhshan-now defunct 
but previously led by the Germans, with Mongolian and American support (and had, in 
the past, Danish and Czech participation as well)-was based in Faizabad but 
occasionally traveled to the Wakhan. The PRT was not active in the Pamirs, though it is 
unclear exactly why. (One Danish captain told me that it was due to Chinese objections 
against having foreign soldiers operating so close to the border.) Similarly, the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) and related UN agencies (WFP, 
UNICEF, UNEP) have had a very limited, occasional presence in the Pamirs. Besides the 
WFP food aid, the commissioning of one report on the Afghan Pamirs (Fitzherbert, 2003) 
seems to have been the extent of the UN' s on-the-ground development work there. 
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As mentioned in previous chapters, the AKDN affiliate FOCUS provided food 
relief to the Great and Little Pamir Kyrgyz, initially via Tajikistan, for seven years, from 
1998 to 2004. In 2005, WFP, which had funded FOCUS' efforts, took over food 
distribution directly following a visit by the WFP country director to the Pamirs. The 
seeming desperation of the Kyrgyz made an impression upon the country director, who 
instructed the Faizabad office to make preparations (collecting demographic information, 
establishing distribution systems, etc.) for a fall delivery, just before the onset of winter. 
Unlike FOCUS, which was the only NGO allowed to provide cross-border aid 
distribution to the Kyrgyz, WFP aid is delivered entirely within Afghanistan, to Gaz 
Khan (for the Great Pamir) and Sarhad (for the Little Pamir), requiring the Kyrgyz to 
travel for several days to retrieve the food. The reason, according to WFP, is that going 
through Tajikistan would be logistically complicated and more expensive. 
WFP has three categories of food relief: emergency food aid, food-for-work 
(FFW), and food-for-education (FFE). Both FFW and FFE programs have been 
implemented in Wakhan district. FFE provides food assistance to schools and FFW gives 
the Wakhi participating in the program staple foods in exchange for their labor, mostly 
centered around road improvement projects on the track from Ishkashim to Sarhad. The 
Kyrgyz are the only population in the Wakhan (and, according to one WFP official I 
interviewed, in the entire country) who regularly receive emergency food aid as 
humanitarian assistance (meaning that it comes absent any acute, precipitating event, 
such as a landslide or an avalanche) according to a scheduled annual delivery. In 2005 
and 2006, the justification for emergency food assistance to the Kyrgyz was based on a 
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combination of livestock losses and drought, resulting in poor pasture conditions. Prior to 
the 2006 delivery, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and 
Hajji Turdi Akhun lobbied WFP to increase the amount of food aid. When asked why this 
was necessary, Akhun replied that they had given much of the previous year's food aid to 
their livestock as fodder in the spring and that as a result there hadn't been much 
available for the people to eat. The WFP country director was furious and stated that 
emergency food relief was to keep people, not animals, alive, to which Akhun retorted, 
"Without our animals, we have nothing." WFP ultimately declined the request. 
In 2007, WFP officials mentioned that they were seriously considering 
implementing a food-for-work program for the Kyrgyz, similar to what had been done 
with the Wakhi, with reciprocal obligations, but, according to one official, "the issue has 
been politicized in Kabul." MRRD, together with Karzai's office, pressured WFP to 
distribute it again as aid rather than FFW. And when WFP suggested suspending food aid 
to the Kyrgyz in 2008, due to surging demand in the face of skyrocketing food prices, the 
Kyrgyz again mobilized their patrons in Kabul. A government delegation visited the 
WFP office in Kabul and told them to find a way to continue supplying the Kyrgyz, 
stating "Make it your priority." Essentially being coerced into provisioning the Kyrgyz 
led one WFP regional director to bemoan, "For the Kyrgyz, food aid is not an emergency. 
It's more like an obligation." 
One reason that WFP wants to change food distribution to the Kyrgyz to a system 
based on reciprocal obligations is because they believe that the Kyrgyz have manipulated 
the program to their advantage. For example, one WFP survey estimated that there were 
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238 households in the Little Pamir and 100 households in the Great Pamir (compare with 
my survey results of 128 and 107 households, respectively)-figures obviously inflated 
(for the Little Pamir) in an effort to get additional food supplies. 154 Nor is the excess of 
food aid the sole issue. Because all of the legumes and much of the cooking oil that the 
Kyrgyz receive are exchanged for other goods (including opium), critics such as George 
Schaller have called food aid an opium subsidy, stating that "Unless opium traders are 
banned from the area no amount of simple welfare or community development can 
alleviate the downward spiral of these Kirghiz" (2004: 16). 
The WFP officials are additionally frustrated because food aid for the Kyrgyz is 
drawn from WFP's contingency stock, which is intended to be used in the event of 
natural disasters or other acute crises that carry the risk of starvation. These emergency 
food rations, intended to prevent starvation, are designed to feed one household for one 
month and consist of one 50 kg bag of wheat flour, 3. 7 kg of vegetable oil, 6 kg of pulses 
(usually yellow split peas), and .5 kg of iodized salt. In the FFW program, each 
participant needs to work 21 days to receive one month's ration. The Kyrgyz receive 
three months of rations entirely gratis (Table 29). But because the population numbers for 
I 
the Little Pamir are so inflated (by 186%~, each Kyrgyz household there receives more 
than five months worth of food aid. 
154 WFP's figures, though inflated, are still much less than what the Kyrgyz claimed during the 2005 WFP 
survey of the Pamirs. For example, Abdul Rashid told them that there were 338 households ill the Little 
Pamir. Perhaps underestimating Kyrgyz perfidy, WFP thought that subtracting 100 from this figure would 
give an accurate nwnber. 
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Table 29. 2006 WFP food relief to the Kyrgyz 
Little Pamir: Great Pamir: Per Total for 
238HH lOOHH HH/month 3 months 
Wheat flour 714 bags 299 bags 
50 kg 150 kg 
(50 kg bags) (35,700 kg) (14,950 kg) 
Yell ow split peas 85 bags 36 bags 
6kg 18 kg 
(50 kg bags) (4,250 kg) (1,800 kg) 
Iodized salt 
7 bags (350 kg) 3 bags (150 kg) .5 kg 1.5 kg 
(50 kg bags) 
Vegetable oil 
119 boxes (714 50 boxes (300 3 cans/ (1 box = six 4-
cans/2,856 liters) cans/1 ,200 kg) 
1 can/3.7 kg 
11.1 kg 
liter/3. 7 kg cans 
Source: WFP 
During the fall 2006 food aid delivery, I met the WFP food distribution 
coordinator in Sarhad. He claimed that the Kyrgyz "really didn't qualify for food relief," 
were "lazy," and "didn' t want a road built to the Pamirs." For these reasons, and based on 
WFP' s success in implementing the FFW program among the Wakhi, he suggested that 
in future years, WFP would switch from food relief to a similar FFW program for the 
Kyrgyz. But WFP realizes that traditional FFW activities such as road-building or 
constructing schools would be hard to implement and oversee in the Pamirs. 155 The latest 
idea, a joint effort between WFP and the Wildlife Conservation Society, involves "Food 
for Conservation of Natural Resources" in which food aid would be provided "in 
exchange for the [Kyrgyz] communities agreeing to act as stewards for protected areas 
and agreeing not to graze or hunt in those areas ... Food could also potentially be provided 
through food for training in support of building local government and community 
155 An additional difficulty, as noted by WFP, is that "Although the [Kyrgyz] communities could 
potentially work on the construction of roads in the area, very costly explosives would be required because 
of the very mountainous terrain, and neither the Government nor WFP have been able to identify sufficient 
funds for such projects. The small population is also widely scattered in the rangelands, making it difficult 
to bring together large numbers of people for food for work projects" (World Food Program, 2008). 
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capacity for wildlife conservation, sustainable rangeland management and eco-tourism 
development" (World Food Program, 2008). 
An additional actor in the Kyrgyz' s patronage politics, besides the Afghan state, 
international NGOs, and UN agencies, is the Kyrgyzstani government. The Afghan 
Kyrgyz received some aid from Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s, during the debate whether 
to emigrate there. After six Kyrgyz visited Kyrgyzstan in June 2008 and lobbied heavily 
for assistance, the Kyrgyzstani government sent four trucks filled with humanitarian aid 
(food, clothing, and a number of miscellaneous items, including two televisions, two 
satellite dishes, three generators, and a DVD player) across Tajikistan a couple months 
later. The arrival of this aid presented something of a conundrum for Abdul Rashid, since 
he had not solicited it directly himself. Nonetheless, its sudden arrival in August 
prompted him to ride with all haste across the Little Pamir valley in the hope of gaining 
some measure of control over (and credit for) its distribution. The trucks were 
accompanied by a number of Kyrgyzstani officials and media who had come along to 
oversee and document the distribution. The arrival of all the Afghan Kyrgyz created a 
chaotic scene and the officials, hoping to bring some order, asked the khan to supervise 
the distribution. The two Kyrgyz factions opposed to him balked at this, claiming that 
Hajji Osman, not Abdul Rashid, was khan and thus should be in charge of parceling out 
the goods. Abdul Rashid pulled out his satellite phone and offered to call Wahid Khan or 
Zalmai Khan, either of whom could confirm that he was, in fact, the khan. As a bluff (the 
phone was out of credit and the battery was dead), it worked, though it was anything but 
dignified and laid bare how diminished Abdul Rashid's stature had become domestically. 
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The National Solidarity Program and the 
Community Development Councils 
Besides the informal status of the khan and the formal office of the wakil, there is 
a hybrid system, the National Solidarity Program (NSP), formal (legal-rational) in the 
sense that there are offices and elections for them according to a series of defmed rules 
determining who occupies a given office but informal (traditional) in that rights and 
responsibilities, including political leadership, remain undefined and largely status-based. 
The NSP was launched by Mghanistan's Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development (MRRD) in 2003, with funding provided by the World Bank and other 
international donors. It is implemented at the local level by 29 Facilitating Partners, 
typically international NGOs156 contracted to establish and run NSP activities in one or 
more districts. The governing structure of the NSP consists Community Development 
Councils (CDCs, locally called shuras), each led by five officers elected by the 
community: rais-e shura (president), maween (vice-president), munshi (secretary), . 
khazanadar (treasurer), and azaa (assistant). While the formal responsibilities of each 
position are reasonably well delineated within the narrow scope of the NSP (delivery of 
development aid), the overall political role of the CDCs is generally undefmed and highly 
variable, as implied by the NSP's vague mission statement: 
The key objective ofNSP is to lay the foundation for the strengthening of 
community level governance in order to address the lack of social 
cohesion brought about by almost three decades of conflict and to re-build 
the trust and confidence of the people of Afghanistan by strengthening the 
very fabric of society. The methodology chosen to strengthen community 
governance is the democratically elected Community Development 
156 Besides NGOs, there is one United Nations agency, UN-Habitat, which works as a Facilitating Partner 
in a number of provinces. 
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Councils (CDCs) who, through the use of community-managed 
reconstruction and development subprojects, improve their access to social 
and productive infrastructure and services. 157 
The result of such ambiguity is that in some areas, the NSP exists mainly to 
deliver aid but has little bearing on either formal or informal politics. In other places, 
such as the Great Pamir, the CDCs have become the predominant political system and 
enjoy a remit far in excess of simply administering development projects. As noted by 
Charles Norchi, a law professor who has studied the program, "The NSP intervention has 
become more than a development service delivery program. It aims to shape social 
outcomes ... " (2010: 111). 
The NSP was introduced to the Afghan Pamirs during the summer of 2007 by 
AKDN, the NSP Facilitating Partner for Wakhan district. According to one AKDN 
administrator I spoke with, the Pamirs were the last part of Badakhshan where the NSP 
was established. The NSP received considerable initial support in the Great Parnir, where 
it met no objection from Hajji Turdi Akhun-and who, as a member of parliament, was 
hardly in a position to refuse a government-sanctioned program. However, in the Little 
Pamir, the NSP was bitterly resisted by Abdul Rashid Khan, who recognized it as a 
fundamental challenge to his informal authority. Only under considerable pressure from 
Zalmai Khan as well as Aly Mawji did Abdul Rashid relent and reluctantly allow the 
NSP to proceed. After AKDN' s initial demographic survey work in both Pamirs during 
the summer and fall of 2007 was completed, a memorandum of understanding was signed 
by community leaders, pledging themselves to support AKDN's efforts to implement the 
program. CDC elections were held in summer 2008 for the six CDCs in the Great Parnir 
157 Official NSP website: http://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=lOl 
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and the eight CDCs in the Little Pamir. 158 Each CDC then drafted a "Community 
Development Plan" centered on a "priority project" that NSP funds would be used to pay 
for. 
At first, the NSP did not generate much interest among the Kyrgyz until the first-
round funds for each CDC's priority project were disbursed in 2009. Every CDC in both 
Pamirs selected the construction (or improvement) of irrigation channels (aryk) to boost 
fodder production as their project. The Kyrgyz were given some technical assistance by 
AKDN engineers but otherwise they did all the construction themselves, using simple 
tools provided by AKDN. Kyrgyz working on NSP projects are paid 150 AFN per day, 
which has been the first widespread introduction of wage-labor into the Pamir (aside 
from tourism, which has only benefitted a small proportion of the society). 159 
Because the 2009 funds anived late in the season and no one was willing to work 
until after the NSP money had been received, the projects were initiated too late to have 
much an impact on the fodder "crop" before it was cut in the fall. Most projects were also 
very much works-in-progress and in some cases the iiTigation channels ran uphill, so the 
water simply pooled. In 2010, again only after NSP funds had disbursed (in August), the 
Kyrgyz attempted to improve the existing inigation channels, in addition to constructing 
new ones. This time, with the benefits of better engineering know-how, all the channels 
carried water downhill, towards the grasslands where the Kyrgyz hoped it would boost 
natural fodder production. It was heartening-and rather surprising-to see the members 
158 There were also an equivalent number of female CDCs but it is unclear how they function and what, if 
any, impact they have had. 
159 Each family is expected to make a 10% reciprocal contribution to the priority project, payable in cash 
( 1,000 AFN or $20) or labor (one week of unpaid work on the project). 
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of a given CDC working cooperatively on these NSP projects, putting in long days of 
hard manual labor despite it being Ramazan. 
The funds allocated to each shura ranged between 100,000-131,400 AFN 
($2,000-2,628) in 2009 and 79,112.5-430,621 AFN ($1 ,582.24-8,612.42). Because each 
household comprising a given CDC receives 10,000 AFN ($200), and because the 
number of households in each CDC varies, more populous CDCs receive more NSP 
funds. Clearly, NSP budgeting requires that the Facilitating Partner establish how many 
households will be participating in the NSP, which led to an additional objection from 
Abdul Rashid. After the NSP process was explained to him, the khan initially said that he 
might be willing to go along with its implementation but only if AKDN was willing to 
accept his Kyrgyz population figures (311 households, with a population 2,028, mostly in 
the Little Pamir). AKDN replied that they could proceed only if a demographic survey 
was conducted and Abdul Rashid replied that regretfully he would not be willing to 
accept the NSP (until forced to change his mind by Aly Mawji and Zalmai Khan, as 
described above). 
Even prior to the 2010 disbursement, the CDCs seem to have supplanted whatever 
passed for community leadership previously, especially in the Great Pamir, where Hajji 
Turdi Akhun as wakil had effectively been acting as khan. Despite claims that the NSP is 
simply a vehicle for community assistance, development is an inherently political 
endeavor in Afghanistan since it involves control of resources, which inevitably brings in 
questions of leadership. In many cases, the elected CDCs (in the Great and, to a lesser 
degree, the Little Pamir) have assumed a political function in addition to their NSP-
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mandated activities. The political aspect of the NSP is especially notable among the 
heads of each CDC, the rais-i shura. For example, when asked who adjudicates disputes 
in the Great Pamir absent a khan or qaryadar, the Kyrgyz responded that dispute 
resolution is handled by the rais-i shura for an intra-CDC matter or, in disputes involving 
members of multiple shuras, by the relevant CDC leaders. As one respondent put it, 
"Why would we need a khan when we have the program hambastegi [the Dari term for 
the NSP; also called hambastegi milli]?"160 
Another aspect of the CDCs that many Kyrgyz prefer, in contrast to having a 
single leader (whether a khan, a wakil, or a qaryadar), is that the distribution of external 
resources is more decentralized under the NSP. Although some Kyrgyz lauded having 
"democracy" (they use the English word) in the Pamirs, more often this seemed to refer 
to devolution and a change from more overt fmms of clientelism rather than the ability to 
choose their own leaders through some democratic process. Many informants also 
believed that under the NSP they stood to receive more resources than they had under the 
khan's (or wakil's) patronage system. Others, however, voiced concern that having six 
rais-e shura in the Great Pamir and another eight in the Little Pamir was a recipe for 
internal competition and gridlock in comparison to having a single leader in each Pamir. 
While the Kyrgyz were noticeably more enthusiastic about the NSP and the CDCs 
in 2010 compared to 2008, there was still some lingering pessimism concerning whether 
it would prove to be an enduring source of leadership. Such sentiment was much more 
160 Norchi reports that a CDC in Parwan province "was evolving as an authoritative decision body that 
would also assume dispute resolution functions . .. CDCs were apparently replacing traditional Shuras. Many 
CDCs were assuming decision functions previously perfonned by Shura andjirgah customary procedures" 
(2010: 109-110). 
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widespread in the Little Pamir, where four of the eight rais-e shura were very wealthy, 
amanat-giving men, and two others were already very influential. This gave the 
appearance of elite capture of the NSP. In contrast, the six rais-e shura in the Great Pamir 
were neither rich nor amanat-givers, making the program seem much more egalitarian. 
Abdul Rashid was not elected to any of the CDC offices in his shura, something that 
Hajji Osman and others gloated over, saying it was proof that he lacked any popular 
legitimacy. Abdul Rashid countered that he had not run in the election but because there 
were no declared candidates (the members of the shura could vote for whomever they 
wanted to), this rang a bit hollow. The man elected rais was young, unmarried (he lived 
the me'fmankana of his azyl), and not very wealthy (many of his livestock were amanat). 
Some of the khan's sons mocked his election, saying that when guests arrived, they 
would have to explain that their rais-e shura "had gone to the yaks" (taken his animals to 
pasture, something no self-respecting baz or aksakal would do himself) and that he would 
be unable to provide the hospitality expected of a Kyrgyz leader. 
Extractive Politics and Neopatrimonialism 
What all three of these political systems-the khanship, the wakil, and the CDCs, 
representing informal, formal, and hybrid governance, respectively-have in common is 
that they are all predicated upon resource extraction and redistribution or, more simply, 
patronage networks. In every case, leadership is predicated on an individual acting as an 
intermediary between the Kyrgyz community and the outside world, whether the state, 
NGOs, WFP, or the NSP. This interaction can be direct, such as by going down to Kabul 
and trying to procure aid, or indirect, as by redistributing (and trying to increase the 
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amount of) NSP funds received. Leaders are expected to safeguard the Kyrgyz 
community and advance their collective interests, which primarily involves attracting 
resources, mostly humanitarian aid and development assistance. There is no inherent 
prejudice (aside from simple jealousy) against any leader trying to find a way to 
personally profit from his position, provided that the community as a whole realizes a 
commensurate benefit. For example, Abdul Rashid appropriated a considerable amount 
of the excess WFP food aid but since everyone in the Little Pamir already received more 
than five months of food (thanks to the khan), and because the khan doled out his surplus 
to families in need, it was generally seen as fair. 
The wakil, Hajji Turdi Akhun, by virtue of his access to the heights of political 
power in Kabul, was faced with especially high expectations that he would press an 
agenda favorable to the Kyrgyz, which primarily meant attracting government attention 
and, with it, assistance, to the Pamirs. Even though Akhun was not an elected official and 
thus had no constituents in the usual sense, his domestic influence depended on his 
success at patronage politics. But because his position was formally part of the central 
government and largely independent of his status within the community, he did not wager 
his social and political capital on his ability to attract attention to the Kyrgyz cause and to 
mobilize resources that would benefit the community to the same degree that the khan 
did. 
The various CDC rais-e shura are somewhere in between: in theory, they are 
answerable to their constituents, who expect that they will distribute resources fairly and 
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who can seek some redress (from AKDN, the Facilitating Partner) if they do not, but in 
reality 
... CDCs do no derive their authority from the people, despite the claims of 
democratic elections. They are upwardly accountable not to the 
community but to the NGO that provides them access to funds. They 
submit paperwork detailing their activities not to community members or 
to district government officials, but to the local NGO implementing the 
project in their area. There are no self-reinforcing accountability 
mechanisms present in these organizations (Brick, 2008: 17). 
And though the NSP may superficially appear less extractive than the activities of either 
the khan or the wakil, since the funds arrive annually, largely independent of any efforts 
of the CDC officers, not only is it "vulnerable to local 'elite capture,' or embezzlement 
by program officials" (Amin, 2012) but the CDCs also "redistribute resources 
accumulated through non-productive sources, specifically from international financial 
assistance, and are thus 'rentier' community organizations. They are dependent on 
outside sources of revenue for support. When such support is absent, as it often is, these 
organizations will have limited opportunities to provide public good because they have 
no revenue" (Brick, 2008: 17). 
The characteristics of these systems vary according to how positions of influence 
are achieved-appointed, consensual, or elected-but the burden of expectations makes 
all of them unstable, as they depend on external resources for both their maintenance and 
their legitimacy. Unlike the previous Kyrgyz patronage system based on amanat, which 
was basically immune to public pressure, the current political systems all primarily 
depend on the mobilization-the extraction and redistribution--of non-indigenous 
resources. Absent these resources, either the leader fails or at best becomes susceptible to 
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challenge, since any patronage system is only as good as the resources it is able to 
mobilize. 
An obvious question is that, given all the challenges facing his administration and 
the multitude of needy, under-served communities throughout Mghanistan, why should 
Karzai (and other political actors in the Afghan government) care about a remote, 
numerically insignificant, electorally negligible population of nomads living in 
Afghanistan's back of beyond? The answer, in the case of the Kyrgyz, is especially 
difficult, since in Karzai' s neopatrimonial regime 
... the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, 
rather than through ideology or law ... relationships of loyalty and 
dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system ... The 
essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal 
favors, both within the state ... and in society. In return for material 
rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward 
as a mark of deference to patrons (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994: 458). 
Because patronage and corruption "within the ranks of the Mghan government, in fact, 
[have] functioned as the glue that holds Karzai's base of support intact" (Hess, 2010: 
184), the careful allocation of patrimonial resources is one of the most important 
decisions facing state actors intent on maintaining and/or expanding their influence. 
The first, and least cynical, possibility is that Karzai actually cares about the 
Kyrgyz. This was the explanation offered by Sher Jan Ahmadzai, a former aid to Karzai, 
who explained, "He [Karzai] is genuinely concerned. He really does care about the 
people, including the Kyrgyz, and wants to help them." While Karzai's more emotional 
moments are often interpreted cynically, variously ascribed to drug use (Peter Galbraith, 
a former UN official, claimed that "In fact, some of the palace insiders say that he has a 
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certain fondness for some of Afghanistan's most profitable exports") or mental illness 
(the journalist Bob Woodward, quoting former US ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl 
Eikenberry, wrote about Karzai, "He's on his meds, he' s off his meds" (Woodward, 
2010: 356), it appears that the suffering of ordinary Afghans is not lost on the president. 
This interpretation accords with the public persona of being a khan that Karzai 
likes to project, which requires him to demonstrate concern (often over local, trivial 
matters) and act charitably towards his constituents, in a personal rather than a 
bureaucratic manner. Holding court at the Arg, listening to various supplicants plead their 
case, and personally instructing his assistants and ministers to address the problem, which 
usually involves the redirection of patrimonial resources, are all hallmarks of a khan. As 
one journalist observed 
At heart, Karzai is a Pashtun tribal leader, just like his father was. What 
are the responsibilities of the tribal leader? To protect his property 
(livestock and women), his land and his people. If one of your people is 
put in jail, whether he lays mines, steals or murders, you' re obliged to get 
him out and let the tribe deal with him ... He [Karzai] sees himself as the 
tribal leader of all Afghans (Rubin, 2009). 
Later in the same ruiicle, Karzai's former interior minister, Ali Jalai, speaking in 
Weberian terms, states that "in tribal culture you depend on loyalty of individuals rather 
than institutions ... You always try to be a patron to people close and loyal to you" (ibid). 
Another explanation is that the Kyrgyz offer Karzai an image of the ethnically 
inclusive, pluralistic government that he wants to project, one free of the tensions 
increasingly extant between Pashtuns and Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. The Kyrgyz are 
also (in theory) an excellent demonstration piece for the expanding writ of the central 
government and its effectiveness in providing basic services for the people of 
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Afghanistan. For example, in a 2008 interview with Kim Barker of the Chicago Tribune, 
Karzai stated that: 
While this is the first time in the history of Mghanistan where we have a 
government that has reached more than half of Afghanistan's nearly 
40,000 villages. This is the first time in the history of Afghanistan where 
you have gone as far as the Parnir mountains of Afghanistan with a mobile 
clinic, and health facilities and schools. This is the first time in 
Mghanistan where you've reached the farthest parts of the country with 
roads. This is the first time in Afghanistan where your health services have 
gone beyond 85 percent of the population (Barker, 2008). 
In both cases, the Kyrgyz provide a risk-free example of inclusivity, one largely immune 
from accusations of ethnic favoritism or pandering. And, since the Kyrgyz are far more 
interested in receiving assistance than taking any sort of partisan stand, they can be 
counted to reciprocate for any aid they receive by voicing support for the government. 
Another explanation is that the Kyrgyz are being courted for electoral reasons, as 
voting constituents. While this might be true for other groups, it is unlikely than any 
politician would assiduously court the Kyrgyz solely for their votes, based on their 
previous electoral experiences. Although they did vote in the 2004 presidential election-
overwhelmingly for Karzai, according to my informants-the helicopter carrying their 
ballots crashed in the Little Pamir and the ballots supposedly were never recovered. They 
have not voted in any subsequent elections. Zalmai Khan wryly noted that he is often 
accused of pandering to his electorate for their votes but that in the case of the Kyrgyz, 
they are so numerically insignificant that if he really was concerned about reelection in 
2010, he probably wouldn't be wasting his time courting a small population that doesn't 
vote anyway. This is a bit disingenuous since, as mentioned earlier, Wolesi Jirga and 
Provincial Council members are typically elected by small margins, so even a few 
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hundred Kyrgyz votes could potentially prove crucial electorally-if polling actually 
occurred in the Pamirs. 
A fourth reason harkens back to the Afghan political tradition of co-opting remote 
and marginal areas and using the population there as proxies rather than providing any 
sort of direct administration and services, what Barfield calls the "Swiss cheese model of 
the polity" (2010, 68) in which the goal was "to control the best bits themselves, and 
leave at arm's length territories deemed unprofitable to rule or of little strategic value" 
(ibid). According to this logic, the Kyrgyz offer an inexpensive and readily available 
means of securing a distant border region, in contrast to the difficulty and considerable 
expense that would be involved in garrisoning regular forces there. Additionally, by 
remaining in the Pamirs, the Kyrgyz presence deters any ideas of irredentism or 
annexation that neighboring countries, most notably Pakistan, might entertain were the 
Pamirs unoccupied. For example, one reason Zalmai Khan gave to The New Yorker for 
providing aid to the Kyrgyz in 2005 was that "the insecurity of the region's border [with 
Pakistan], which was used as a crossing point by AI Qaeda and Uzbek terrorists, meant 
that the government could not afford its traditional neglect." (Anderson, 2005: 70). 
For their part, the Kyrgyz appear to believe that the last reason is the most likely 
one. At least they hope so, since it is central to their negotiating strategy with Kabul. 
Abdul Rashid, as well as many other Kyrgyz I interviewed, believed that the threat of 
"voting with their feet" was a trump card they held in their demands for greater assistance 
from the central government. The Kyrgyz understand that if all or most of them were to 
decamp from the Pamirs, for China or Kyrgyzstan (the two most commonly cited 
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destinations), its main impact would be to undercut these multiple narratives-Karzai as 
a caring man of the people, a government increasingly effective at providing basic 
services, an ethnically inclusive state-and force the government to replace the Kyrgyz 
emigrants with other inhabitants and border forces. Since the Kyrgyz are convinced that 
no other Mghan ethnic group could survive year-round in the Pamirs-and, given that 
they are the only yak-raising pastoral nomads in Mghanistan, they might be right, though 
the W akhi would certainly try-they discount the possibility that the government could 
simply find someone to replace them. 
In addition, because the Kyrgyz are only vaguely aware of their celebrity as a 
"postcard" ethnic group, they perhaps do not realize that one of the most significant 
effects of any mass emigration would be the media coverage it would receive. However, 
they do know that the Afghan government has no desire to have its incompetence in 
delivering basic services and security to the Afghan people highlighted. While 
geographically remote, the Pamirs are now more accessible to foreigners than many other 
parts of Afghanistan lying on the ring road, including provinces like Wardak and Logar, 
barely an hour away from Kabul. Numerous human interest stories about the Kyrgyz 
have appeared in Western media, including The New Yorker (Anderson, 2005), The 
Telegraph (Coughlan, 2005), the BBC (Leithead, 2007); GEO Magazine (Callahan, 
2009), The New York Times (Wong, 2010), and National Geographic (Finkel, 2013). The 
departure of several hundred colorful nomads astride their horses and yaks, with 
thousands of livestock in tow, would be big news-and a public relations nightmare for 
Karzai. Even if the Kyrgyz don't realize this, Karzai does, and while he most likely does 
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not count it as at all probable, it costs him relatively little to prevent it from happening in 
the first place, by acceding to some of the Kyrgyz's demands for aid. 
In their ongoing deliberations whether to stay or quit Afghanistan, the Kyrgyz are 
often guided by their experience of the Soviet occupation, when, in a form of 
administrative encapsulation, they received various forms of assistance (subsidized 
goods, medical care, access to markets) at a minimal cost to their autonomy. But Afghan 
Kyrgyz nostalgia for the golden years of the Soviet presence in the Pamirs can be 
interpreted more broadly to include Cold War politics as they played out along the 
Afghan-Soviet Central Asian border regions. Geographer Ronald Wixman has argued 
that one of the basic reasons behind the consistency of Soviet nationality policy over 
time, including whether the state would grant a particular group official recognition and, 
along with it, the development of various "ethnic institutions," including a national 
territory and national language, was a desire to spread world revolution by influencing 
members of the same ethnic groups living abroad, and especially those in areas bordering 
the USSR (1986: 449-450). However, support for such groups varied considerably; when 
the Soviets could exert influence outward by using these groups, they were supported, but 
when influence flowed inward, into the Soviet Union, the same ethnic groups were 
repressed (Wixman, 1986: 460). 
Soviet nationalities living in border regions near their co-ethnics were mainly 
exploited in two ways: for "irredenta purposes ... those used to press territorial claims or 
ambitions against neighboring states" and as "showcase republics ... those used to create 
an image [author's italics] of benevolence to enlist support or sympathies from ethnics 
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abroad" (Wixman, 1986: 459). Such efforts should have held appeal for the Kyrgyz, 
outliers in Afghanistan who lived there only by default and much of whose identity 
derived in apposition to their Persian (Tajik, Wakhi, and Pashtun) neighbors. Yet Kyrgyz 
identity was also proudly rooted in their success, often at great cost, in avoiding 
collectivization at the hands of an external communist power, which tempered whatever 
envy they might have felt looking at Kyrgyz communities across the border in Soviet 
Tajikistan or Chinese Xinjiang. 
With the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the resulting independence of the 
five Central Asian republics, newfound social and religious freedoms combined with the 
imperative to transform a colonized nation into an independent state led to the revival of 
(or, as discussed in Chapter Six, the invention of) many cultural, religious, and historical 
traditions. This frequently involved looking for supposedly unadultered examples from 
the pre-Soviet past, uncorrupted by seventy years of official atheism and other deleterious 
forms of social control. To many Kyrgyz living in Kyrgyzstan, their kinsmen in the 
Afghan Pamirs offered just such a reservoir of pre-Russified Kyrgyz traditions. 
Beginning with attempts to "repatriate" the Afghan Kyrgyz to their titular 
homeland in the late 1990s, a small but vocal and politically savvy number of Kyrgyz in 
Kyrgyzstan have dedicated themselves to bringing the Afghan Kyrgyz home. One such 
group is Kyrgyz Butagy, a Bishkek-based NGO that has visited the Afghan Pamirs and 
produced a short video 161 highlighting the many difficulties faced by the Afghan Kyrgyz. 
Although easily dismissed as a quixotic, insignificant initiative, "in a country where 
ethnic identity, linguistic nationalism and patriotic fervor have grown stronger since 
161 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZT _ 8mUwvk 
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ethnic violence in 2010, the question of relocation is easily politicized, and Kyrgyz-
language media coverage of the diaspora in Afghanistan is emotionally charged" 
(Rickleton, 20 12). 
The efforts of Kyrgyz Butagy and various Kyrgyzstani politicians have already 
resulted in some small but tangible benefits for the Afghan Kyrgyz, such as aid deliveries 
to the Pamirs in 2008 and 2011 and an offer from Kyrgyzstan's Ministry of Labor, 
Employment and Migration to the Afghan government to open "four checkpoints to allow 
[Afghan] Kyrgyz compatriots to sell products from livestock operations and buy 
necessary manufactured goods, communicate with their relatives and the outside world 
[sic]" (Karimov, 2011). In this respect, the Kyrgyz are similar to the Wakhi, in that both 
groups enjoy the protection and patronage afforded by an external actor (AKDN for the 
Wakhi; the Kyrgyzstani state, media, and NGOs for the Kyrgyz). The crucial difference 
is that the AKDN's assistance will likely remain enduring, whereas what little 
international support the Kyrgyz receive is valuable primarily in terms of extracting 
development aid from the Afghan state by lending credibility to their threats to emigrate 
with the offer of both a destination and the necessary logistical support to reach it. 
EPILOGUE: THE TIME OF KHANS HAS PASSED 
"It is all very well for men in crowded cities to be disgusted with the 
world and to talk of the delights of solitude. Let them but pass one twenty-
four hours on the banks of the Sir-i-kol [Zor Kol], and it will do more to 
make them contented with their lot than a thousand arguments." 
John Wood, A Journey to the Source of the River Oxus (1872) 
On December 22, 2009 (1 Jadi 1388), Hajji Abdul Rashid Khan died at home in 
Kyzyl Korum, his winter quarters. He had been ill for a long time but his health had 
become precipitously worse in the fall of 2009. An attempt was made by Greg Mortenson 
to get the ISAF commander, General Stanley McChrystal, to send a helicopter to fetch 
the khan and bring him down to Kabul for medical treatment (Mmienson, 2009: 363-367 
passim; Heard, 2012). However, the rescue was deemed too risky and never materialized, 
something that, had he even been aware of it, probably would not have surprised Abdul 
Rashid, who by then was familiar with disappointed expectations and false hopes. 
Instead, Hajji Abdul Rashid Khan, as the Kyrgyz lyrically phrase it, "dunyadan 
ketken"--departed the world-surrounded by family, no doubt as he always expected, 
and maybe even hoped for. Afghanistan had been changing faster than he could 
comprehend and in his final years as khan, his leadership had become petty and 
ineffective, seemingly more preoccupied with maintaining his position than benefitting 
the Kyrgyz community. He was buried in a simple grave overlooking the Little Pamir 
valley, on the sunlit kiingd'f side. His walking stick, donated by a passing trekker, serves 
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as the headstone; the Kyrgyz no longer build giimboz, the domed mud brick mausoleums 
that dot the Pamirs, claiming that it is "un-Islamic" to do so. 
Niaz Ali, his munshi, who had earned the enmity of many Kyrgyz, left the Little 
Pamir not long after the khan's death. His departure was not surprising, as no one 
expected him to stay on after the death of his patron. Many Kyrgyz resented Niaz Ali for 
his political cunning, did not trust him, were biased against him for being Wakhi, and 
often described him to me as "a devil" (sha'ftan). Even some of Abdul Rashid's sons felt 
that Niaz Ali's utility-"He's good at writing letters," one shrugged, when asked why 
they kept him around-didn't merit the costs involved in housing and feeding him. He 
married once again, to a W akhi woman, and moved in with his brother in Khandud, 
where he is reported to be doing some occasional work for the Central Asia Institute. 
The khan's passing, while not unexpected, created a number of dilemmas for the 
Kyrgyz of the Little Pamir. It brought greater disunity to the community, as any number 
of claimants began proclaiming themselves to be the new khan. Because the khanship is 
neither heritable nor governed by any definite rules of succession, the Kyrgyz have been 
unable to agree on whom, if anyone, will replace Abdul Rashid as leader. The jockeying 
has been especially contentious as a result of the dissension and distrust sown during the 
latter part of the khan' s rule, described in Chapter Seven, when a number of his Kyrgyz 
rivals occasionally proved unwilling to recognize Abdul Rashid's authority as khan in 
domestic matters. 
Soon after the khan's death, a group of aksakals and other influential persons 
from the Little Pamir, including Hajji Osman, Abdul Rashid ' s main rival, and Hajji 
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Roshan, Abdul Rashid's fourth-eldest son, came together to select a new khan. Roshan 
emerged as the leading candidate but unanimity proved elusive and the process turned 
acrimonious. To many Kyrgyz, the idea of Roshan as khan is baffling, if not laughable: 
he is young (Roshan was 29 years old in 201 0), inexperienced, and has a history of opium 
use. The khan, in his fmal months, had been trying to groom Roshan for the khanship, but 
given the non-hereditary nature of the position, he could do little more than make his 
wish known and try to impart some of his status to Roshan by selecting Roshan as his 
companion for the Hajj and by leaving him a modest inheritance. 162 Despite these efforts, 
some Kyrgyz began saying there were in fact two khans: one, Hajji Roshan, in Minara 
(the area stretching northeast from the middle part of the lake, Chakmaktyn Kol) and 
another, Hajji Osman, in the region southwest of the lake. 
By 2010, Wahid Khan, the ABP commander, had become involved in the dispute 
(whether his mediation was sought or if he simply inserted himself is unclear) and he 
endorsed Hajji Roshan. Even this was insufficient and in 2011 another Kyrgyz delegation 
went down to Ishkashim, putting the matter of the khanship again before W ahid Khan. 
This time he wrote a letter stating that Hajji Roshan was recognized by the Afghan 
government as the Kyrgyz khan. Some Kyrgyz, perhaps recalling the suspicions 
surrounding Hajji Turdi Akhun's appointment to the Meshrano Jirga, quietly voiced 
suggestions of bribery. In any case, those Kyrgyz disinclined to support Hajji Roshan as 
khan were not swayed by Wahid Khan' s letter and continued to claim that Hajji Osman, 
162 As noted previously, while great personal wealth is not a prerequisite for a khan, having the resources to 
handle the ritual obligations of hospitality are mandatory. Such resources include spare labor to entertain 
and provide for the needs of guests, ample stocks of imported commodities (tea, rice, flour, etc.), and 
sufficient disposable livestock (sheep) to provide meat to important guests or during formal meetings 
hosted by the khan. 
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not Roshan, was "their khan." The seeing intractability of this stalemate led some Kyrgyz 
informants to voice concerns that violence could erupt between the two factions. 
When I interviewed him in September 2010, Hajji Osman did not claim to be the 
khan, but declared that he would not recognize Roshan as khan either. At the time, 
Osman, already the rais-e shura of his CDC, was more interested in lobbying Zalmai 
Khan for Hajji Turdi Akhun's position in the Meshrano Jirga, which was up for 
reappointment that year. Toward that end, he had spent five months in Kabul during the 
2009-2010 winter, meeting with various government officials (but not Karzai) and trying 
to secure some aid for the Little Pamir Kyrgyz as well as pressing the case for a road to 
be built to the Little Pamir rather than the Great Pamir. Echoing what I had just heard in 
the Great Pamir, Hajji Osman stated that there wasn't much need for a khan anymore 
since that CDCs in the Little Pamir, led by eight rais-e shuras, provided sufficient 
governance. Like Akhun, Osman appears more motivated by wealth than power, and is 
reluctant to shoulder the middleman' s responsibilities to his constituents that come with 
being khan. 
The 2010 Election 
On September 18, 2010, Afghanistan had its second parliamentary election, for 
the Wolesi Jirga. More than 2,500 candidates ran for 249 seats. As with the 2009 
presidential and provincial council elections, there were widespread accusations of fraud, 
voter intimidation, and disenfranchisement. The Independent Election Commission, 
which has constitutional authority for all elections, ordered recounts in seven provinces, 
including Badakhshan. The final results were ce1iified on October 31 , 2010, after 9,878 
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of the votes cast in Badakhshan were invalidated. Alhaj Zalmai Mujaddadi, running as an 
incumbent, received 16,410 votes, the most (7 .1%) of any of the 97 candidates who ran in 
Badakhshan. 
The results of the election, in which a number of Pashtun incumbents lost their 
seats, including ones from Pashtun-majority provinces, created at least two dilemmas for 
Karzai. First, Pashtuns represent Karzai's ethnic base yet there was already a widespread 
sense among them of alienation from his government. As the International Crisis Group 
noted 
The deepening ethnic divide among Afghan political elites was also 
apparent [at the start of Karzai's second elected term]. The number of 
Pashtuns nominated [for cabinet positions, subject to approval by the 
Wolesi Jirga] in the first round outnumbered other ethnicities by a 
substantial margin. The increasing Pashtun tilt in key appointments 
reflects a four-year long trend in which Karzai has sought to shore up his 
traditional ethnic base with the perks of patronage even as much of the 
Pashtun belt sinks deeper into revolt against the Karzai government 
(2011: 3). 
Despite the pro-Pashtun bias that has come to define Karzai ' s second term (ibid), many 
Pashtuns still believe that they have been unfairly excluded from their traditional heights 
of power in the government and the military, with the paradoxical result that "It was his 
[Karzai' s] own coethnics that were the most discontented with his government, in spite of 
the fact that they played a dominant role in it" (Barfield, 2010: 324). The results of the 
2010 election only served to confirm this perception. Previously, 120 seats in the Wolesi 
Jirga had been held by Pashtuns, a percentage (48.2%) in excess of their proportion of 
Afghanistan's population (42%, according to the CIA World Fact Book). 163 In the 2010 
election, Pashtun incumbents lost 26 seats, leaving some Pashtun-majority provinces with 
163 https://www.cia.gov/Jibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html 
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few or no Pashtun representatives. In Pashtun-dominated Ghazni province, for example, 
all eleven seats went to Hazara candidates, largely because of a lack of polling stations 
and low voter turnout in the insurgency-plagued Pashtun areas. 164 
The other problem for Karzai was that many of the losers in the election were his 
allies and he now faced the prospect of diminished influence over the Wolesi Jirga, the 
only chamber in the National Assembly really capable of checking the strong executive 
branch. Without a pliable Lower House, Karzai risked having his ministerial choices 
rejected and his legislative agenda stymied, as had happened following the 2005 
parliamentary elections, when "the parliament quickly became the locus of opposition to 
his administration" (Barfield, 2010: 301). Yet because 
... allegiances [among MPs] remain fluid, they are subject to considerable 
interference from above. The lack of consolidated groups in the Wolesi 
Jirga since 2005 has been highly beneficial to the president. Given the 
availability of financial resources, he has been able to persuade MPs to 
support certain bills at strategic moments. This remains the case, but 
Karzai's concern with the ethnic composition of the new parliament could 
be linked to the fear that a stronger Hazara contingent may, in the current 
context, promote the so-called "opposition" and prevent-or at least make 
more costly-some of the bargaining he has been able to undertake in the 
past (Coburn and Larson, 2011: 10).165 
Besides a number of extra-constitutional steps taken in an effort to placate his 
supporters and regain leverage over the Wolesi Jirga, Karzai also exercised his 
constitutional prerogatives. While ultimately limited in what he could do to change the 
outcome of the Wolesi Jirga election results, Karzai did have 34 appointments to the 
164 In other areas, a number of incumbents, including some Pashtuns, lost their seats after the Independent 
Election Commission invalidated ballots based on credible evidence of fraud. 
165 The authors of this report go on to note that " .. . it would be wrong to assume that the parliament will 
break down along ethnic lines. The sizeable Hazara contingent (50-60 MPs) is unlikely to form a 
consolidated or consistent interest group in parliament because they are split along regional and political 
party lines" (Coburn and Larson, 2011: 1 0). 
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Meshrano Jirga at his disposal, since all of the previously appointed incumbents' five-
year terms had expired in December 2010 and they were up for reappointment. In 
February 2011 , Karzai fmally submitted the list of his appointments to the Senate. Ofthe 
34 sitting senators (two of whom were from Badakhshan), 15 were reappointed and 19 
new members were appointed. 166 Of these, 11 were Pashtuns (three were from Ghazni). 
Only one appointee was from Badakhshan. It was not Hajji Turdi Akhun. 
While Akhun did not face any serious political challenges from anyone else in the 
Great Parnir, there had been a risk of the seat going to someone from the Little Pamir. 
Led by Hajji Osman, the Little Pamir Kyrgyz had been petitioning Zalmai Khan to 
recommend one of them (likely Osman himself) to Karzai for the position, claiming that 
in the interest of fairness and parity every five years the seat should rotate between the 
two Pamirs. Zalmai Khan's proposed solution, as he told me in September 2010, was to 
get two appointed seats in the Meshrano Jirga allocated to the Kyrgyz (one for each 
Pamir)-an unlikely prospect in any case, given that Karzai was likely to view an extra 
"Kyrgyz seat" as a waste of an appointment, but especially so after the 2010 election. 
Failing that, Mujaddadi realized he would have to choose between recommending Hajji 
Turdi Akhun to be reappointed for five more years or selecting another Kyrgyz, most 
likely someone from the Little Pamir. Zalmai Khan was coy when I asked who he might 
choose from the latter; he mentioned Hajji Osman, who had been lobbying hard for the 
position, but suggested that he might chose "someone different, a third person better 
166 The 34 appointees were from the following provinces: Kabul (7), Ghazni (3), Balkh (2), Faryab (2), 
Kunar (2), mohajireen (2), representing expatriate Afghans, and one each from Badakhshan, Baghlan, Dai 
Kundi , Helman_d, Herat, Jowzjan, Kandahar, Kapisa, Maidan Wardak, Nangarhar, Nimruz, Panjsher, 
Paktia, Parwan, Samangan, and Zabul. Thus, 13 provinces have no appointees in the Meshrano Jirga, just 
two senators drawn from the Provincial Coucils. 
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qualified than either candidate [Akhun or Osman]," and mentioned Hajji Roshan. 167 In 
the end, though, the Kyrgyz's efforts were for naught, and the zero-sum competition 
between the Great and the Little Pamir for the Meshrano Jirga seat was eclipsed by much 
bigger zero-sum contests. 
The Last Khan? 
Besides the question of who will be the next khan lies the greater issue of whether 
there will even be another khan at all. With the CDCs established in both Pamirs, many 
Kyrgyz claim that "the time of khans is finished" (khandardyn waqty khalas boldu) and 
that they need-and, with the CDCs, have-a new, more democratic model of leadership. 
The CDCs received the second disbursement of NSP funds in August-September 2010 
and in both Pamirs the Kyrgyz were able to improve and complete the projects they had 
begun in 2009 (mostly irrigation canals to boost fodder production). Now, having been 
established as a viable and credible institution, in addition to (in most cases) having 
received a greater amount of funding in 201 0 compared to 2009, the elected members of 
the CDCs have amassed more political capital, such that many Kyrgyz believe, as one 
told me, "We don' t need a khan any longer. We have rais-e shura." Another informant, 
lauding the more democratic nature of the CDCs, stated that "khans were a thing of our 
fathers and grandfathers." 
In some ways, the waning authority of the khanship and its possible replacement 
by other, more formal leadership statuses, could be seen as simply part of a broader trend 
in recent Afghan history. Of course, as I have argued, there were very specific factors that 
167 Roshan was considerably younger than the constitutionally-mandated minimum age of 35 for the 
Meshrano Jirga, although it is doubtful that this alone would have prevented his selection. Many political 
figures in Afghanistan have been caught falsify ing their age to make them old enough to run for office. 
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accounted for the shift from Hajji Rahman Kul's power to the much more nominal 
authority of Hajji Abdul Rashid: different means of accumulating political capital, a 
much weaker basis for patronage, and a greatly changed political landscape in 
Afghanistan. But, as Azoy noted during his fieldwork in northern Afghanistan in the late 
1970s, the power of the "old-style, rural khans of the North" (2012: 154) was much 
diminished as a result of increased state encapsulation. Barfield saw this marginalization 
as a deliberate policy of the Afghan state as it tried to exert greater bmeaucratic authority 
and directly administer various areas that previously had been ruled by co-opting tribal 
leaders (1981: 61-62). But, he added, "While the central government had been effective 
in expanding its power into the countryside, its goals were limited to encapsulating local 
political structmes in order to prevent them from causing trouble. It never attempted to 
displace or transform the deep-rooted social organization in which most people lived out 
their lives" (20 10: 220). 
More recently, Coburn observed that "Maliks, and the entire qaum system, had 
lost some of their power over the past thirty years, yet predictions of their demise from 
studies in the 1960s and 1970s have proven premature" (20 11: 109-11 0). The reason, as 
he goes on to note, is that "The political upheaval and lack of government presence 
[dming the 1980s-1990s] created a space in which the qaum system continued to survive, 
though sometimes in an altered form" (2011: 11 0). The same is also true for the Kyrgyz's 
informal political structure, except that additionally in the Pamirs the khanship was not 
challenged by any other leadership status or political system that threatened "the 
reduction of khan authority and their removal to the periphery of events" (Azoy, 2012: 
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75). If anything, the Soviet occupation of the Pamirs reinforced the importance of the 
informal system of authority, with the need for influential Kyrgyz to act as middlemen. 168 
Hence, the roles and responsibilities of the Kyrgyz khanship were simply adapted to 
whatever was required for liaising with the dominant power (Soviet forces, mujahideen 
commanders) but the institution itselfwas never at risk of being completely displaced (or 
even replaced) by other forms of leadership. This was in contrast to many other parts of 
northern Afghanistan, where 
The conflict [the anti-Soviet jihad] ... had demanded knowledge and skills 
usually not possessed by the old-line khans. Power shifted to a new and 
younger generation of Resistance "commanders" who, like their 
predecessors, were dependent on followers whom they attracted by spoils 
and the prospect of more spoils. Principally these spoils came in the form 
of weapons and other war equipment, either captured from the enemy or 
sent-together with saddlebags of cash-from Pakistan (Azoy, 2012: 
123). 
The end result was that the qomandans prevailed in the thirty-year contest for 
authority and "militia commanders have now [post-2001] supplanted rural khans in top 
echelons across the North" (Azoy, 2012: 156; c.f. Dorronsoro, 2005: 120-122). Giustozzi 
refers to these qomandan as "new Khans" since they have taken over "the social and 
political role of the old notables" (2009: 34), to include status-marker activities such as 
buzkashi sponsorship (Azoy, 2012: 154-165 passim). 
In contrast to the setbacks occurring in the formal (the loss of Hajji Turdi Akhun's 
seat in the Senate) and informal (Hajji Abdul Rashid Khan's death and the inability to 
reach consensus on selecting a new khan) systems, the CDCs at fust glance do appear to 
offer a more stable and participatory form of leadership. However, the early experience 
168 A similar dynamic appear to have been fairly common in other areas also unaffected by war and 
insurgency (c.f. Dorronsoro, 2005 : 121 and Giustozzi, 2009: 34). 
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of the Kyrgyz with the CDCs suggests that the NSP is likely to prove anything but 
enduring in the future. It was not until the first tranche ofNSP funds arrived in 2009 that 
the Kyrgyz began to take the CDCs seriously. Even then there was skepticism that more 
funds would follow the next year. This unce1iainty diminished not only the willingness of 
the various communities to invest any of their own labor or resources into the projects, at 
least until the next year's funds arrived, but also initially circumscribed the authority of 
the CDC leaders. Had, for some reason, the 2010 funds not been disbursed, it is unclear 
what would have occurred but it is likely that many Kyrgyz would have felt vindicated in 
their earlier disregard of the program. And while it is probable that the NSP will remain 
funded in the near future, the money will not last indefinitely. For the CDC leaders in the 
Pamirs, whose political capital mostly comes from their distribution of NSP resources, 
the fact that they were elected to their positions will not mean very much if they lose the 
ability to treat the NSP like any other patronage network, through which they are able to 
redistribute resources to their supporters. 
While the drying up of NSP resources threatens to unsettle domestic politics, 
arguably a greater risk is that without any well-connected middlemen pressing their case 
in Kabul and soliciting other forms of patronage, the Kyrgyz truly will find themselves 
"forgotten on the roof of the world" (Paley, 2012). As Afghanistan enters a new, post-
ISAF period, and as the availability of external resources contracts/ 69 existing patronage 
networks will be reconstituted and redirected to areas of greater strategic importance to 
the Afghan government as it tries to maintain its neo-patrimonial power. Given the 
169 The World Bank estimates that "97 percent of Afghanistan's GDP is derived from spending related to 
the international military and donor community presence" (United States Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 2011: 24). 
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central importance of cross-border drug trafficking to the various former Jamiat 
commanders in Badakhshan (whether they hold formal positions or not), as well as the 
recent increase in opium poppy cultivation in the province, 170 it is likely that, post-2014, 
sources of patronage will flow from within the province rather than from Kabul: "The 
provincial networks will grow increasingly autonomous, because the redistribution of 
state resources through state patronage will probably be less effective in the future. 
Networks linked to drugs or contraband will likely become more independent while the 
system in general grows more fragile" (Dorr-onsoro, 2012: 13). If so, the experience of 
the 1990s, when the responsibility of leaders was to minimize harm caused by the 
mujahideen rather than to mobilize resources, suggests that it is doubtful whether the 
Kyrgyz will find much benefit from this smi of patrimonial politics. And though NGOs, 
the UN, and other international bodies will still offer an alternative source of patronage 
for local leaders, it will be on a scale much reduced from the past decade. 
A Future on the Bam-e Dunya? 
For the first time since 2005, the Kyrgyz do not have any formal representatives 
in government and even if another Kyrgyz were to be appointed to the Meshrano Jirga, 
this would not happen until 2016 (when the term of the current 34 appointees is up). 
Their patrons in Kabul-President Karzai, Zalmai Khan-are consumed with more 
pressing matters than the welfare of the Kyrgyz, such as combating a robust insurgency, 
dealing with the transition to Afghan responsibility for security as ISAF withdraws, and 
170 According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), poppy cultivation in Badakhshan increased 
97% between 2009-2010 and 55% between 2010-2011 (UNODC, 2010: 3; UNODC, 2011 : 3). However, 
these levels are still a fraction of peak cultivation in 2004, when 15,067 ha of poppy were grown (compared 
to 1,100 ha in 2010 and 1,705 ha in 2011). 
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jockeying for power in advance of the 2014 presidential election amid a complicated 
mosaic of shifting loyalties and ethnic factions. One thing the Kyrgyz do increasingly 
share with the power-brokers down in Kabul is the idea of fleeing Afghanistan if things 
get really bad after 2014. 
Unfortunately, their assets cannot be put into a suitcase and carried to Dubai, so 
the Kyrgyz are much more limited in their exit strategies. Remaining in the Pamirs and 
enduring whatever the future brings is the default option. Other alternatives include 
abandoning pastoralism in the hope of finding some new means of subsistence in a 
different land Goining their kinsmen in Turkey is often mentioned in this regard) or 
remaining herders but trying to fmd new pasturelands in Kyrgyzstan or China. 171 But, as 
Afghanistan continues to fade from international (and the media's) consciousness, it is 
probable that not only will the Kyrgyz lose what limited attention and assistance they 
cunently receive but that what they consider their trump card, the threat of emigrating, 
will prove to be of little value. The assumption the Kyrgyz make is that the Afghan state 
wants them to remain in the Pamirs, would be greatly embruTassed by their departure, and 
thus is willing to offer them various incentives to stay there. But, faced with more 
existential concerns, the state might decide that another Kyrgyz exodus is not worth 
preempting, which would shift the onus onto the Kyrgyz to make good on their threat. 
Besides undercutting what little, and constantly diminishing, leverage they have 
with the Afghan government, such a response would force them to actually make some 
171 The Kyrgyz never mention Tajikistan as a possible destination, probably because they are aware of the 
generally poor economic situation there and the problems of rangeland over-grazing. They are somewhat 
cognizant that Kyrgyzstan is also facing difficult economic times, but assume that China and Turkey, both 
"besyar bar dawlattar" (very rich countries), have ample ability (not to mention desire) to host them should 
they decide to emigrate. 
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tangible effort to emigrate, which, regardless of their intended destination, is not likely to 
be either quick or painless. The last thing that China wants is a sudden influx of 1,150 
Muslims into Xinjiang. Tajikistan, a failing state, is hardly prepared to absorb a large 
number of dependent refugees. Kyrgyzstan, as discussed in the previous chapter, would 
probably still welcome the Afghan Kyrgyz but would probably want to locate them 
somewhere other than an urban center and may well try to use them as pawns to establish 
more of a Kyrgyz presence in Uzbek areas in the south, much like the Turkish 
government did with the Kyrgyz refugees in 1982, when it resettled them in a majority 
Kurdish area. And. lastly, it is unclear whether the bonds of kinship are such that the 
Kyrgyz in Turkey (or the Turkish government) would really welcome the arrival of more 
Kyrgyz refugees from the Afghan Pamir when pastoral resources in the area around their 
village, Ulu Pamir, are already at capacity. If there is a "last migration" for the Afghan 
Kyrgyz, no one knows where it will be. 
On a final, more subjective note, an additional concern is not just where the 
Kyrgyz might go, but what they would find there. In their own minds, many Kyrgyz have 
romanticized what life would be like outside of the Pamir; as one informant told me in 
2010, "If we knew in 1999 what we know now [about the outside world], there's no way 
we would not have gone to Kyrgyzstan." What they often forget is that, in contrast to 
pastoralism, subsistence via farming or wage labor is considerably more arduous, in 
addition to being something they are poorly skilled to do. It is possible, perhaps even 
likely, that Hajji Osman really was speaking for the entire community, rather than just his 
dissident faction, when he told me, "We went to Tajikistan, and we came back. We went 
292 
to China, and we came back. We went to Pakistan, and we came back. Why would we 
leave for anywhere else? This is our watan [homeland]." After all, one of the few 
questions that I could always count on a simple and consistent reply to was the same one 
that brought me to the Pamirs to begin with: "Why do you stay up here? Why not go 
somewhere else, with roads and schools and hospitals, and leave the Pamir behind?" To 
which they would reply, invariably, "This is our watan. This is our homeland." 
CONCLUSION- ON THE BANKS OF 
THE OXUS AND THE JAXARTES 
Does the preceding analysis of Afghan Kyrgyz political organization and 
strategies answer Voltaire's challenge and tell us anything beyond the succession of "one 
barbarian by another barbarian"? If so, what is the broader utility provided by an 
understanding of how leadership is achieved, legitimized, maintained and contested in 
Afghan Kyrgyz society? And, in a small community like that of the Kyrgyz, why are 
leaders necessary at all, especially now that the Afghan state has greater presence among 
the Kyrgyz than ever before? 
Many of the ongoing debates over what can perhaps most broadly be summarized 
as "tribe and state relations" in Central Asia are primarily concerned with reinterpreting 
previous analyses of how informal leadership articulates with the authority of the state 
(Beckwith, 2011; Gullette, 201 0; Sneath, 2007). While revisionist approaches to Central 
Asian history and anthropology can provide useful discussion by challenging the received 
wisdom, their relevance to modem political conflicts is often limited by an over-reliance 
on historical sources and a dearth of recent case studies. Shahrani, in a critique of 
anthropological approaches to "traditional local leadership in rural contexts," noted that 
"the study of national conflicts involving central governments and rural populations is 
largely left to historians and political scientists" (1986: 255) and suggested that 
"systematic use of longitudinal data in the form of life-histories of traditional local 
leaders as well as elicitation of native conceptions of leadership may provide us with a 
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more valuable clue dowards constructing better and more dynamic models of leadership 
than those we are working with" (1986: 269). 
The Afghan Kyrgyz offer an important example of the resiliency and adaptability 
of local populatons to political and economic changes, including the relationship between 
informal governance, in the form of leadership, and formal government. 172 Following 
Fredrik Barth's study of Pashtun society, in which his intent was to give "a descriptive 
analysis of the political system of Swat, with special reference to the sources of political 
authority, and the form of organization within which this authority is exercised" (1965: 
1 ), my aim has been primarily to provide a granular, ethnographically-grounded account 
of Kyrgyz leadership in the context ofpost-Taliban Mghanistan. First, I wanted this work 
to stand as a credible and accurate re-study of fieldwork that had been conducted among 
the Kyrgyz in the 1970s, by Remy Dor (1975) and Nazif Shahrani (1979). Their 
ethnographies, far more descriptive than theoretical, provide both reference points and 
points of departure, and I have likewise endeavored to anchor my arguments and 
conclusions to the "facts on the ground"-just forty years later. Second, and again 
following Barth, I have sought to emphasize the transactional nature of Kyrgyz politics, 
rather than locate my analysis either in social structure or else in its post-structural 
equivalent, the hegemony of the state. Leadership in Kyrgyz society is not simply some 
formulaic result of their clan-based social organization but neither is it driven entirely 
from the top-down, in the process of their encapsulation by the Afghan state. 
172 As Barfield and Nojumi (20 10: 40) caution, it is a mistake to equate governance with government in 
places like Afghanistan where "one finds adequate local governance in the absence of formal government 
institutions." 
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Both Dor and Shahrani lived among the Kyrgyz when Hajji Rahman Kul's power 
was at its apogee: he owned more livestock than any other Kyrgyz, counted almost half 
of all Kyrgyz households as his amanat clients, and enjoyed an excellent relationship 
with officials in all strata of government but most importantly at the national level. But 
because ofthe egalitarian ethos of Kyrgyz society, in which, theoretically, no man is born 
into a position of leadership, Kul also required some sort of political capital to be 
recognized as a legitimate khan since these three factors alone-wealth, patronage, and 
influence-do not inherently translate into leadership without some sort of conversion 
occurring by way of a desire to lead and the acceptance of one's leadership (Bailey, 2001: 
156). For Rahman Kul, his wealth, combined with the amanat system that had developed 
as part of the "closed frontiers nomadism" the Kyrgyz were forced to adopt, gave him a 
tangible, structural means of accumulating political capital. His political connections with 
Kabul only further buttressed his position domestically. 
But the sources of political capital are not static, as noted by most prominently by 
Bourdieu. Kyrgyz leaders oppmtunistically exploit different sorts of capital--economic, 
social, cultural-based on their availability as well as the needs and desires of the 
community they aspire to lead. During Rahman Kul's time, livestock were the resource 
he possessed in abundance and, through the amanat system, were what his followers 
received in return for accepting his leadership. Due to various leveling effects, described 
in Chapter Five, combined with the Soviet presence in the Pamirs during the 1980s, 
external assistance, in the form of commodities, medical care, access to markets, and 
development aid, replaced amanat livestock as the source of political capital. The fluid 
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nature of political capital was noted by the Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca in the 
nineteenth century, who observed that "as soon as there is a shift in the balance of 
political forces-when, that is, a need is felt that capacities different from the old should 
assert themselves in the management of the state, when the old capacities, therefore, lose 
some of their importance or changes in their distribution occur-then the manner in 
which the ruling class is constituted changes also" (1939: 65). 
In the case of the Kyrgyz, wealth alone no longer sufficed as political capital, 
since most households were smallholders, capable of meeting their own subsistence 
without having amanat animals. The fact that the richest man in the Little Pamir, 
Apendibai, never held any position of leadership testifies to this shift in what Mosca calls 
"the political formula," which "must be based upon the special beliefs and the strongest 
sentiments of the social group in which it is current, or at least upon the beliefs and 
sentiments of the particular portion of that group which holds political preeminence" 
(1939: 72). 
The administrative encapsulation of the Kyrgyz during the Soviet occupation 
required the khan to act as middleman between the external powers and his own 
community. Doing so allowed him to mobilize the various external resources that were 
available to him owing to his relationship with the encapsulating power. These were 
resources desired by the community but which they could only procure by acting 
collectively in te1ms of supporting the khan. Political capital accrued because the khan 
had exclusive access to these resources, both practically and symbolically, by virtue of 
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standing at the apex of an opportunistic and dynamic system that served to extract these 
resources. Abner Cohen (1974: 80) nicely summarizes this dynamic: 
The leadership process consists in the contribution of individuals towards 
the organizational problems of the group ... the leaders fulfill their 
functions thorough the manipulation of symbols .. . It is the structural 
situation of the group that determines what type of symbols are more 
effective than others and hence what type of leader is needed ... Underlying 
the symbolic process .. .is the creation of normative obligations which bind 
the members of the group together, both the leaders and the led. As a 
result, the leader is given by the group power which he exercises for the 
group. This power is normative in nature. It is essentially symbolic. 
Central Asian Models of Political Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a slippery concept and often has an ipso facto basis, so any analysis 
of it involves answering two basic questions: what is legitimacy, in terms of how it is 
socially constructed, and how is it achieved? For instance, the tianming (Mandate of 
Heaven) of ancient China provided at best a tautological definition of legitimacy, since 
the previous rulers only became illegitimate after falling to new ones, whose success 
proved that they had inherited the fmmer' s legitimacy: 
Having overthrown the Shang, the founders of Chou [Zhou] had to justify 
their right to rule. Consequently, they developed the doctrine of the 
Mandate of Heaven, a self-evident moral law ... The Chou asserted, 
therefore, that the Shang, though they had received the mandate to rule, 
had forfeited it because they had failed in their duties. The mandate then 
passed on to the founders of Chou (Chan, 1963: 3) 
It is more often the case that questions of legitimacy arise not concerning what, 
but rather, why-why a certain person or group of persons should rule. Various theorists 
have proposed a number of different taxonomies, such as Weber's traditional, 
charismatic, and legal-rational forms, and David Easton's three-fold classification of the 
possible bases for legitimacy: ideological, structural, and personal (1965: 18). 
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When considering legitimacy and Kyrgyz politics, more useful than identifying a 
particular type of overarching legitimacy is accounting for two other factors that directly 
affect political outcomes: how sustainable a given source of legitimacy is and how 
different forms of legitimacy can also serve to limit competition for positions of 
leadership. Both are clearly relevant concerns for any leader and the degree of their 
existence (or absence) will determine how much effort a leader will have to expend to 
establish and maintain his legitimacy. 
Sustainability refers to what costs the maintenance of any giVen type of 
legitimacy will entail. From the perspective of a leader, the ideal smi of legitimacy is one 
that is self-sustaining and largely internalized by his followers, such as Easton's 
ideological legitimacy-a normative belief that has been internalized to the degree that it 
appears to be the nature order of things (Mosca, 1939: 106-7). The opposite would be 
coercive force, a notoriously weak basis for legitimacy since it requires constant 
maintenance, an often impossible degree of oversight, and provides no guarantee of 
acceptance. Another type of legitimacy is primarily economic, in the form of patronage 
and/or exchange. This idea of transactionalism is usually associated with Fredrik Barth's 
monograph, Political Leadership among the Swat Pathans. Accordingly, it is worth 
quoting at length from Barth: 
In the idiom of Swat Pashto, the world is divided into two kinds of 
people: mar sa(f, 'satisfied men', and wuge sarf, 'hungry men'. The 
'satisfied men' have enough food in their storehouses to feed the families 
of scores of 'hungry men' throughout the year. The chief, by his 
overwhelming wealth, is thus not only in a position to offer occasional 
gifts and hospitality; he can really make a substantial contribution to the 
subsistence of his followers. If offered such a contribution over a period of 
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time, a poor man inevitably bases his domestic economy on it. The 
possibility of being cut off becomes a major threat. 
It is against this background that the importance of gifts and 
hospitality as a source of the chiefs political authority must be 
understood. Gift-giving and hospitality are potent means of controlling 
others, not because ofthe debts they create, but because of the recipient's 
dependence on their continuation. A continuous flow of gifts creates needs 
and fosters dependence, and the threat of its being cut off becomes a 
powerful disciplinary device (1965: 79) 
The primary shortcoming of patronage, as Kyrgyz leaders understand very well, is that, 
similar to coercion, it becomes an unceasing process, requiring a constant supply of 
mostly exogenous inputs in order to meet demand. When this demand goes unfulfilled, 
support is withdrawn. 
In the Central Asian context, kinship and descent have historically offered a self-
sustaining basis for ideological legitimacy, as well as political organization: 
"Organizational capacity is itself [author's italics] explicable as deriving from the 
acceptance of ranking and authority, an acceptance that is embedded in the Central Asian 
kinship structure" (Lindholm, 1986: 351). The Mongol confederation established by 
Chinggis Khan in the thirteenth century provides an excellent example of these dynamics 
and, viewed alongside Kyrgyz transactionalism, offers an illustrative juxtaposition of 
different forms of legitimacy. 
Chinggis Khan' s power was seen, at least by his fellow Mongols, as legitimate 
according to an "idiom of kinship" (Barfield, 1991: 165) that required little justification, 
since the Mongols ' entire social structure was predicated upon hierarchical kinship 
relations. In contrast to the politically egalitarian pastoral tribes of North Africa and the 
Middle East, whose 'asabiyya (group solidarity) was famously described by Ibn Khaldun, 
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the nomads of Central Asia had a tradition of hierarchical leadership, based on "culturally 
legitimated" hierarchical kinship organization and hereditary leaders (Barfield, 1991: 
157). The key difference is that, whereas political organization among Middle Eastern 
nomads was limited by this egalitarianism (as well as clan endogamy) to the 
complementary opposition of segmentary lineages, the Central Asian nomads were able 
to form confederations, whether by alliance or conquest, involving unrelated tribes. This, 
in tum, significantly expanded the number of personnel that could be mobilized for 
effective military action. 
Chinggis Khan's confederation had its roots in the pastoral nomadic social 
structure and kinship systems of the Turko-Mongols. As Lindholm notes, "The lineage 
structure of Central Asia is thus of a peculiar type that is especially liable to the evolution 
of hierarchy and social stratification" (1986: 341 ). Patrilineal herding groups were 
organized into conical clans, based on descent from a common ancestor but ranked and 
segmented hierarchically according to genealogical distance from the ancestor (Sahlins 
1968: 24). Exogamy served to bind non-patrilineally related groups and "reciprocal 
marriage ties created patterns of alliances that crosscut the seemingly rigid set of 
patrilineal relationships within a conical clan" (Barfield 1991: 164-5). Rules of 
inheritance dictated that a father's political influence, if any, passed to his eldest son, 
while the youngest son's patrimony was his father's estate-his yurt and the original 
pasture lands. 
Genealogy provided the foundation of the Turko-Mongol conical clan, since 
seniority determined the ranking of any given lineage: "the various bones or paternal 
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descent lines are collaterally ranked according to the birth of their founders, and are thus 
considered senior and junior to each other. Of the various collateral patrilines, the senior 
in order of descent from the founding ancestor, the line of eldest sons, is the most noble" 
(Krader, 1963: 322). This principle of seniority173 often had the effect of limiting political 
leadership to senior clans (based, in tum, on senior lineages). However, in practice, this 
principle was limited to status and primarily guided decisions concerning allocation of 
pasture, social and military obligations, and the structure of local political authority 
(Barfield 1992: 26). The problem was that Mongol rules of inheritance, while well-suited 
for the distribution of pasturage and property, proved incapable as a means of regulating 
political succession. 
The hierarchical principles of seniority were applied differently toward the issues 
of inheriting property and political succession. In the latter context, such principles "only 
set the parameters of succession struggles. They determined who could compete, not who 
would emerge victorious" (Barfield, 1992: 207), which was ultimately determined 
through a process Joseph Fletcher called "blood tanistry" (1979). Because hierarchy as a 
basis for political institutions-encompassing multiple lineages, clans and even different 
tribes-was more of a "system in reserve," with little bearing on ordinary interactions, 
political succession, when an issue, tended to follow the principle of seniority, but there 
were no absolute rules such as strict primogeniture. 
The institutionalization of power through rules (or at least parameters) of 
succession that create a permanent hierarchy, is also "an institutionalization of 
173 The "purity" of lineage was also an aspect of seniority: there could be no unce1tainty of paternity (as in 
the case of Chinggis Khan's son J ochi) and the sons of principal wives were ranked higher than those born 
by secondary wives or concubines (Barfield 1992: 207). 
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inequality" (Lewellen 1992: 60). Following Chinggis Khan's death in 1227, the idea of 
legitimate sovereignty based on agnatic descent from a particular lineage (in this case, 
Chinggisid) was fi1mly established (McChesney 2000: 75). In practice, this meant that 
only lineal kinsmen of Chinggis Khan were eligible for the khanship. The delimitation of 
how power could be exercised and contested in the Mongol empire had the effect of 
creating a political elite, 174 namely those members of the community "entitled to compete 
for honors and power" (Bailey 2001: 23). However, because "the right to succession was 
ultimately upheld by the ability to fend off rivals, by force if necessary" (Barfield, 1992: 
209), the political elite were forced to ally with those followers barred from direct 
competition to form what has been referred to as "contract political teams" (Lewellen, 
1992: 116), with the "contract" based on patronage, in terms of both material goods and 
access to functionary positions of leadership within the hierarchy of power: "Chingiz 
Khan rose not by affirming kinship, but by suppressing it in favor of clients and 
'companions"' (Lindholm, 1986: 350). 
BmTowing from the ideological foundations of a society based on ranked and 
segmented hierarchies, the rule of Chinggisid descent created a de jure ruling class with a 
monopoly on political power. Following the model of the ruling class proposed by 
Mosca, the Mongols did not "justify their power exclusively by de facto possession of it, 
but [tried] to find a moral and legal basis for it" (1939: 70). The tradition of hereditary 
khanship, as a political institution among the Mongols, had not only to be legitimated but, 
174 The political elite were, to use Bailey's terminology, ascribed; that is, one was born into the position that 
pennitted competition (200 1: 24-25). 
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in many respects, invented, 175 so as to "foster the corporate sense of superiority [author's 
italics] of elites-particularly when these had to be recruited from those who did not 
already possess it by birth or ascription-rather than by inculcating a sense of obedience 
in inferiors" (Hobsbawm 1983: 10). A legitimated superiority, along with a monopoly on 
the exercise of coercive power, together comprised Ibn Khaldun's "royal authority" 
(1967: 108). 
In this context, the principle of descent from Chinggis Khan served a threefold 
function: it delimited the ruling class; secured their access to (or at least the right to 
compete for) power; and provided the "political formula" by which "every governing 
class tends to justify its actual exercise of power by resting it on some universal moral 
principle" (Mosca 1939: 62). Although it consigned the majority of the Mongols-not to 
mention their non-Mongol subjects-to a comparatively "lowly station" in life, this 
political formula satisfied the need "so universally felt ... of knowing that one is governed 
not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force, but on the basis of a moral 
principle" (Mosca 1939: 71). 
The Kyrgyz khanship, like every other political institution, including the Mongol 
khans discussed above, similarly requires some sort of legitimation. But because the 
Kyrgyz genealogical system, unlike that of the Mongols, is non-hierarchical, lacking 
ranked lineage segments, there is no ruling class delimited by the kinship structure. This 
means that, in theory, everyone has the right to compete for leadership. Those who 
175 The Mongols seem to have adopted each of Eric Hobsbawm's three types of "invented traditions" : 
"a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial 
communities, b) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those 
whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of 
behavior" (1983: 9). 
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successfully occupy a position of leadership do so through achievement, not ascription 
(or coercive force), 176 and as a result the Afghan Kyrgyz have little in the way of 
ideological or "sacred legitimacy" since transactional support based on the redistribution 
of resources provides the basis for political clientelism and cooperation and there is no 
additional need to invoke a legitimizing ideology beyond simple pragmatism and self-
interest. And because the khan occupies a status rather than an office, there is typically no 
formal process of acclamation, so the patronage benefits the khan provides the 
community in his role as middleman, rather than any formal investiture of authority such 
as elections, serve as the basis for his legitimacy. Patronage provides a metric, both actual 
and symbolic, ofhis success as a transactional leader. 
For most of the thirty years that Abdul Rashid was khan (and, before him, Hajji 
Rahman Kul's thirty years as khan), the assumption that, in fact, there should be a khan 
went largely unchallenged. Abdul Rashid was certainly fortunate in that events during his 
tenure as khan-the return from Pakistan, the Soviet occupation, the mujahideen period 
and the civil war, and the establishment of a new post-Tali ban government-demanded 
that the Kyrgyz have some sort of leadership and external representative. The Soviet 
troops in the Pamirs also provided a new basis for patronage, offsetting the loss of the 
amanat system. And, as I mentioned in Chapter One, Abdul Rashid was canny enough to 
appropriate the symbols of the former khan, not just by acting as leader and patron but 
by, for example, moving to Rahman Kul's abandoned seasonal camps after returning 
from Pakistan. All of this served to establish and reinforce his legitimacy, including the 
176 However, one anthropologist who briefly visited the Kyrgyz in the 1970s did claim that tyranny and fear 
were aspects ofRahman Kul's power (Singer, 1976: 159-160). 
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continuity of symbolic forms: "It is possible to change power relationship [sic] in a 
society overnight, but a great deal of the symbols validating and supporting those 
relationships will survive and change only slowly ... In the new situation the old symbolic 
forms may perform new functions" (Cohen, 1974: 39). 
It was only towards the end of his life that Abdul Rashid began to confront 
legitimacy issues concerning not just whether he should remain the khan but if there 
should be a khan at all. The latter question marks a remarkable change in Kyrgyz 
attitudes towards leadership and authority, one largely driven by newly arrived notions of 
elective democracy and popular legitimacy (in the sense of possessing some "mandate of 
the people"), brought by the National Solidarity Program and, to a lesser degree, by the 
four nationwide elections that have occurred in Mghanistan since the Taliban were 
overthrown. The political formula continues to change as new avenues to leadership, 
mostly in the form of alternate means of extracting and distributing patronage, open up. 
For the first time in their history, the Afghan Kyrgyz have formally participated in 
government by sending a wakil to the Meshrano Jirga in Kabul, allowing them to more 
directly benefit from the neopatrimonial distribution of state resources. Similarly, the 
arrival of the NSP and the CDC elections that followed created a hybrid system with 
democratically elected leaders redistributing NSP resources. And in all the cases-khan, 
wakil, and rais-e shura-patronage served as political capital, the accumulation of which 
was reflected in greater domestic authority, to the point that the non-traditional forms of 
leadership (wakil, rais-e shura) threatened to displace "the authority of the eternal 
yesterday" invested in the khan. This process has only accelerated since Abdul Rashid' s 
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death; his pre-mortem attempt to groom his son Hajji Roshan for the khanship provoked a 
predictable backlash from much of the community, as (Roshan's personal shortcomings 
aside) it was widely believed that Roshan had done nothing to earn the position other 
than being born to Abdul Rashid. And, as discussed above, in Kyrgyz society ascription 
alone offers insufficient political capital and legitimacy for someone to be khan. 
It is impossible to predict what will become of the Kyrgyz, or, for that matter, 
what will happen in Afghanistan once ISAF's mission ends in 2014 and the international 
community, already weary from more than a decade's involvement there, seeks to 
extricate itself from "the graveyard of empires." The khan is dead, the wakil lost his 
position, and the CDCs face an uncertain future in the short-term due to funding issues 
for the NSP. There is no obvious "system in reserve" for them to fall back upon, 
including kinship, which, "as an organizational principle becomes less important ... as 
clients, allies, and slaves replace kinsmen in the administration of empire, both in its 
phase of expansion and in its dissolution" (Lindholm, 1986: 340). It is possible that the 
progressive decentralization of leadership that began when Hajji Rahman Kul fled the 
Pamirs in 1978 will accelerate and that a more acephalous political system will result, 
sufficient for maintaining domestic order but generally incapable of selecting a 
middleman by consensus who can represent their interests externally. What is more 
likely, though, is that, guided by their recent history and cognizant of the gains, however 
minor, they have made since 2001, Kyrgyz leaders-established and aspiring alike-will 
continue to look outside the Pamirs in an opportunistic yet fundamental quest for external 
resources that they can extract and redistribute to their followers, in an attempt to 
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accumulate political capital and establish some measure of legitimacy. And this, perhaps, 
is really the lesson that the Kyrgyz offer: how a small, marginal, remote highland 
community, living the most basic of material existences on the Roof of the World, can 
command such attention from the state and international NGOs, largely through the 
assiduous and unceasing efforts of their leaders. 
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